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This thesis attempts to specify an optimal monetary policy for a developing country
with partial dollarization. In particular, optimal monetary policy options are investigated
within the context of an estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model in order to examine the interaction of the monetary authority with the rest of the
economy.
The first chapter introduces the research questions, scope of the research, and a brief
illustration of dollarization in developing countries in general and Vietnam in particular.
Chapter 2 begins with the formulation of an open economy DSGE model with typical
features of a developing country, including partial dollarization and a chronic budget-
deficit fiscal rule. A parameterized version of the model is then simulated to investigate
the sensitivity and significance of various nominal and real frictions in the model. The
remainder of the chapter is devoted to an examination of the role of partial dollarization
feature in the model economy.
Chapter 3 estimates the theoretical model using a dataset from Vietnam - a developing
country in the Southeast Asia. This is the first estimated DSGE model for Vietnam, as
far as my supervisors and I are aware. In particular, the model is estimated with Bayesian
i
estimation method based on thirteen macroeconomic series with the presence of orthog-
onal structural shocks on both supply and demand side. The final section of this chapter
is devoted to a discussion of the relative importance of various shocks and frictions for
explaining the dynamics of the model economy and an evaluation of the model’s empirical
properties using standard validation techniques.
Estimation results are then integrated in the fourth chapter in order to specify an op-
timal monetary policy under the estimated model. The first section introduces Currie &
Levine (1993)’s method to optimal policy problem which uses standard control state-space
approach and Bellman’s principle of optimality. Following the derivation of the optimal
monetary policy problem with linear, forward-looking constraints and a quadratic objec-
tive, asymptotic losses are then presented for a Ramsey policy, a discretionary policy, and
an ex ante optimized simple Taylor-type rule. The last section of the chapter discusses
the dynamics of the model economy under optimal policy. Among the major findings was
the superiority of the optimal Ramsey policy over other policy options.
Chapter 5 concludes with some brief comments on the results of general interest, the
contributions of the research, and then proposes a potential agenda for future research.
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The role of monetary policy in the stabilization of the business cycle has been centre stage
in discussions between economists and policymakers over the past few decades. Monetary
policy design and implementation are also a crucial part of the economic agenda in almost
all countries. However, as we discuss below, there is a clear sense that the effectiveness
and transmission mechanism of monetary policy in developing countries are more or less
impaired by the presence of partial dollarization in the economy. Therefore, a large
literature has focused on the emergence of official and de facto dollarization in developing
countries, theoretical aspects of dollarization, and empirical evidence on the impact of
dollarization in the economy.
1.1 Question for the Thesis
Departing from the common interests in the literature, the present thesis pursues research
on the design and implementation of monetary policy in a developing country with partic-
ular reference to Vietnam, with an emphasis on the dollarization feature of the economy.
In this context, the research question here is how should the central bank formulate an
1
optimal monetary policy that aims at maximizing the social welfare?
In order to answer this question, an open-economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium (DSGE) model developed by Adolfson et al. (2005) is extended to incorporate
specific features of a developing country to further examine how partial dollarization
impacts the formulation and working of monetary policy in practice. Qualitative and
quantitative analyses are conducted using modern econometric methods and Bayesian
estimation techniques, given a macro dataset from Vietnam. As far as my supervisors
and I are aware, this is the first estimated DSGE model for Vietnam. Meaningful re-
sults obtained from the thesis should be useful for macro-economists and policymakers in
developing countries in general, and for Vietnam’s central bank in particular.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
Following the introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 sets out a New Keynesian model
for a small open economy with key blocks from standard DSGE models. A number of
nominal and real frictions are included in the model, including price/wage stickiness in
the tradition of Calvo (1983), variable capital utilization, capital adjustment costs, and
habit persistence. The model differs from classic models in the field in two features which
are less usual in standard DSGE models but more relevant to a developing country like
Vietnam: partial dollarization and a budget-deficit fiscal rule which has been in use since
the 1990s. Sensitivity analysis of the real/nominal frictions and dollarization feature is
then conducted in order to examine the role of each friction in the simulated model. Es-
pecially, impulse responses from different scenarios of dollarization are consistent with
predominant findings that dollarization hinders the effectiveness of monetary policy.
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In Chapter 3, Bayesian estimation methods, which are a type of hybrid approach
between informal calibration and Maximum Likelihood, are applied to estimate key pa-
rameters of the model. In particular, a dataset consisting of 13 observables on Vietnam’s
economy and the US output, inflation, and interest rate as world economy’s indicators has
been used in the estimation. Multivariate convergence of the estimated parameters has
been achieved and estimation outputs also show that the data provide useful information
to update the priors. Properties of the estimated model and a model fit analysis are also
investigated after estimation. In addition, by comparing log likelihoods and second mo-
ments of key variables with those of the data, the hypothesis of high dollarization scenario
is found to outperform baseline and low dollarization variants of the model.
Furthermore, optimal monetary policy options are then characterized and set up in
Chapter 4 in a standard control state-space approach, Bellman’s principle of optimality
as in Currie & Levine (1993). In particular, a Ramsey policy, a discretionary policy,
and an ex ante optimized simple Taylor-type rule are evaluated on the basis of related
asymptotic losses. The nature of dynamic responses of the macroeconomy under optimal
monetary policy is also discussed in detail. Results show that in an economy character-
ized by partial dollarization, the optimal Ramsey policy compares very well with other
policy options, while the ex ante optimized simple Taylor-type rule is almost as good as
the optimal discretionary policy.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes and summarizes important results of general interest and
key contributions of the present research. A potential agenda of further research is also
3
proposed at the end of the thesis.
1.3 Overview of Vietnam’s Economy
1.3.1 Doi Moi Process
After the war with the US ended in 1975, the whole country was formally reunified but,
as argued by Van Arkadie & Mallon (2004), the integration of two very different economic
systems presented a formidable challenge. North Vietnam had sought to implement a
Soviet approach to economic development in which the economy, mainly the allocation of
inputs and outputs, was centrally planned with prices fixed and regulated, and state enter-
prises were the main vehicle for state-led growth, while in the south, a market economy
was firmly established under the old regime where goods and services were freely dis-
tributed following the demand and supply of the market, and the private sector was the
main player in the economy. Nevertheless, a large socialist transformation program, which
according to Riedel & Comer (1997) meant public ownership of the means of production
under the form of state ownership of industry, collectivisation of agricultural and handi-
craft sectors, and a state monopoly on foreign trade, was tightly implemented throughout
the south. The commercial and industrial sectors were nationalised, while agriculture
was collectivised. Human capital also faced a serious loss due to the leaving of hundred
thousands of boat people to other countries. The motivation system and benefit division
of the new regime directly had adverse effects on the economy. Productivity promptly
fell, output in agricultural sectors went down, industry idled and commerce was immo-
bilised. Furthermore, the US aid to the south stopped in 1975 and was replaced by the
US sanctions, according to Dang (2009), and aid from Soviet bloc and China to the north
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was gradually cut down while the two countries were in tense political conflicts until 19781.
The socialist transformation program in the south, accompanied by the drive of the
“socialist relation of production” throughout the country, had a disappointing impact to
the economy, particularly in the agricultural sector. As Vietnam was characterised as an
agricultural economy where agriculture accounted for about half of GDP and nearly 80
percent of the population was rural, as pointed out by Irvin (1995), the decline in agricul-
tural output in this period had a serious impact on the living standard of the majority of
the people. As shown by Irvin (1995), per capita national output was estimated to have
fallen by 10 percent while inflation had risen to 140 percent in 1980. Public spending on
the war with China in 1979 put a heavy burden on a poor economy which had just got
out of another long war. In the absence of a coherent strategy, as argued Irvin (1995),
government policy was essentially of an ad hoc nature and, thus, the implementation of
two price-wage-currency reforms in 1982 and 1985 failed to meet the targets of control-
ling inflation and the scarcity of goods as they were all directed at the symptoms rather
than the economy’s fundamental problems. As a result of these unsuccessful reforms, the
consumer price level rocketed up by 774.7% in 1986, as shown in figure 1.1, in spite of
the state price controls, while the increase of wages lagged far behind, as argued by Tran
(1996). Until 1986, Vietnam experienced a sharp economic downturn in which, as pointed
out by Mallon (1999), the government’s revenues were small, the fiscal deficit was large
and persistent, while budget reserves were scarce owing to high military spending and
support provided to unprofitable state-owned enterprises. There was almost no foreign
investment, the technology gap between Vietnam and other countries in the region was
1According to Dang (2009), aid from China which averaged 300-400 million USD per annum in previous
periods was also stopped completely in 1977.
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becoming larger. These pressing challenges made the “Doi Moi” in 1986 unavoidable.
Doi Moi was formally approved by the Sixth Party Congress of the Vietnam Commu-
nist Party (VCP) in December 1986. Doi Moi comprised an agenda on policy reformation
in order to stabilise the economy, to restore, and to speed up economic growth. The
congress decided to eliminate the system of bureaucratic and centralised management
based on state subsidies, and to shift to a multi-sector, market-oriented economy with
a higher role for the private sector. Capital resources were directed to developing the
agriculture sector, expanding consumer goods production, and improving foreign trade as
well as foreign investment. Van Arkadie & Mallon (2004) argue that the policies approved
at the Sixth Party Congress represented a breakthrough from earlier policies and were the
conclusion of internal argument about the breakdown of the previous system to result in
tangible effects on the welfare of the Vietnamese people. Following this event, a specific
plan of Doi Moi was considered in a series of the VCP meetings, undoubtedly indicating
the demand to change from state control towards indicative planning and macroeconomic
policy levers.
Moreover, significant micro-level reforms implemented after 1986 brought about a
strong supply response that significantly developed the environment for an effective im-
plementation of macro level reforms that followed. In 1987, large-scale price reforms were
implemented with the formal price of non-essential consumer products being increased
to meet the market prices and the scope of controlling being considerably diminished.
Simultaneously, there was a significant devaluation of the Vietnamese official currency
(VND). The approval of the VCP Resolution No. 10, together with the enactment of the
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Land Law and Foreign Investment Law in 1988, presented a milestone of the reform and a
turning point in the economic development of the country. As argued by Tran (1998), this
brought about a bold institutional change to the agricultural sector and marked the end of
bureaucracy and the centrally planned targets mechanism in Vietnam. The abolition of an
old goods-based relationship between farmers and their cooperatives also led to a sustain-
able development of the economy in general and the agricultural sector in particular since
1988. As a result, the hyperinflation during 1986-88 was brought down to 34.7 percent
in 1989 and stabilised at the one-digit level from 1992 onward, as illustrated in figure 1.12.
Figure 1.1: Key Macroeconomic Indicators, 1986-1994
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam.
As argued by Irvin (1995), after experiencing a difficult period of reform and adjust-
2Figure 1.1 shows real GDP at constant 1985 prices in trillions of VND as there was no official market
exchange rate between VND/USD in this period.
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ment in the 1980s, Vietnam in the early 1990s enjoyed rapid, export-led growth which
averaged 7.6 percent a year (Griffin (2016)). Furthermore, the acceleration of international
economic integration in the first half of the 1990s also played a key role in expanding mar-
kets for exports, attracting foreign investors, and enhancing economic efficiency. The first
Vietnam’s western trading partner was the European Union (EU) after a bilateral trade
agreement was signed in 1992. In 1995, Vietnam normalised diplomatic relation with the
US and joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Having joined the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1998, Vietnam and the US finally con-
cluded the first ever bilateral trade agreement in 2000. This agreement came into effect
in 2001 and immediately generated significant impetus to the country’s export, invest-
ment, and economic growth. In addition, as an active member of ASEAN, Vietnam has
also been engaged in many Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between ASEAN and trading
partners such as ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (2002), ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (2003), and ASEAN-South Korea FTA (2005)3.
This open-door policy has provided sharper supply-side incentives to the economy,
creating a huge market access for Vietnamese entrepreneurs, significant “vent for surplus”
of cheap labour and agricultural products, and thus played a key role in the boom in
exports which is one of the key engines of economic growth in Vietnam. Van Arkadie
et al. (2010) argue that the key drivers of economic growth in Vietnam in this period also
include agricultural growth, export growth, and booming foreign investment. However,
the foundations of economic growth were mainly capital expansion and labour inputs but,
3In recent years, Vietnam has signed FTA on goods with India in 2010, Agreement on Comprehensive
Partnership with Japan in 2008, FTA with Chile in 2013, and most importantly Free Trade Agreement
and Investment Protection Agreement with the EU in 2019.
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as argued by Nguyen & Nguyen (2009), not accompanied by technological progress. While
capital expansion in Vietnam was attributed to foreign investment and remittances from
Vietnamese living abroad (“Viet-kieu”), the expansion of labour inputs was primarily due
to labour migration from rural to urban areas. In the second half of the 1990s, economic
growth slowed down and inflation remained subdued due to the impact of the Asian fi-
nancial crisis in 1997-98 as well as the increasingly unsustainable composition of growth.
However, as argued by Jenkins (2004), it is the increased global integration of Vietnamese
economy during the 1990s that helped the economy to weather the crisis rather well, and
economic growth continued to increase at an average of 7.6 percent per annum between
1990 and 2000.
Figure 1.2: Key Macroeconomic Indicators, 1995-2015
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam and the IMF.
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According to Vuong (2014), Vietnam’s economic growth averaged 7.5 percent in the
years leading to the global financial crisis. However, the rapid rate of growth in this
period succumbed to the “resource curse” problem as there appeared more evidence that
economic growth relied heavily on excess consumption, natural resource exports, and cap-
ital endowments, while innovation and productivity were not the main engines of growth4.
As shown in figure 1.4, natural resources-related products such as crude oil, coal, or rub-
ber represent a large share of the overall exports from Vietnam. Following the WTO
accession in early 2007, Vietnam experienced a surge in foreign direct investment and
domestic credit growth, as shown by Takeda & Ghura (2010), galloped to 53.9 percent
per annum. As a result, double-digit inflation recurred and reached 19.9 percent in 2008,
as depicted in figure 1.2, the highest level since the early 1990s. While monetary policy
tightening and fiscal austerity were being implemented to curb rising inflation, according
to Nguyen et al. (2011), the global crisis unfolded causing economic growth to fall from
over 8 percent in 2007 to 6.3 in 2008 and even down to 3.9 percent in the first half of
2009 as a consequence of a sharp fall in demand for export and capital inflows. Within
a short space of time, the economy experienced another sharp policy reversal when the
government launched a large fiscal stimulus package of 8 billion USD, while the monetary
authority at the same time pumped large amounts of credit into the economy in 2009 and
2010. Credit grew at 39.6 and 32.4 percent, respectively, as in Rodlauer & Salgado (2014),
and the VND was sharply devalued by 10.1% in 2011 (SBV (2011)). The government’s
efforts helped push GDP growth back to 6.78% but at the price of galloping inflation at
11.75 percent in 2010, and 18.13 percent in 2011 (SBV (2010), SBV (2011)). In a nutshell,
4According to Vuong (2014), Vietnam had a very high incremental capital to output ratio (ICOR) of
7-8 times compared to other Southeast Asian economies of 3-4. Investment to GDP ratio rose from an
average of 4.9 percent during 1996-2000 to 39.1 percent in 2001-05.
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the period from 2007-11 was the second vicious circle since the Doi Moi, given the impacts
of the global crisis, that propelled the economy toward another macroeconomic crisis, the
outcome of which was serious inflationary pressures and a heavy burden on budget and
trade deficits.
Figure 1.3: Trade Indicators, Foreign Direct Investment, and Private Transfer, 1995-2015
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam and the IMF.
Another milestone in Vietnam’s contemporary economic history was the issuance of
the government’s Resolution No. 11 in early 2011, a policy package which specifies a
wide range of monetary, fiscal, and structural reforms, aiming to restore macroeconomic
stability and cool down an overheated economy. This resolution helped address high lev-
els of inflation, tensions in the foreign exchange market, high nominal interest rates, and
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declining foreign exchange reserves. Its results proved that this policy remained one of
the most important macroeconomic policies in the government’s agenda in recent years.
In spite of structural challenges that create a headwind for growth5, figure 1.2 shows that
inflation was on a downward trend to 6.8, 6.0, and 1.8 percent in 2012, 2013, and 2014, re-
spectively. Vietnam’s economic growth gradually recovered and, as shown by SBV (2015),
reached 6.68 percent in 2015, the highest level since 2008, while inflation was 0.63 percent,
the lowest level in a 15-year period. The recovery of economic growth in this period was
mostly led by a strong FDI-driven export sector which is in turn underpinned by further
recovery in domestic demand, robust private consumption, and investment growth6.
5Such as SOE reforms, banking sector weaknesses, diminishing fiscal space, and SOE restructuring
costs etc.
6Exports increased at 12.6 percent and final consumption increased at 9.1 percent, the highest level
since 2008.
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Figure 1.4: Composition of Trade, 1995-2015
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam and the IMF.
1.3.2 Monetary and Fiscal Framework
Monetary Policy Framework. Since the Doi Moi, Vietnam has implemented sweeping
banking sector reforms, of which the liberalisation of the banking system was one of the
most important policies. Turning points include the transformation of the mono-banking
system into a two-tier system in 1990, allowing commercial banks to be in operation, the
restructuring of state-owned commercial banks, and the development of financial mar-
kets. As regulated by the Law on State Bank of Vietnam, the State Bank of Vietnam
(SBV), a government agency with the governor being a member of the cabinet, functions
as a typical central bank. However, it was not until the mid-1990s that SBV-controlled
deposit/lending interest rates were replaced by market-determined interest rates with the
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lifting of floors for deposit rates and ceilings on lending rates. Also, another thorny issue
facing monetary authority is the usual structural changes that could destabilise the link
between monetary policy and the real economy. The relatively underdeveloped mone-
tary market also limits the scope of standard open-market operations which, according to
Camen (2006), were not introduced until 2000, making it more difficult to fine tune mone-
tary policy. Other macroprudential policy tools, such as countercyclical capital buffers or
countercyclical liquidity requirements, which are seen as useful complement to standard
monetary policy in emerging economies in dealing with capital inflows and asset price
inflation pressures, have not been in effective operation in Vietnam.
As argued by Anwar & Nguyen (2018), one of the distinct features of Vietnam’s mone-
tary policy is the mechanism which distinguishes between the functions of SBV and those
related to national monetary policy. Decisions regarding the monetary policy plan are
principal functions of the government. A projection of the annual inflation rate is prepared
by the SBV and then discussed among the cabinet. This projection, once submitted to
the National Assembly for approval, will be the official annual inflation target, according
to SBV (2015). As pointed out by Anwar & Nguyen (2018), the SBV, an integral part
of the government, implements monetary policy through standard instruments such as
interest rate, reserve requirement ratio, and exchange rate7. In addition, as argued by
Camen (2006) and IFS (2017), although the SBV has two lending facilities, which are
7With regard to exchange rate policy, the SBV announces an official VND/USD exchange rate with
bands and manages the supply of foreign exchange to keep the interbank exchange rate within the bands.
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refinancing and discount rates8, its refinancing rate is mainly used as the policy rate.
Another notable feature of the Vietnamese economy is its high level of dollarization
since the Doi Moi which, according to Zamaróczy & Sa (2003), presents a pressing chal-
lenge for monetary policy makers to devise an optimal monetary policy. As argued by
Zamaróczy & Sa (2003), dollarization was neither sought nor encouraged by monetary
authorities but it came from a sudden and massive foreign currency inflows on the “supply
side” after the open-door policy, stemming mainly from sizable foreign direct investment,
private transfers, and export earnings, as shown in figure 1.3, and a lack of confidence
in the Vietnamese currency on the “demand side”. Figure 1.7 shows that dollarization in
Vietnam reached its highest level of 41.2% in 1991 and remained in the range from ap-
proximately 10-30% during the whole period of study. Despite the fact that dollarization
can send an important positive signal to foreign investors, signifying increased stability
and reduced risk, as argued by Menon (2008), it poses a serious threat to the formulation
and conduct of monetary policy in Vietnam.9
8According to Camen (2006), both are collateralised and the latter gives commercial banks access to
funds subject to quotas. The refinancing rate is the upper rate and the discount rate the lower one for
lending from the SBV, defining the band within which the rate for open market operations moves.
9A detailed discussion on dollarization is presented in the next section.
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Figure 1.5: Monetary Policy in Vietnam, 1995-2015
Source: National Assembly, General Statistics Office of Vietnam and the IMF.
As a country in transition, Vietnam experienced a bout of hyperinflation in the second
half of the 1980s and early 1990s, but major stabilisation efforts have brought inflation
under control, as shown in the previous section. Figure 1.5 shows key indicators of Viet-
nam’s monetary policy from 1995 to 2015. The dashed green curve and the pink curve
illustrate the annual growth rate of credit to the economy and the inflation target10, while
the blue bars, blue curve, dark yellow curve, and red curve show the inflation gap, broad
money growth, inflation rate, and policy rate, respectively. As shown in figure 1.5, the
10These annual inflation targets are extracted from the National Assembly’s annual resolutions on
socio-economic development plan during the period 1995-2015. They are set for the next 12 months.
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period after 1994 has been characterised by modest inflation, except a turbulence from
2007-11. A striking feature during this period, as argued by Camen (2006), is a lack of
a close relationship between inflation rates and the growth rates of money and credit to
the economy. While the average annual rates of money and credit growth were 26.1 and
25.4 percent, respectively, inflation averaged approximately 7 percent during the period
1995-2015. This disconnect between money growth and inflation, as Camen (2006) points
out, reflects a rapid rate of monetisation of assets in Vietnam in this period.11
However, figure 1.5 also shows that there seems to be a positive correlation between
the policy rate and inflation gap. The improved behaviour of inflation during the period
of study can be attributed to the SBV’s increased aggressiveness in responding to realised
inflation and, to some extent, to the amount of capacity in the economy, as shown in figure
1.2. While the policy rate followed a downward trend from 1995 to 2007 as the inflation
gap was mostly negative, it picked up during the 2008-11 turbulence with an average infla-
tion rate of 14.3 percent in this period, before dropping in recent years when the inflation
gap turned negative again and economic growth slackened considerably. As argued by
Hetzel (2000), Taylor’s original rule is deduced from two aspects of monetary policy in
which the central bank uses a short-term interest rate as its policy instrument and sets its
11The ratio of broad money to GDP, which is one of the main indicators of financial deepening and also
an inverse ratio of the velocity of money, has increased from about 20 percent in the mid-1990s to around
138 percent in 2015. Commercial banks have in many years been major owners of government’s bonds,
which was up to 80 percent in 2015, according to the Ministry of Finance. From 2012-14, while fiscal
deficits increased to 5.4, 6.6, and 6.3 percent, respectively, large shares of money growth were directed
toward financing fiscal deficits as the growth rates of credit to the economy were relatively smaller than
money growth rates in the same year (8.7 and 18.5 percent in 2012, 12.7 and 18.8 percent in 2013, and
13.8 and 17.7 percent in 2014.
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interest rate peg based on the observed behaviour of the economy. Any characterisation of
a “leaning against the wind” monetary policy in which the central bank raises its interest
rate peg when economic activity is strong and inflation undesirably high, and conversely,
poses the flavour of a Taylor rule. From this point of view, a simple Taylor-type rule could
be appropriate to describe the formulation and conduct of monetary policy by the central
bank in Vietnam in the relevant period. This argument is in line with Huynh et al. (2017)
where a “leaning against the wind”, or a Taylor rule, is shown to be applicable to stabilise
and improve Vietnamese economy performance.12
Fiscal Policy Framework. Fiscal policy in Vietnam before Doi Moi, as argued by
Nguyen (2017), was characterised by an expansionary setting and the state budget was
not only a pool of fund for the state sector but also the planned distributor for the whole
economy. The main internal budget sources were from state-owned enterprises’ revenues
which were required to be transferred entirely to the state budget13. However, as the
majority of state budget came from external funding from the Eastern Bloc, a sudden
drop in capital inflows in the end of the 1980s triggered a shock to the government’s fiscal
position. As a result, the government ran large budget deficits which were mostly financed
by printing money, while revenues from taxes and fees played a secondary role during this
12There is also a coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. The objective of monetary policy, as
stated by the State Bank of Vietnam (https://www.sbv.gov.vn/monetarypolicyobjectives), is to manage
monetary policy in a proactive and flexible manner in close association with the fiscal policy to control
inflation, stabilise macro-economy, support economic growth at a reasonable level, and ensure the liquidity
of credit institutions. The SBV (2011)’s annual report also states in page 19 that low investment growth,
which was largely public investment, “helped tighten monetary policy, decrease money supply, and control
credit growth at low level.”
13And their losses, if any, were also financed by the state budget.
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period.
From the beginning of the Doi Moi, Vietnam embarked on extensive fiscal reforms with
fiscal decentralisation being a fundamental cornerstone of the whole program, as argued
by Martinez-Vazquez (2004), in order to facilitate efficient allocation of resources and
to meet the needs of local population. According to Vu (2016), fiscal decentralisation in
Vietnam started in 198914 and accelerated with the promulgation of the first State Budget
Law in Vietnam’s history in 1996. Given the current administrative structure15, as argued
by Martinez-Vazquez (2004), Vietnam’s budget structure is highly hierarchical and fol-
lows a nested or Matruska doll model which was common in the former Soviet Union16. In
addition, according to WB (2015), the administrative agencies at local governments oper-
ate on the basis of a unique nested system of dual administrative subordination, meaning
that they are horizontally accountable to the corresponding People’s Council, but at the
same time vertically accountable to their functional line department at the immediate
higher level, and ultimately central line ministries. Therefore, the budget at each local
level has to be approved not only by the corresponding People’s Council, but also by the
upper level government, and will be submitted through a bottom-up process before all
sub-national budgets are consolidated into the state budget for approval by the National
Assembly.
Furthermore, at central level, a legacy of central planning has been the separation
of managerial responsibilities for recurrent and capital expenditures, as argued by Leung
14With Council of Ministers/Government’s Resolution No, 186.
15Vietnam’s territorial administrative structure is organized into four levels, including central govern-
ment, 63 provinces with 5 large cities being granted provincial status, districts, and communes.
16But now this mechanism is only present in China, Lao PDR, and Vietnam, as argued by WB (2015).
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(2010). The budget planning is managed according to a dual budgeting process in which
the Ministry of Finance leads the planning of the recurrent budget and the Ministry of
Planning and Investment is responsible for the preparation of the capital budget. While
local expenditure constitutes over half of total government spending, the hierarchical na-
ture of the budgeting process undermines local authorities’ policy autonomy over local
budgets as they are highly subject to changes and revision requests by higher levels of
government17, as pointed out by Morgan & Trinh (2017). This budgeting system induces
an asymmetry in fiscal relations between central and local authorities and even within
provinces, leading to what we considered to be inequitable outcomes in resource alloca-
tion across tiers of governments as well as a mismatch with spending responsibilities, as
argued by Martinez-Vazquez (2004). However, according to Nguyen & Anwar (2011),
despite these shortcomings, fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam has improved transparency
and brought the decision-making process closer to beneficiaries.
Therefore, in recent years, Vietnam has implemented various policies to reform the
fiscal framework, including a greater fiscal decentralisation throughout the country and
the modernisation of the tax system18. The government also reduced and eventually
stopped subsidising state-owned enterprises, and imposed a hard budget constraint on
state companies. As a result, Vietnam’s fiscal position has gradually been improved and
17There are three types of revenues: (i) 100 percent central; (ii) 100 percent local; and (iii) shared
revenue to close the gap between 100 percent local revenue and local spending needs. The horizon-
tal fiscal gap which remains after shared revenue are added to 100 percent local revenue are filled by
intergovernmental transfers.
18A series of tax laws were passed during this period, including laws on revenue tax, special consump-
tion tax, export-import tax, agricultural land-use tax, land-use-right transfer tax, natural resources tax,
income tax, house-land tax.
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an active fiscal policy mechanism has been put in operation through spending adjustments
as well as maintaining an efficient tax system. However, the most pressing challenge has
been budget deficits that Vietnam continued to run during the whole period and remained
unchanged in recent years. As argued by Le (2016), the key reason underlying Vietnam’s
chronic fiscal deficit position is the government’s ever-increasing recurrent expenditures,
which could account for roughly two thirds of the government’s annual spending and could
undermine Vietnam’s fiscal sustainability in the medium and long run.
Figure 1.6: Fiscal Policy in Vietnam, 1995-2015
Source: National Assembly, General Statistics Office of Vietnam and the IMF.
As a chronic budget-deficit running country, one of the most important indicators of
the government’s state budget proposal submitted to the National Assembly is an esti-
mate for the annual budget deficit, which will then be discussed and approved by the
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National Assembly as a deficit target. Figure 1.6 shows key indicators of Vietnam’s fiscal
policy during the period from 1995 to 2015. The dashed green curve depicts the annual
deficit targets19, while the blue bars, dashed pink curve, and red curve illustrate the deficit
gap, public debt, and government spending, respectively. As shown by the third subplot
of figure 1.6, public debt and government spending have been on increasingly divergent
paths since the late 1990s. Public debt continuously increased from around 20 percent
of GDP in late 1990s to 57.1 percent in 2015, while government spending outturns were
characterised by modest rates in the years from 1995-99, around 20 percent per annum,
before it picked up slightly during the period 2000-05 and remained stable at around 30
percent of GDP since 2006. In addition, the second subplot of figure 1.6 also shows a
tendency of negative correlation between the deficit gap and government spending, espe-
cially during the late 1990s and the period from 2006-15.
As a country in transition, capital investment for Vietnam by state-owned enterprises
and government’s recurrent expenditure on public wage bill remain a significant part of
annual government spending. However, one of the core challenges facing the Vietnamese
dual economy20, as argued by Perkins & Vu (2010), is the inefficiency of state-owned
enterprises’ public investments, which skyrocketed almost 60 percent in 2007, resulting
in persistently high budget deficit. Therefore, the government has implemented a public
investment restructuring programme in response to the increasing level of public debts
19These annual budget deficit targets are extracted from the National Assembly’s annual resolutions
on state budget estimate from 1995-2015. They are set for the next 12 months.
20As argued by Perkins & Vu (2010), while the private sector which performs far better a job in terms
of job creation and economic growth has been strangled, state-owned enterprises continued to receive a
great deal of credit in the economy and executed a lion’s share of public investments.
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and to meet the annual budget deficit target. In particular, as the deficit gap widened fol-
lowing the economic slump in 2007-11, as argued by Groom et al. (2018), the government
reduced capital spending in the years that followed, from 13.1 percent of GDP in 2009 to
7.8 percent in 2012, while non-wage recurrent spending was also cut down by 10 percent.
Furthermore, according to Takeyama (2018), when public debt outstanding increased to
63.3 percent in 2016, the government also made a bold decision to control the public debts
by stopping government guarantees to new state-owned enterprise’s borrowings, which by
the end of 2016 accounted for 20 percent of government guaranteed debts.
In addition, the government also actively responds to the deficit gap by rationalising
the public sector headcount as public wage bill is significantly higher than in other coun-
tries in the region, as argued by Rodlauer & Lane (2016). In Vietnam, the wage bill takes
a large share of the government’s recurrent expenditure, mounting up to approximately
20 percent of total budget spending, as argued by Dinh et al. (2017). In the period from
2014-17 when the deficit gap was in a surge, wages in the public sector were managed
to grow only by an average of 3 percent, reflecting the government’s effort in reining in
the public sector wage bill in order to reduce the deficit gap, while nominal wages in the
private sector grew rapidly at an average rate of 8.4 percent, according to Dinh et al.
(2017). Given these developments, a simple fiscal rule could be appropriate to capture
the behaviour of fiscal authority in response to the movements of deficit gap and public
debt during the relevant period.
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1.4 Dollarization: the Issue and the Literature
The fundamental roles of a domestic currency include a store of value, a means of pay-
ment/exchange, and a unit of account. Therefore, dollarization, as defined by Feige (2003),
is the process of substituting the United States dollar (USD) for a domestic currency to
fulfill these fundamental functions of the domestic currency. Viseth (2002) explains that
this is the phenomenon in which USD is used as a store of value, unit of account as prices
of goods being quoted in USD, and later as a means of payment in the economy. In prac-
tice, the term dollarization, as emphasized by Calvo & Gramont (1992), indicates that
USD serves as a unit of account or as a store of value, and not necessarily as a medium
of exchange. Thus, an economy in which USD serves only as unit of account and/or store
of value is dollarized, but may not be subject to “currency substitution”, another term
which has also been in widespread use in the literature to describe dollarization. In other
words, currency substitution is normally the last stage of the dollarization process. This
is in line with Feige (2003) who distinguishes currency substitution where USD is used
as a medium of exchange from asset substitution in which USD is just a store of value
and/or a unit of account. Feige (2003) shows that this phenomenon can be classified
as either de jure dollarization if the policy is officially adopted by the government or de
facto dollarization when agents voluntarily substitute USD for the domestic currency as
a means of payment and unit of account and/or hold USD-denominated assets as a store
of value.
This is a common characteristic of developing and transitional countries as these
economies usually have to face with prolonged periods of high and variable inflation and
expectation of high exchange rate depreciation, as argued by Ra (2008). In general, the
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level of dollarization in an economy can be measured by either foreign currency deposits
(FCD) as a proportion of the overall monetary supply21 or the amount of foreign currency
in circulation (FCC). However, in developing/transitional economies, measuring FCC is
empirically impossible because of the significant operation of the unofficial sector in the
economy. The ratio of FCD over broad money (M2) as in Viseth (2002), or the propor-
tion of M2 denominated in USD as in Calvo & Gramont (1992), is thus the most common
proxy for the dollarization status of a country.
As shown by Ra (2008), dollarization22 has been one of the thorniest issues in Latin
America such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay, especially in the
1980s. From the early 1990s, dollarization has come out of the region to become a typical
feature in transitional economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Viet-
nam, a transitional economy in Indochina, is not an exception. Dollarization in Vietnam
can be traced back as far as the 1960s when the US officially participated in the Vietnam
war and as a result, the USD was in wide use and circulation in the South in parallel with
the South Vietnamese government’s currency, while all foreign currencies were completely
forbidden in Northern Vietnam. After the reunification of the country in 1975, however,
holding of foreign currency was then ruled out in the whole country. It was not until
the late 1980s that dollarization has come back as a nationwide phenomenon following
the government’s effort to curb hyperinflation during 1986-88. This bout of hyperinfla-
tion, which peaked 350% in 1988, was fuelled by a mistaken policy package called “Price
- Salary - Currency”23 and the corresponding dramatic depreciation of the exchange rate24.
21Total liquidity, M2.
22A similar phenomenon is euroization.
23“Gia - Luong - Tien” in Vietnamese.
24Goujon (2006) shows that the depreciation is 20,000%, from 15 VND/USD at the end of 1985 to 3000
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Dollarization in Vietnam in the early years of the open-door policy came from the “sup-
ply side” in the form of massive foreign currency inflows stemming mainly from sizable
foreign direct investment, private transfers, and export earnings, as argued by Zamaróczy
& Sa (2003). In addition, given a lack of confidence in the Vietnamese currency on the “de-
mand side” and an inappropriate conduct of monetary policy, these large foreign currency
inflows provided the impetus for speedy dollarization in the following years. In partic-
ular, the milestone in the dollarization process was in 1989 when bold reform policies
were implemented with the removal of price controls, the unification of the exchange rate
regimes, and especially the introduction of foreign currency deposits. At the same time,
interest rate on domestic currency-denominated deposits was raised accordingly which
helped bring about a spectacular decline in inflation, back to 35% in 1989. It is this
open-door policy for USD deposits and the loss of public confidence in the local currency
that marked the beginning of a period of serious dollarization in Vietnam.
However, as argued by Goujon (2006), a rapid money creation in the next three years
(1989-91) under weak domestic credit control resulted in another surge of inflation25,
a further 367% depreciation of the domestic currency against the USD, and notably a
widespread dollarization in the economy. The following years witnessed a short period of
dollarization reversion together with a moderate average inflation rate of about 10% as a
result of, as pointed out by Guillaumont Jeanneney (1994), a large USD sales in the foreign
exchange market in 1992 which led to a 25% appreciation of the domestic currency, better
control of monetary expansion, and the official policy of pegging the domestic currency to
VND/USD at the end of 1988.
2567% in 1990 and 72% in 1991.
26
the USD. Figure 1.7 shows a general picture of dollarization in Vietnam since the Doi Moi
in the 1980s. The blue line depicts the ratio between foreign currency deposits (FCD)
and the overall money supply (M2) as a proxy for dollarization status in Vietnam, while
the red line shows the ratio of FCD over total deposits. The green line indicates annual
inflation rates in the same period. The level of dollarization basically reached its peak of
41.2% in 1991, and remained in the range from 10-30% during the whole period except
another comeback at 31.7% in 2001.
Figure 1.7: Dollarization in Vietnam
Source: International Monetary Fund and Fulbright Economics Teaching Program.
While figures on FCD tell us an official picture of dollarization in Vietnam over the
past three decades, the use of foreign currencies in reality, mostly USD, has become more
and more substantial in the economy over the same period as a medium of exchange and
unit of account throughout the country. Pham (2018) shows that in Vietnam, the USD
has been used in quotation for most durable goods such as automobiles, motorbikes, ra-
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dios, televisions, laptops, and real estate. Services in many cases are also quoted in USD,
including hotel rooms, spa services, and tuition fees at some universities.
In theory, dollarization can help prevent currency and balance of payments crises, and
reduce the costs of further integration into the world economy. In addition, dollarization
can be employed in some countries as a means to restrain inflation and promote the roles
of domestic financial institutions in stimulating domestic as well as foreign investment.
On the other hand, however, dollarization in developing countries, to some extent, causes
macroeconomic instabilities and deprives the central bank of its lender of last resort func-
tion, as pointed out by Hauskrecht & Hai (2004). In other words, the central bank’s role
as a money controller weakens, posing more systemic risks to the financial system.
Dollarization in developing and transitional economies has attracted a number of re-
searchers in the field. Two main groups of research questions include, first, what are the
determinants of dollarization or the use of the USD in a country? And second, what are
the differences in key economic/monetary policy performance26 between a non-dollarized
and a dollarized economy? A majority of studies on dollarization pay attention to the
reasons why a country has to take to the use of USD in place of domestic currency.
Most of them agree that dollarization is usually one of the ultimate consequences of high
inflation, as in Calvo & Gramont (1992), Civcir (2005), and Hauskrecht & Hai (2004).
Another key determinant, as shown by Vega et al. (2012) and Basso et al. (2007), is the
interest rate differentials between USD and the domestic currency. The trade-off between
inflation and the real exchange rate variability is also found by Basso et al. (2007) to be
26Key variables in consideration include inflation, growth, exchange rate/interest rate pass-through,
determinants of inflation.
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a significant factor explaining dollarization. Other important determinants, as shown by
Civcir (2005) and Terrones & Catão (2000), include relative rates of return of domestic
and foreign currency denominated assets, expected change in the exchange rate, structural
factors related to costly banking, credit market imperfections, the availability of tradable
collateral, and the credibility of current economic policies.
On the consequence of dollarization, Vega (2012) shows that in an economy charac-
terized by partial dollarization, the wedge between foreign and domestic currency lending
rates is decreasing while the degree of correlation between negative returns and the ex-
change rate is increasing in periods of exchange rate volatility. As argued by Calvo &
Gramont (1992), dollarization aggravates the initial recession in a money-based stabi-
lization and makes the initial boom more pronounced in an exchange rate-based stabi-
lization. Furthermore, dollarization is likely to increase financial instability in dollarized
economies, as found by De Nicoló et al. (2003), and also depresses bank performance
as well as lowers bank profitability, as in Kutan et al. (2012). Edwards (2001) uses a
panel from 1970-98 to compare the economic performance of 11 dollarized economies with
non-dollarized counterparts in Latin America. He finds that, except for experiencing sig-
nificantly lower inflation, dollarizers have not had a more successful fiscal performance
than non-dollarizers, nor been spared major current account reversals, and their growth
rates have also been lower. Similar results are found by Edwards & Magendzo (2003)
where dollarized countries have had lower rates of inflation but, at the same time, statis-
tically lower rates of GDP per capita growth. In addition, exchange rate pass-through to
prices in highly dollarized countries is significantly larger and more persistent, reinforcing
the claim that “fear of floating” is a greater problem for highly dollarized economies, as
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argued by Reinhart et al. (2003).
Also, Alvarez-Plata & Garcia-Herrero (2008) show that dollarization can actually in-
crease the pass-through of the exchange rate to prices and require larger monetary ag-
gregates, including foreign currency, to be monitored. It leads to large currency mis-
matches due to the immediate impact of exchange rate depreciation on foreign currency-
denominated liabilities. Watanabe (2007) argues that higher dollarization deters financial
development through two channels. The first one is a standard self-insurance mechanism
that weakens the incentives of commercial banks to screen and monitor private borrowers.
The second one is an informal remittance channel that keeps dollarization higher. Bellocq
& Silve (2008) also warns that in this case, the capacity of the central bank to regulate
the foreign currency liquidity risk and stabilise the financial system is very limited.
In line with other developing countries, inflation and international reserves are found
to be the first and foremost determinants of dollarization in Vietnam, as in Anh (2018),
Hauskrecht et al. (2004), and Nguyen & Pfau (2010). However, as Vietnam is a country
in transition from a centrally planned toward a market economy, dollarization has also
been associated with some specific causes. Hauskrecht & Hai (2004) show that the lim-
ited ability to borrow domestically and abroad in domestic currency has been causal for
the dollarization of the Vietnamese economy. Pham (2018), by employing a VAR model,
argues that parallel market premium is the key determinant of dollarization in Vietnam,
in addition to the ceiling interest rate for USD deposit and interest rate differentials in
the economy. The rate of domestic currency depreciation is also found to be significant
in the shift toward USD with 3-4 month lag, as in Vuong (2003).
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In a nutshell, while a large literature has focused on the determinants of dollariza-
tion in developing countries and its impact on the performance of key macroeconomic
variables, little has paid attention to empirical assessment of the design and transmission
mechanism of monetary policy in dollarized economies. This study not only adds empiri-
cally significant evidence on the optimal conduct of monetary policy, but also contributes
to providing a detailed analysis on the dynamics of the economy under optimal policy
framework with particular reference to Vietnam.
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Chapter 2
A DSGE Model for Developing
Countries
In this chapter, a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model for an open, developing economy is set up with key blocks from
standard DSGE models. A number of nominal and real frictions, in-
cluding sticky prices, sticky wages, variable capital utilization, cap-
ital adjustment costs and habit persistence, are also included in the
model. Workers, importers and domestic intermediate good produc-
ers are monopolistic competitors, facing wage and price sluggishness
à la Calvo (1983). It should be noted that partial dollarization, a
common characteristic in developing world, is a key feature of the
present model. The theoretical model is also simulated to analyse
the role of each friction and dollarization feature in driving the de-
velopment of the model economy.
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2.1 Introduction
Christiano et al. (2018) argue that the outcome of any important macroeconomic policy
change is the net effect of forces operating on different parts of the economy. A central
challenge, therefore, is how to evaluate the relative strength of those forces and Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, among a range of tools, are the leading
tool for such exercises in an open and transparent manner. Since the seminal paper pub-
lished in 1982 by Kydland & Prescott (1982) in which, as shown by Fernández-Villaverde
(2010), for the first time macroeconomists could build a small and coherent dynamic
model of the economy with optimizing agents, rational expectations, and market clear-
ing, New Keynesian DSGE models have become the standard workhorse for quantitative
analysis of policies as they can help evaluate the desirability of different policy strategies
and of institutional development.
A large literature has been devoted to elaborating the significant role of economic
policy in minimizing welfare distortions caused by imperfections and rigidities, which are
the crucial distinction of the Keynesian perspective that real economies are not perfectly
flexible nor perfectly competitive. As shown by Tovar (2009), DSGE models can help to
identify sources of fluctuations, answer questions about the impact of structural changes,
forecast and predict the effect of policy changes, elucidate the sources of macroeconomic
fluctuations, and perform counterfactual experiments. However, benchmark DSGE mod-
els have paid little attention to specific features of developing countries which, as a conse-
quence, may fail to explain important regularities of the business cycle in developing world.
In developing key building blocks of a DSGE model for developing countries, we have
33
borrowed important insights from Christiano et al. (2005), Adolfson et al. (2005), Adolf-
son et al. (2007), Altig et al. (2011), and Erceg et al. (2000). Particularly, price-maker
feature of firms, which is a prerequisite for price stickiness and is opposed to price-taker
property in a perfectly competitive world, can be achieved in a tractable way by the
monopolistic competition approach of Dixit & Stiglitz (1977). Nominal price inertia also
requires some form of staggered prices and the Calvo (1983) formulation is used as it has
become standard because of its advantage in aggregation. A similar persistence mecha-
nism on wage setting suggested by Erceg et al. (2000) is also used for the formulation of
the present model. Additional frictions which have been proposed in recent years to im-
prove the theoretical and empirical adequacy of DSGE models such as habit formation in
consumption preferences, adjustment costs in investment, and variable capital utilization
by Christiano et al. (2005) are also explicitly incorporated in the model.
Therefore, the demand side of the model is composed of households consuming a basket
of domestically produced goods and imported goods supplied by domestic and importing
firms. Households can save in domestic bonds, foreign bonds and hold cash and their
choice can be balanced into an arbitrage condition1. In the domestic market, they can
also rent capital to domestic firms subject to a capital investment adjustment cost. In
addition, households are monopoly suppliers of their differentiated labour services so they
can set their own wage, leading to an explicit wage equation. On the supply side, there
are firms in the domestic and external sectors. Intermediate good firms produce differen-
tiated goods and index their prices with Calvo-type setting, given their capital and labour
inputs. Following Adolfson et al. (2005), we include in the model a stochastic unit-root
1The uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition.
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technology shock which can induce a common stochastic trend in aggregate quantities so
as to render stationarity of all model variables.
However, we depart from Adolfson et al. (2005), Christiano et al. (2005), and Altig
et al. (2011) by incorporating characteristics typical of a developing economy. In Vietnam
as well as in many other developing countries, there is an “original sin” that governments
have to take to official borrowing in foreign currency, mostly USD, because of domestic
fiscal strains. This problem is acute and particularly so when oil prices are high. Fis-
cal strains and reputational concerns create the need for fiscal rule. In addition, fiscal
strains also create suspicion that the authorities might turn to the printing press, in emer-
gencies, strengthening firms’ and households’ demand for assets in foreign currency as a
hedge, leading to partial dollarization. Therefore, the present model will first feature, as
in Vietnam, a chronic budget-deficit fiscal rule where fiscal authority pursues an explicit
target for the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio. Second, partial dollarization is also explicitly
included in the model. Recent literature has identified two forms of partial dollariza-
tion which are currency substitution and asset substitution. In a currency substitution
regime, the domestic currency is partially replaced by a foreign currency in its function
as a medium of payment, while with asset substitution, the domestic currency is partially
substituted by USD as unit of account/store of value. We introduce asset substitution
to the model economy by exogenously assuming that a subset of domestic firms set their
prices in USD. Thus in this case, the domestic Phillips curve will be a weighted combi-
nation of the Phillips curves for firms setting their prices in domestic currency and those
setting their prices in USD.
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This chapter is organized as follows. We present the theoretical DSGE model with
particular emphasis on developing economy aspects in Section 2. In Section 3, the theo-
retical model is parameterized and the conditions for determinacy is examined. Section
4 simulates the model so as to facilitate the sensitivity analysis of frictions as well as
dollarization feature set up in the theoretical model. A summary of the chapter is given
in Section 5.
2.2 The DSGE Model for Developing Countries
2.2.1 Households
The households in the economy enjoy utility from consumption while receiving disutility
from working. They are also suppliers of labour in the economy. Households rent capital
to the domestic firms and decide how much to invest in the capital stock given certain
capital adjustment costs. These are costs to adjusting the investment rate as well as costs
of varying the utilization rate of the capital stock. Each household is a monopoly supplier
of a differentiated labour service which implies that they can set their own wage.
First, following Adolfson et al. (2007), a permanent technology shock εzt is explicitly
specified in the model in order to render stationarity in all model variables. The growth






where µzt = εzt/εzt−1 and εzt is the innovation.
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Second, the model economy is comprised of a continuum of households indexed by j ∈
(0, 1). Following Christiano et al. (2005), the households are assumed to obtain utility from
consumption, leisure and cash balances and thus have to choose between their current level
of consumption, amount of cash holdings, foreign bond holdings, and domestic deposits in
order to maximize their intertemporal utility. In addition, the households need to make
decisions on the level of capital services provided to the firms, level of investment and






u(Cj,t − bCj,t−1)− f 1(hj,t) + f 2(qj,t)
]
(2.2)
with the corresponding functional forms for utility, labour, and cash holdings as follows
u(.) = ln(.); f 1(.) = Λh
(.)1+σh
1 + σh




In addition, following Adolfson et al. (2007), consumption preference shocks εct , labour
supply εht , and money demand shock ε
q
t assumed to follow AR(1) processes are also in-
















where utility of the jth household depends positively on consumption Cj,t, which is also
relative to an internal habit persistence included through parameter b, and qj,t - the house-
hold’s real assets in non-interest bearing form/cash holdings in domestic currency after
being rendered stationary2 with the trend level of technology εzt . It also depends nega-
tively on the household’s labour supply hj,t. Parameters σh and σq show the labour supply
and cash holding elasticities. Λh and Λq are constants in the labour disutility function
and cash holding utility function.
2qj,t = Qj,t/Ptε
z
t , where Qj,t are nominal assets, Qj,t/Pt are real assets.
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Third, following Arrow et al. (1961), which proposed the CES function, and Dixit &
Stiglitz (1977) who proposed the variety of models of consumer behaviour, the aggregate
consumption of households is assumed to be given by a Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) index of a continuum of differentiated goods, produced, respectively, domestically
and from abroad as follows:
Ct =
[
(1− ωc)1/ηc(Cdt )(ηc−1)/ηc + ω1/ηcc (Cmt )(ηc−1)/ηc
]ηc/(ηc−1) (2.5)
where Cdt and Cmt are domestic and imported consumption; ωc and ηc are the share of
imports in consumption and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported
consumption goods, respectively.













Fourth, the households’ capital services Kt can be increased by their investing an
amount of It in the additional physical capital K̄t, taking one period to come into action,
or by directly raising the utilization rate of the physical3 capital stock at hand (Kt = utK̄t)
where ut is the utilization rate4 that, according to Christiano et al. (2005), satisfies u = 1
3Physical capital implies all factors of production (or input into the process of production), such as
machinery, buildings, or computers etc. Thus, capital services are the factors of production in operation
which define the capital utilization rate ut.
4Christiano et al. (2005) point out three measures of capital utilization: first, the intensity with which
all factors of production are used in the industrial production sector; second, time series on electricity
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at steady state5 and the capital utilization cost function f(ut) at steady state is zero6.
Total investment is also assumed to follow a CES function of the form
It =
[








where Idt and Imt are purchases of domestic and imported investment goods, respectively;
ωi is the share of imports in investment; ηi is the elasticity of substitution between in-
vestment goods.













Following Altig et al. (2011), the technology that transforms current and past invest-
ment into physical capital is specified by the equation
f 3(It, It−1) = [1− f 4(It/It−1)]It (2.11)
where function f 4 is assumed to be increasing, convex and satisfies f 4(1) = f 4′(1) = 0,
f 4′′(1) > 0 at steady state. We define ζ ≡ f 4′′(1) as the investment adjustment cost
consumption in the industrial production (assuming capital services and electricity are used in fixed
proportions); and third, the workweek of capital as measured by average hours worked.
5All capital in operation.
6f(1) = 0 or no cost for capital utilization at steady state. The fraction 1/σa, as argued by Altig et al.





Therefore, the law of motion for the households physical capital stock is given by
K̄t+1 = (1− δ)K̄t + εitf 3(It, It−1) + ϑt (2.12)
where εit is a stationary investment-specific technology shock7; and ϑt is the capital-
market-access variable reflecting the accessibility to a market where households can pur-
chase new physical capital K̄t+1. As argued by Adolfson et al. (2007), as all households
are identical, the model is in equilibrium only if ϑt = 0.
Fifth, in addition to accumulating physical capital and holding cash, following Adolf-
son et al. (2005), the households can save in domestic and foreign bonds with a risk-
premium on foreign bond holdings defined as f 5(at, ϕt), where the real aggregate net
foreign asset position of the domestic economy after being scaled with the trend level of







Following Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2001) and Adolfson et al. (2005), a risk-premium
on foreign bond holdings is also assumed to be strictly decreasing in net foreign asset
7Greenwood et al. (1992) introduced an investment-specific technology shock to describe the tech-
nological change that is specific to or embodied in new capital goods to distinguish with the “newtral”
(disembodies) technology shock, proposed by neoclassical growth models as in Solow (1957), Kydland &
Prescott (1982), and Long Jr & Plosser (1983), that allows all goods to be produced more efficiently.
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position, to satisfy f 5(0, 0) = 1, and is given by the functional form of8
f 5(at, ϕt) = exp(−Λa(at − ā) + ϕt) (2.14)
where ϕt is a time-varying shock to the risk premium; Λa is a constant9. This implies
that domestic households have to pay a premium over the exogenous foreign interest rate
R∗t if the domestic economy as a whole is a net borrower (B∗t < 0), and receive a lower
remuneration on their savings if the domestic economy is a net lender (B∗t > 0).





t Cj,t(1 + τ
c
t ) + P
i
t Ij,t + Pt[f(uj,t)K̄j,t + P
k
t ϑt] (2.15)






+(1− τ kt )Rkt uj,tK̄j,t +R∗t−1f 5(at−1, ϕt−1)StB∗j,t +Dj,t
−τ kt
[
(Rt−1 − 1)(Mj,t −Qj,t) + (R∗t−1f 5(at−1, ϕt−1)− 1)StB∗j,t +B∗j,t(St − St−1)
]
The left-hand-side of the equation shows how the households use their resources. Mj,t+1
denotes total assets including both interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing assets while
StB
∗
j,t+1 is foreign bond holdings. These stock variables are calculated at end-of-period
8According to Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2001), the size of the risk premium is assumed to be increasing
in the country’s stock of foreign debt. Thus, the “No Ponzi Game” condition in which the households are
solvent if the present value of their long-run liability is non-positive can be satisfied.
9It is assumed that Λa, ā ≥ 0. According to Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2001), the introduction of the
risk-premium on foreign bond holdings is also for a technical issue because, as is well known, small open
economies facing a purely exogenous world interest rate display nonstationary dynamics in response to
stationary exogenous shocks. As a result, the solution to the log-linearized equilibrium conditions may
not be a valid approximation to the exact, nonlinear equilibrium system. Thus, the introduction of a
variable risk-premium on foreign bond holdings can eliminate any source of nonstationarity.
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so value at time t should be indexed t + 1. P ct Cj,t(1 + τ ct ), P it Ij,t, and Ptf(uj,t)K̄j,t are
the households’ consumption, nominal resources spent on investment goods, and capi-
tal adjustment costs with the utilization cost function f(ut), respectively, where τ ct is a
consumption tax. As physical capital stock is owned by the households, they have to
pay capital adjustment costs10. The cost for capital market access paid by households is
PtP
k
t ϑt where P kt is the price of capital.
On the right-hand-side of the equation, the resources households have at their dis-
posal include Qj,t, Πt, and Dj,t which are non-interest bearing assets, profits, and net
cash income (from holding cash) from participating in state contingent securities at
time t, respectively. In addition, the households’ current assets can also be financed
by income on interest-bearing assets from previous period Rt−1(Mj,t − Qj,t), in which
(Mj,t − Qj,t) is nominal domestic assets that are not held in cash11, and Rt = 1 + rt
is the gross interest rate; labour income (1 − τ yt )
Wj,t
1+τwt
hj,t where τwt and τ
y
t are pay-roll
tax and labour-income tax; income from physical capital stock (1 − τ kt )Rkt uj,tK̄j,t, with
capital-income tax τ kt and gross nominal rental rate per unit of capital services Rkt ; and
income from foreign bond holding from previous period R∗t−1f 5(at−1, ϕt−1)StB∗j,t, where
R∗t−1f
5(at−1, ϕt−1) is the risk-adjusted pre-tax gross interest rate from holding foreign
bond. However, households also have to pay capital-income taxes for the profits they gain
from interest-bearing assets τ kt (Rt−1− 1)(Mj,t−Qj,t), foreign bond holding from previous
period τ kt (R∗t−1f 5(at−1, ϕt−1)− 1)StB∗j,t, and what they get from exchange rate differences
10f(ut)Pt in the budget constraint.
11The households’ nominal domestic assets not held in cash earn the interest rate of Rt−1 as we can
think of an asset paying out a nominal amount with certainty, or as argued by Adolfson et al. (2005),





Finally, following Erceg et al. (2000), Adolfson et al. (2005), and Christiano et al.
(2005), we assume that each household is a monopoly supplier of a differentiated labour
service. The wage is then determined by the households, given a stickiness that is intro-
duced à la Calvo (1983).
Each household sells its labour, hj,t, to an aggregator which transforms household
labour into a homogeneous input goodHt using the production function of Dixit & Stiglitz








where the wage markup λw ≥ 1.
In any period t, there is a probability of 1− ξw that a household j can renegotiate its
wage contract to have a new wage rate W̃t. However, in the case when it is not allowed to
renegotiate, following Adolfson et al. (2005), household j automatically indexes its wage
to last period’s CPI inflation, current inflation target, and current permanent technology






where κw is the indexation parameter; πct is the CPI inflation rate in the previous period;
π̄t+1 is the current inflation target.
If household j is not allowed to change its wage during s periods ahead, the index for
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Therefore, in any period t, the jth household that is able to reset its contract wage

























taking into account the possibility ξw that the wage will not be reoptimized in the future
and the marginal disutility of labour.
However, following Smets & Wouters (2003) and Adolfson et al. (2005), we need to
use employment instead of aggregate hours worked due to the lack of these data for the
sample country in order to perform Bayesian estimation. In addition, as they also point
out, employment is in general likely to be stickier than total hours worked in response to
macroeconomic shocks. Thus, we assume that only a constant fraction 1− ξe of the firms
is assumed to be able to adjust the level of employment to their desired amount of total
labour input Ψ̃i,t. The rest of the firms ξe have to maintain the level of employment as
in the previous period. The difference will be taken up by unobserved hours worked per
employee because, following Adolfson et al. (2005), each employee is assumed to supply
his labour inelastically after having set his wage. Or as argued by Smets & Wouters
(2003), as hours worked is assumed to be perfectly flexible, the overall labour input will
not be affected by the rigidity in employment.
44






where li is hours per worker in firm i, Hi,t+s is hours worked.
2.2.2 Firms
The model consists of two main categories of firms. There are intermediate good and final
good firms, operating in two sectors of an open economy. In the domestic sector, inter-
mediate firms produce differentiated goods, using capital services and labour inputs only,
and set their prices according to an indexation variant of the Calvo (1983)’s model, while
final good firms use a continuum of these intermediate goods to produce a homogeneous
final good which can be used for consumption and investment by the households.
In the external sector, each of the intermediate importing firms buys a homogeneous
good at price P ∗t in the world market and converts it into a differentiated import good,
either for consumption or investment, through a brand naming technology before selling
it to final imported-consumption firm or final imported-investment firm. Also, each of
the exporting firms buys the domestic final good at price Pt and differentiates it by brand
naming to sell to foreign households. Thus, each of them is a monopolistic supplier of a




Following Erceg et al. (2000), it is convenient to abstract from the household’s prob-
lem of choosing the optimal quantity of each differentiated good Yi,t as households are
assumed to have identical preferences. At time t, final good firms combine and transform
a continuum of intermediate goods, indexed by i ∈ (0, 1) into a homogeneous final good,
which can be used for consumption and investment by the households12. The final good
sector is perfectly competitive.
The output is assembled by a representative final good firm using a technology of the









in which Yi,t denotes time t input of intermediate good i and λdt ≥ 1 is the time-varying
markup of firm i in the domestic market.
In a perfectly competitive market, the final good firm is a price taker and thus output
price Pt as well as input prices Pi,t are taken as given. The final good firm sells units of










where, as argued by Erceg et al. (2000), Pt can be interpreted as the aggregate price index.
The final good firm’s demand for each good Yi,t, or also as argued by Erceg et al.
12Also according to Erceg et al. (2000), the final good firm combines intermediate goods in the same
proportions as the households would choose. Thus, the final good firm’s demand for each differentiated
good is equal to the sum of household demand.
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The domestic market is also composed of a continuum of intermediate goods firms.
These firms operate in a monopolistic competitive market and thus each of them is a
monopolist in producing its own good and competitive in the markets for inputs.
Following Christiano et al. (2005) and Adolfson et al. (2005), an intermediate good








i,t − εztφ (2.24)
where 0 < α < 1 and a fixed cost of production φ is included and set to make sure that
profits are zero in steady state. Hi,t and Ki,t are homogeneous labour and capital ser-
vices13 used by the ith firm in its production, respectively. The function also includes the
permanent technology shock εzt and a domestic covariance stationary technology shock εt.
As workers must be paid in advance of production, a fraction νt of the intermediate
firms is assumed to have to borrow to pay their wage bills at a gross nominal interest
rate Rwt . Thus, the end-of-period labour costs of the firm are WtRwt Hi,t, where Wt is the
nominal wage rate per unit of aggregate and homogeneous labour Hi,t and Rwt is given by
an index of the economy-wide gross nominal interest rate Rt−1 as follows
Rwt = νtRt−1 + 1− νt (2.25)
13Which can be different from physical capital stock as there is also variable capital utilization in the
model.
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The capital costs of firm i are RktKi,t where Ki,t is the capital services stock and Rkt ,
as defined above, is the gross nominal rental rate per unit of capital services. Given the
assumption that price for intermediate good i, Pi,t, is given, the firm is then constrained
to produce Yi,t and thus the cost minimization problem faced by the i-th intermediate









Yi,t − (εzt )1−αεtKαi,tH1−αi,t + εztφ
]
(2.26)
Each of the intermediate good firm is subject to price stickiness through an indexation
variant of Calvo (1983). In any period, the probability that a given price can be reopti-
mized at a new price, denoted by P̃t, is constant and equal to 1− ξd.
For the remaining firms with probability ξd of being not allowed to reoptimize, follow-
ing Adolfson et al. (2005), their price is then indexed to last period’s inflation πt−1 and





where κd is a parameter for partial indexation. From equation 2.22, the aggregate price

















14The Lagrangian λtPi,t can be taken as the nominal marginal cost of firm i, MCi,t and λt is the real
marginal cost.
15All firms that can reoptimize will always set the same price P̃t and those that are not allowed
to reoptimize set the same price ˜̃Pt. While aggregate price Pt is an index of prices of optimized and
non-optimized firms, prices for consumption and investment (P ct and P it ) are indices of domestic con-





If a firm is not allowed to change its price during s periods ahead, or in other words,
the optimized price today will remain the same in the next s periods, then the price in




Thus, firm i has to solve the following optimization problem, taking into account that












Yi,t+s −MCi,t+s(Yi,t+s + εzt+sφ)
}
(2.30)
This problem shows that the price set at time t by firm i is a function of expected
future marginal costs and the firm also uses the stochastic discount factor (βξd)snt+s to
make profits conditional upon utility, in which β denotes the constant discount factor
while nt+s is the marginal utility of the households’ nominal income in period t + s that
is exogenous to the intermediate firm.
External Sector
Final Importing Firms
The final homogeneous imported-consumption good or final homogeneous imported-
investment good is produced by final imported-consumption firms or final imported-
investment firms by combining and transforming a continuum of differentiated imported
consumption/investment goods. The relationships between the demands for final homo-
geneous imported-consumption good and final homogeneous imported-investment good





















where λm,ct and λ
m,i
t are time varying markups on the imported consumption/investment
good.
Intermediate Importing Firms
Each of a continuum of intermediate importing firms imports a homogeneous good
at price P ∗t in the world market and converts it into a differentiated good, either a con-
sumption good Cmi,t or an investment good Imi,t, through a brand naming technology before
selling it to the final imported-consumption firm or final imported-investment firm.
Price stickiness in the external sector is also introduced following Calvo (1983). Each
imported-consumption/investment firm faces a probability 1 − ξm,c and 1 − ξm,i that it
can reoptimize its price at P̃m,ct and P̃
m,i
t , respectively, in any period16. As in the case of
domestic intermediate firms, following Adolfson et al. (2005), importing firms that are not
allowed to reoptimize with probability ξm,c and ξm,i then index their price to last period’s






16Note that the superscript i denotes investment while the subscript i denotes firm i. Given the
stickiness of the domestic prices, incomplete exchange rate pass-through to the prices of imported con-
sumption/investment goods is assured even though importing firms of both kinds buy a homogeneous







where κm,c and κm,i are indexation parameters.
If a period t optimizing firm is not allowed to change its price during s periods ahead,















The intermediate imported-consumption firms have to solve the following profit opti-










































where the stochastic discount factors are (βξm,c)snt+s and (βξm,i)snt+s, respectively; φm,c
and φm,i are fixed costs.
Exporting Firms
A continuum of exporting firms buy the homogeneous domestic final good at price Pt,
turn this into differentiated export goods and sell them to the households in the world
51
market. In addition, we apply the same price-setting framework à la Calvo (1983) as in
the intermediate importing firms. The new optimized export price is P̃ xt , while an export
firm which is not allowed to reoptimize its price is assumed to index the price to last
period’s export price inflation and the domestic inflation target as follows


























where Xi,t+s is the demand for exporting firm i at t+s.
In a nutshell, after solving the objective functions of each type of firms and replac-
ing individual demand by the aggregate demand, we come up with four New Keynesian
Phillips curves which determine inflation in the domestic market, imported-investment
market, imported-consumption market, and export market.
2.2.3 The Rest of the World
Also following Adolfson et al. (2005), the model is assumed to be a small open economy
in comparison with the rest of the world and thus it plays a negligible part in the world’s
aggregate consumption and investment. The world’s demands for aggregate domestic














where C∗t , I∗t and P ∗t are foreign consumption, investment goods and price level, respec-
tively. Parameter ηf denotes the elasticity of substitution which is assumed to be the same
for consumption and investment so that we can take the world’s output Y ∗t = C∗t + I∗t as
the only demand, be it consumption or investment, and do not have to take into consid-
eration the amount of exporting goods used for consumption and investment in the world
economy.
Foreign variables are assumed to follow AR(1) processes which describe the dynamics
of the world income Y ∗t , inflation π∗t and interest rate R∗t . A stationary asymmetric tech-
nology shock ε̃z∗t = εz∗t /εzt is included to allow for temporary differences of technological
progress domestically and abroad, where εz∗t is the total technology level abroad. Y ∗t is
also scaled with εz∗t to get the stationarized version.
The equations for the rest of the world are as follows
lny∗t = lny












t−1 −R∗) + εR
∗
t (2.45)
2.2.4 Identities of the Open Economy
In an open economy, real exchange rate (RER) is one of the key relative prices between








where St is the nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign exchange in units of home
currency). So an increase in RER reflects increased international competitiveness of the
home economy.
The standard Uncovered Interest Rate Parity shows that the difference in interest rates
equals the expected change in the nominal exchange rate. It is also sensitive to the net
foreign asset position when being derived from the first order conditions with respect to
foreign bond holding:
R̂t − R̂∗t = Et∆Ŝt+1 − Λaât + ϕ̂t (2.47)
where all variables are in log-linearized form and the functional form for the premium on
foreign bond holdings is assumed to be
f 5(at, ϕt) = exp(−Λa(at − ā) + ϕt)
2.2.5 The Government
Fiscal policy in the model reflects the actual regime that has been implemented in Vietnam
since the Doi Moi in the 1990s. The deficit targets need to be met annually and government
spending is the key fiscal instrument. Following Gouvea et al. (2008), a feedback rule for
the fiscal authority in which government spending responds to the deviation of the primary
deficit17 from its target and the public debt-to-GDP ratio is given by
Gt = φGGt−1 + (1− φG)
[
φΩ(Ωt−1 − Ω̄t−1)− φBBrt
]
+ zGt (2.48)
17Primary budget deficit excludes interest payments for government debts, if compared with budget
deficit.
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where Gt is government expenditure as proportion of GDP. Ωt and Ω̄t denote the primary
deficit as proportion of GDP and primary deficit target, respectively18. Brt is the debt-
to-GDP ratio and zGt is taken as a shock to government spending.


















Following Smets & Wouters (2003), we assume that the central bank follows a Taylor-
type rule which, in principle, responds to the deviations of inflation from its target and
output gap. However, for the sake of simplicity, following Cantore et al. (2016), the rule is
assumed to be a so-called implementable Taylor rule. This rule is implementable because
monetary authorities do not have to take into consideration the output gap which is an
essential part of a conventional Taylor rule.
R̂t = ρRR̂t−1 + (1− ρR)[ˆ̄πt + θπ(π̂ct−1 − ˆ̄πt) + θyŷt−1] + zRt (2.50)
where zRt denotes a shock to monetary policy; R̂t, ˆ̄πt, π̂ct−1, and ŷt are interest rate,
inflation target, inflation, and output, respectively; ρR, θπ, θy are interest rate smoothing,
inflation response, and output response parameters, respectively.
2.2.6 Equilibrium
The goods market clears when demands from domestic households, the government and
the world market are met by the output of the final good firm or the aggregate production
18Ωt is the budget balance and negative in case of deficit. Thus, φΩ is positive, reflecting the fact that
any deviations of the primary deficit from the target will be corrected by government spending.
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t − εztφ− f(ut)K̄t (2.51)
where Gnt is government consumption before being rendered stationary by εzt .
The foreign bond market clears when the trade balance of the external sector is equal









t )− StP ∗t (Cmt + Imt ) +R∗t−1f 5(at−1, ϕt−1)StB∗t (2.52)
where f 5(at−1, ϕt−1) is the risk-adjusted gross nominal interest rate.
The credit market is in equilibrium when the demand for credit from domestic inter-
mediate firms to pay their wage bills equals the available assets:
νWtHt = Mt+1 −Qt
or
νWtHt = µtMt −Qt





where, following Altig et al. (2003) and Adolfson et al. (2005), qt = Qt/Ptεzt , wt =
Wt/Ptε
z




Dollarization is a distinct feature of many developing countries in general, and Vietnam in
particular, as we have witnessed from the data. DSGE models are, as argued by Castillo
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et al. (2006), regarded as useful tools to deal with this issue since they can make explicit
the operating mechanism of dollarization.
It is assumed that among all types of firm in the model, only domestic final goods
firms dollarize. Following Castillo et al. (2013), partial dollarization is introduced through
the form of asset substitution in which we exogenously assume that a subset of domestic
final goods firms set their prices in USD, 0 < δpd < 1. Therefore, the real marginal
costs of domestic firms with domestic currency-denominated prices (PDt ) and of domestic
firms with USD-denominated prices (PUSDt ) are adjusted with the relative price of goods
in domestic currency to the consumer price index (tDt ) and the relative price between









The relative price between domestic currency and USD20 and the relative price of









In both cases, each group of firms faces the same optimization problem as in the
baseline framework. Therefore, there arise two different Phillips curves determining the
inflation rates for the two groups of firms, πDt and πUSDt , respectively.
19Dollarization is modelled as asset substitution, so it only captures the unit of account/store of value
functions of money but does not affect the medium of exchange function of money.
20Deviations from the law of one price.
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Finally, the domestic inflation is then a weighted average of inflation in domestic
currency and foreign currency plus the variation in the exchange rate, which is given by
π̂t = (1− δpd)π̂Dt + δpd(π̂USDt + ∆St) (2.58)
We can see from this equation that partial dollarization not only increases the sensi-
tivity of domestic inflation to the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate but also adds
endogenous persistence to inflation.
2.2.8 Structural Shock Processes
All of the structural shocks and tax rates in the model are assumed to follow AR(1)
processes, in linearized form, as follows





iid∼ N(0, σ2x) (2.59)
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The limited availability of Vietnam’s macroeconomic data is the key challenge for the
calibration of the model. In addition, the limited availability of studies using DSGE
framework on Vietnam data also hinders the use of prior information from previous pa-
pers at both macro and micro level, which is considered a formal practice to calibrate and
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estimate DSGE models with Bayesian technique. Therefore, the model parameters of the
baseline scenario are calibrated on the basis of observations for Vietnam during the period
1996-2012 and estimates established by relevant previous studies21 for the purposes of the
simulations and sensitivity analysis exercises of the chapter.
First, the dollarization parameter δpd is set to the low, medium and high rates of
dollarization which are 0.01, 0.30, and 0.46 respectively. Consistent with earlier stud-
ies, the discount factor β is set to 0.98 that implies a steady state value of inflation at
around 6 percent. Second, following Christiano et al. (2005), the Frisch labour supply
elasticity 1/σh is set to 1, which is also strongly supported by micro evidence on the
labour market as in Gomme & Lkhagvasuren (2013). The markup power in the wage
setting λw is set to 1.05 as it is argued that this elasticity is low in comparison with
the values assumed in the real business cycle literature, but is well within the rage of
point estimates reported in the labour literature. Following Adolfson et al. (2005), the
constant in the labour disutility function (steady state hours worked) Λh is set to 7.522.
The share of imported consumption in aggregate consumption ωc and the share of im-
ported investment in aggregate investment ωi are calibrated at 0.31 and 0.55, respectively.
Third, following Adolfson et al. (2005), the constant in the cash holding disutility
function Λq is set to 0.38 and the cash holding elasticity σq to 10.62 which is also consi-
tent with Smets & Wouters (2007) and Christiano et al. (2005). The depreciation rate δ
is calibrated at 0.013 and the share of capital in production α is 30 percent. The base-
line model is assumed to have zero capital utilization rate by setting σa, a parameter
21Christiano et al. (2005), Adolfson et al. (2005), Altig et al. (2011), and Erceg et al. (2000).
22This indicates roughly 30 percent of the households’ time is spent on work in steady states.
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determining the capital utilization rate23 ût, at a very large number 106. For the elas-
ticities and markups in the model, the gross markup for the domestic sector λd is set to
1.2 while the external sector markups λm,i, λm,c to 1.3, implying a substitution elasticity
within domestic goods ηd ≡ λd/(λd−1) at 6 and a substitution elasticity within imported
consumption/investment goods at 5. These are approximately the standard mark-up on
prices as in Corsetti et al. (2012). In addition, as argued by Chari et al. (2002), the most
reliable studies seem to indicate a range for the elasticity between 1 and 2. The elasticities
between domestic and imported-consumption goods ηc, domestic and imported-investment
goods ηi as well as the elasticity of substitution within goods in the foreign economy ηf 24
are thus set to 1.5.
Fourth, all nominal friction parameters ξ are set at 0.6 - 0.8 in order to ensure a
3-quarter average length of price and wage adjustments, which are also consistent with
Corsetti et al. (2012). For other real friction parameters, habit formation b is set to 0.7
which is the point estimate by Boldrin et al. (2001), Christiano et al. (2005), and Smets
& Wouters (2007). The share of firms that have to finance wage in advance25 ν is set to
unity and investment adjustment cost ζ to 8.7. Likewise, the indexation parameters κ for
the wage level and for domestic and external sector prices are set according to Smets &
Wouters (2007) and Adolfson et al. (2007) at 0.5 and 2, respectively.
Fifth, for the specification of monetary policy parameters, we rely on estimates re-
ported by Clarida et al. (2000) so as to meet the Blanchard-Kahn conditions for determi-
23See details in appendix C.
24Which is assumed to be the same for both foreign consumption and investment.
25Working capital channel.
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nacy when solving the model. The interest rate smoothing is set to 0.9, inflation response
to 1.7 and output response 0.1. As for fiscal policy, we rely on estimates reported by
De Castro et al. (2011) for a developing country in Latin America. Specifically, the feed-
back parameters on government spending φG, deviation of the primary budget deficit from
its target φΩ, and government debt φB are calibrated at 0.7, 0.46, and 0.17, respectively.
The government long-term debt Br is calibrated at 0.65 in order to match the average
level during the sample period.
Finally, for the shocks which are serially correlated, the autoregressive parameters ρ
are set from 0.8 - 0.9, implying that all of them are stationary processes.
2.3.2 Conditions for Determinacy
In the context of the economic reforms that are under way over the last decades, the
role and content of monetary policy have evoked larger attention. According to Friedman
(1968), the first and the foremost lesson that history teaches about what monetary policy
can do is that it can be prevented from being a major source of economic disturbance and
provide a stable foundation for the economy, contributing to offsetting major disturbances
arising from other sources. Also, as shown by Woodford (2003), it is sometimes argued
that maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation should be the exclusive goal of mone-
tary policy on the basis that money is neutral in the long run. At the same time, other
discussions of actual monetary policy assume at least some degree of concern with the
stabilization of economic activity as well, which was often treated as the primary goal of
monetary policy in the early literature. Furthermore, having lived through the economic
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turmoil over the last decades, as pointed out by Fender (2012), whether monetary policy
had an important role in causing the crises is debatable, but it is shown that monetary
policy can make a contribution in preventing a crisis from having too large an effect on
output and employment, and in facilitating recovery from any such effects it might have.
Therefore, it is of intrinsic interest to examine to what extent a developing economy with
partial dollarization can be stabilized with a simple Taylor-type rule that only tracks a
few nominal variables.
The exercise is conducted through a method introduced by Blanchard & Kahn (1980)
in a seminal paper published in 1980, which focuses on a procedure to find the explicit
solution for a class of general linear difference models together with the conditions for












where (n−m)× 1 vector x1t consists of predetermined variables at time t with x10 given;
x2t is a m× 1 vector of non-predetermined variables; and ot is a vector of outputs. All of
the variables are absolute or proportional deviations about their steady states. Matrices
Γ,Θ,Π and Ξ are fixed and εt is a vector of random zero-mean shocks.
Rational expectations are then formed assuming a full information set {x1s, x2s, εs} with





where matrix D selects a subset of the model’s variables from which monetary authority
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feedbacks.
According to Blanchard & Kahn (1980), when we substitute the monetary policy rule
2.61 into the state space representation 2.60, the condition for a stable and unique equi-
librium of the model is dependent on the magnitude of the eigenvalues of the matrix
Γ + ΘD. If the number of eigenvalues of matrix Γ + ΘD outside the unit circle equals the
number of the model’s non-predetermined variables, the model has a unique and stable
solution. Instability happens if the number of eigenvalues of matrix Γ + ΘD outside the
unit circle is larger than the number of non-predetermined variables. In this case, when
the economy is pushed off its long-run growth level after a shock, it cannot ever converge
back to it, but rather finishes up with explosive inflation dynamics.
On the other side, when the number of eigenvalues of Γ + ΘD outside the unit circle
is smaller than the number of non-predetermined variables, the model is of indetermi-
nacy. In this case, Cantore et al. (2013) argue that if a shock displaces the economy from
its steady state, there are many possible paths leading back to equilibrium, or in other
words, there are multiple well-behaved rational expectations solutions to the model econ-
omy. Given forward-looking rules, indeterminacy can occur when central banks respond
to private sector’s inflation expectations which are driven by non-fundamental exogenous
random shocks on the demand or supply26. Therefore, the monetary policy rule itself can
26They are shocks which are not based on economic fundamentals such as preferences or technology,
and are named sunspots. When central banks adjust the rule’s coefficients in order to accommodate the
private sector’s inflation expectations, those expectations become self-fulfilling. Therefore, the monetary
policy rule will not be able to uniquely pin down the behaviour of at least one real/nominal variable in
the model, making various paths compatible with the equilibrium.
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introduce indeterminacy, leading to “sunspot equilibria”. It should be noted that sunspot
fluctuations, as argued by Cantore et al. (2013), are typically welfare-reducing at poten-
tially large magnitude.
Figure 2.1 plots the results of the Blanchard-Kahn determinacy and stability condi-
tions for the present model with respect to inflation response and interest rate smoothing
parameters. The results show different values of the key parameters of the monetary pol-
icy rule, θπ and ρR, with which the model has a unique solution. The red regions are the
combination of the parameters of interest rate and inflation that introduce determinacy.
The parameter step is set at 0.1 and the maximum values of 2 and 1.6 are set for θπ and
ρR, respectively. These values have been well-identified by previous VAR models.
Figure 2.1: Conditions for Determinacy
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The results also show a lower bound of 1.2 for the inflation response parameter beyond
which the interest rate rule leads to indeterminacy when the interest smoothing parameter
is set within a range of 0 and 0.91. Put differently, the specified Taylor-type rule will
generate a saddle-path stability or unique solution when the inflation response parameter
θπ is set between 1.2 and 2 in the current exercise, while interest rate smoothing parameter
lies within the range from 0 and 0.91. This is more or less in line with the results reported
by Batini et al. (2008) who use Chilean macroeconomic dataset. In addition, the model
can also generate a unique solution when inflation response parameter is set less than 1.2
combined with any value of the smoothing parameter from 1.1 to 1.6.
2.4 Model Simulation
2.4.1 Properties of the Simulated Model
In this section, the calibrated model is simulated to analyse the impulse responses to a
monetary policy shock which is an important feature of the developing country scrutinized
in this dissertation.
The impulse response functions of key endogenous variables to a one-standard devi-
ation monetary policy shock are reported in figure 2.2. The figure exhibits the response
of inflation, output, consumption, investment, and employment where all variables are
expressed as a percentage deviation from their steady states and most of the responses
lie within three standard deviations. The simulation results show that the baseline model
succeeds in accounting for the dynamic response of an emerging economy to a monetary
policy shock. The U-shaped responses, which are pervasive features of estimated VAR
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models, are also consistent with most of the aggregate variables in consideration, with
the exception of the price level, the real wage, and the real exchange rate. In particular,
as money wage rates are relatively stickier than prices in the present model, a real wage
increase after a contractionary monetary shock reflects the effects of a decrease in em-
ployment and is broadly consistent with the results in Altig et al. (2011) and Adolfson
et al. (2005). As argued, at least implicitly, by Keynes (1936), goods prices were much
more flexible than the money wage rate and firms should be regarded, approximately, as
profit maximising competitors. In this case, the assumption of positive but diminishing
marginal product of labour implied a negative association between the real wage and the
level of employment.27
The effect of the shock on aggregate quantities are also well in line with Adolfson
et al. (2007) except for the domestic inflation. A contractionary monetary policy shock
induces a sharp decline in the price level, which then returns to its preshock level after
approximately 2 quarters. It should be noted that while inflation is already shown by
Adolfson et al. (2005) to be less persistent than the typical estimates in the VAR liter-
ature28, the effect of a policy shock on the price level in the present model is even far
less inertial. This is particularly a notable impact of partial dollarization in the economy.
The expected effect of a tightened monetary policy aiming at curbing high inflation in
dollarized economies may not be as effective as we would see in developed countries as
27As explained by Wells (1987), Keynes (1936) postulates that it is the level of employment which
determines the real wage, not the other way around.
28As in Christiano et al. (2005), Altig et al. (2003), Altig et al. (2011). Adolfson et al. (2007) argue
that this may be due to the fact that the simulated model allows for a very high capital utilization rate
when σa is set so as to get a very small elasticity of capital utilization with respect to the rental rate of
capital.
66
the policy just induces a short-term effect due to partial dollarization. In addition, a
monetary policy shock leads to a much more persistent effect on output as the response
exhibits a prolonged slump that lasts very much longer after the price has returned to
its steady state value. The lowest level is seen about 3 quarters after the shock and the
output response is negative for almost 20 quarters. The magnitude of the effect on output
is almost twice as that of employment and consumption.
Figure 2.2: Impulse Response Functions to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
Another result that is worth emphasizing is that the shock has even a more persistent
effect on key endogenous variables than on the interest rate itself. While output, con-
sumption, investment, and employment are not back to where they started after roughly
20 quarters, nominal interest rate returns to its steady state after just around 15 quar-
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ters. This phenomenon where the shock’s effects on key endogenous variables last longer
than that on the policy variable itself reflects a strong internal propagation mechanism
within the model which, as argued by Bouakez et al. (2005), can explain the persistent
and hump-shaped response of key endogenous variables to monetary shocks. Figure 2.2
also shows that a contractionary policy shock generates a corresponding rise in the real
wage, though not in a hump-shaped manner. As the effectiveness of monetary policy is
shown to be hindered by the presence of partial dollarization in the model, so too is the
effect of the policy shock on real wage when its positive response seems to fade away after
just a year.
2.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis of Frictions
The calibrated model is also alternatively simulated in order to examine the quantitative
contributions of relevant frictions in the model to its performance. The exercise is car-
ried out by assessing the behaviour of the impulse response functions of key endogenous
variables following a positive monetary shock when some of the nominal/real frictions are
switched off while others are retained during the process.
In the model, we feature two sources of nominal rigidities which are price stickiness
according to the staggered contracts in Calvo style and price/wage indexation. This type
of contract is modeled for all firms in the domestic and external sectors, and also for
the wages. In addition, the model also incorporates four sources of real rigidity, which
are internal habit formation in households’ consumption, investment adjustment costs,
variable capital utilization, and working capital channel.
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Nominal Frictions
Price/wage Stickiness . In order to show how the nominal frictions in the model
actually shape the impulse response functions, the calibrated model is simulated for the
variant where all nominal frictions, including Calvo indices for domestic firms, consump-
tion/investment imports, exports, and wages, are all set approximately to zero and the
remaining parameters are held at their benchmark values so that all prices are considered
flexible (ξd = ξm,c = ξm,i = ξx = ξw = 0.01). The responses predicted by the baseline
model are plotted in continuous lines, while the dotted lines show responses from the
restricted model.
The impulse response functions of key aggregate variables are displayed in figure 2.3.
It is shown that the introduction of nominal frictions plays a critical role in the model’s
performance and all the effects on price, output, consumption, investment would be com-
pletely different when price and wage stickiness is dropped from the model. First, a key
result of the comparison with the model without nominal frictions is that the presence
of nominal frictions helps create the U-shaped impulse responses of key aggregate vari-
ables after a monetary policy shock, which is known to be a typical feature of VAR and
New Keynesian models. Second, as in previous studies, the policy operates effectively
through an interest rate channel that has become a standard framework for investigating
monetary policy issues. A monetary shock in the model with nominal frictions not only
induces plausible movements of inflation and other aggregate variables, but also creates
a substantial trade-off between stabilizing inflation and output in the short-term which
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also prevails in previous VARs and DSGE models.
Figure 2.3: Sensitivity Analysis of Nominal Frictions
Finally, the presence of nominal frictions increases the sensitivity of aggregate variables
to the interest rate with considerably higher magnitudes. Furthermore, the “puzzle” in
the behaviour of real exchange rate after a monetary shock in the variant without nominal
frictions is replaced by an increasing function which returns to the steady state after the
shock in roughly 2 years. These results are highly in line with Christiano et al. (2018) who
show that Calvo-style frictions generate implications which are consistent with aspects of
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micro data, and are believed to be an essential feature of business cycles in economies
where inflation is moderate.
Price Indexation . While price/wage stickiness allows the firms and households to
adjust prices/wages in response to a wide variety of information, dynamic indexation in
contrast restricts the adjustment to a single source of information which is the inflation
in the previous period. Figure 2.4 shows how aggregate variables respond to a monetary
policy shock in the baseline and restricted models (all indexation parameters κ are set to
0.01). The black lines show impulse responses based on the fully-calibrated model, while
the dotted red lines are impulse responses from the restricted model.
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Figure 2.4: Sensitivity Analysis of Indexation
It is shown that the responses to a monetary policy shock are qualitatively similar
across the whole simulated period. A contractionary shock produces an immediate de-
cline in inflation and negative, U-shaped responses of output, consumption, employment,
and investment in both models. The presence of domestic price and wage indexation
generates a relatively smaller magnitude of the responses and induces a slightly lower
persistence of output, consumption, employment, and investment. The impulse responses
of inflation also indicate that price/wage indexation has seemingly little effect on the dy-
72
namics of inflation in the model. However, it should be noted that indexation brings the
real wage rate back down faster, softening the blow to output to some extent.
Real Frictions
In order to examine the role of real frictions, the model is simulated to compare the
impulse response functions of the baseline model with a model variant without habit per-
sistence and a variant without investment adjustment cost. The contributions of variable
capital utilization and working capital channel are also analysed and included.
Habit Persistence . Habit formation, as argued by Bouakez et al. (2005), induces
agents to adjust their labour supply more gradually to attain a smoother and more persis-
tent consumption profile than under time-separable preferences. This exercise examines
the contribution of habit formation to the propagation mechanism of the model. To that
end, a restricted version of the model without habit formation (b = 0.01) is perturbed
and simulated.
The impulse response functions of key aggregate variables of the baseline model and
the restricted model are plotted in figure 2.5. While inflation and nominal interest rates in
the restricted model respond in a qualitatively similar manner to a monetary policy shock
in both cases, output and consumption decrease sharply after a contractionary monetary
shock and return fairly slowly to their steady state levels. The key result here is that
without habit formation, the dynamics of the responses are just monotone and do not
exhibit U-shaped pattern, a property that has been widely predicted by previous studies
73
featuring general equilibrium models, as we can see in the baseline model.
In addition, the presence of habit formation makes almost no difference to the dynamics
of inflation in the model. These results are largely consistent with Bouakez et al. (2005).
However, it is shown that habit formation can to some extent magnify the persistence of
output response after a monetary shock. The reason here is that, as explained by Bouakez
et al. (2005), habit-forming agents allocate their resources so as to get a smoother and more
persistent consumption profile than agents in models with time-separable preferences.
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Figure 2.5: Sensitivity Analysis of Habit Formation
Investment Adjustment Costs . In the first generation of DSGE models, the capi-
tal stock was assumed to be freely changed from period to period without any restriction
via the investment process. However, in reality, the investment process is restricted by
adjustment costs which lead to additional real rigidities in the capital accumulation pro-
cess. In other words, investment is not fully and costlessly transformed into next period’s
capital stock29.
29Two approaches have been developed to examine the adjustment costs in the investment process.
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Figure 2.6 shows how the presence of investment adjustment costs influences the ef-
fects of a contractionary monetary shock in the model. The impulse response functions of
key aggregate variables of the baseline model and the restricted model are plotted. The
black lines indicate impulse responses from the baseline with ζ being calibrated at 8.67,
which is then compared with the impulse responses of the model restricted at almost zero
for the investment adjustment cost parameter.
First, if we assume that the firms in the model are the owners of the capital stock and decide the level of
investment in each period, then the so-called Tobin’s Q is used to examine the dynamics of the Q ratio
that represents the ratio between the market value of the firm and the replacement cost of its capital
stock. Second, if the households are assumed to be the owners of the capital stock, as in the present
model, investment adjustment costs are imposed upon the households who decide the investment level.
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Figure 2.6: Sensitivity Analysis of Investment Adjustment Costs
While the dynamic responses of the aggregate quantities are qualitatively almost the
same, they exhibit some notable differences between different variants of the model. The
impulse responses of aggregate investment and output are U-shaped at considerably larger
magnitude than they are in the baseline model where adjusting investment is costly. How-
ever, the presence of adjustment costs associated with investment induces much more
persistent response of investment to a monetary policy shock in the model. These results
imply that the existence of investment adjustment costs leads to a different transmission
77
mechanism of the monetary shock to the capital stock and apparently changes the amount
of investment in each period. Therefore, a cost to investment magnifies the persistence in
the capital stock accumulation process. A similar result is found in Christiano et al. (2005)
who show that a sticky price model can generate hump-shaped investment dynamics and
induce inertia in investment when investment costs are included. Investment adjustment
costs, thus, have important contributions to understanding the aggregate dynamics of the
model economy.
Capital Utilization . Christiano et al. (2005) consider two scenarios where the cap-
ital utilization rate is fixed at the value of σa = 0.01 for the baseline and a variant with
σa = 100, implying the case without variable capital utilization. However, in order to
achieve determinacy, we set the elasticity of capital utilization with respect to the rental
rate of capital at 0.1 (σa = 10) for the benchmark calibration and evaluate the sensitivity
of the capital utilization decision when there is no variable capital utilization, σa = 106,
following Adolfson et al. (2007). Figure 2.7 provides an illustration of the role that capital
utilization plays in the model.
In particular, while the magnitude of the responses of the endogenous variables in
consideration do not change significantly, the presence of capital utilization only induces
a slightly less persistent effect on output, employment, consumption, and investment, but
a stronger effect on the magnitude and persistence with respect to investment. As argued
by Christiano et al. (2005), in a model with moderate wage and price stickiness, it is
crucial to allow for variable capital utilization in order to generate inertia in inflation
and persistence in output as it helps dampen the large rise in the rental rate of capital
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that would otherwise occur. However, given a model for developing countries where the
domestic prices are also determined by a certain level of partial dollarization, the presence
of variable capital utilization seems to have little effect on the dynamics of inflation. This
result is broadly consistent with Adolfson et al. (2007) where variable capital utilization
does not seem to play a critical role in the model’s performance and capital utilization
cost parameter is thus switched off during the estimation.
Figure 2.7: Sensitivity Analysis of Variable Capital Utilization
Working Capital Channel . Working capital is defined by Corugedo et al. (2011)
as the difference between current assets, which are firms’ resources in cash or readily con-
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vertible into cash such as inventories, and current liabilities or firms’ cash requirements.
Firms thus have a funding gap between when they pay the costs of inputs and when they
receive the revenues from the sales of output. Thus, working capital represents operating
liquidity available to firms and having the right amount of working capital at the right
time is crucial for the efficient operation of firms. Therefore, frictions in working capital
channel can affect the supply side of the economy, leading to lower employment and out-
put while pushing up inflation. This is the reason why working capital channel is assumed
to play a significant role as a transmission channel of economic shocks into the economy,
especially shocks on the financial and banking sector.
Figure 2.8 plots the impulse responses of aggregate variables in the case where there is
no working capital channel (ν = 0.01) compared with results from the benchmark model.
It is shown that introducing working capital channel slightly magnifies the responses
of real variables, including output, consumption, and investment, to a monetary policy
shock. The likely reason is that the presence of working capital channel pushes up the
sensitivity of output to the interest rate, as the firms’ marginal costs are also increased.
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Figure 2.8: Sensitivity Analysis of Working Capital Channel
However, the presence of working capital channel is also shown to have very little
impact on inflation. In other words, there is almost no difference in the response of
inflation in the model economy as inflation behaves almost the same in the two variants
of the model. This result is consistent with Cabezon (2014) in which it is shown that
working capital does not have critical implications for monetary policy in a relatively
open economy, though this finding differs from that of Ravenna & Walsh (2006) for a
closed-economy model, where the working capital channel is found to create a trade-
off between output and price stabilization. The main finding here is that even though
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working capital can be an efficient cost channel in which monetary policy can affect the
economy, it plays a negligible role in the determination of domestic inflation in the present
model because, as argued by Cabezon (2014), the effect of a monetary shock on the firms’
marginal costs may be neutralized through the exchange rate channel.
2.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Dollarization
Figure 2.9 illustrates how different levels of partial dollarization influence the performance
of the model after a monetary policy shock. The impulse responses of key aggregate vari-
ables of the baseline model (δpd = 0.3) are compared with the impulse responses from two
other variants of the model in which dollarization rates are imposed at a higher level of
0.46 and almost no dollarization (δpd = 0.01). The black lines show the impulse responses
from the baseline model, while the impulse responses of aggregate variables of the high
and low dollarization scenarios are plotted in the green and red dotted lines, respectively.
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Figure 2.9: Sensitivity Analysis of Partial Dollarization
A number of results are worth emphasizing in this case. First, it is shown that the
impulse response functions of aggregate variables to a shock on monetary policy in all
scenarios are produced in U-shaped manner as in previous VAR or DSGE-based studies.
However, with the presence of dollarization in the model, a shock on monetary policy
has considerably larger effects on inflation dynamics. The higher degree of dollarization,
the larger the magnitudes of the responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock.
The initial decline in the price level when there is serious dollarization in the economy is
almost twice as big as the decline in the model with moderate dollarization. The effect is
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even more notable when compared with the restricted model without dollarization.
Second, as the level of dollarization increases, the model generates weaker responses of
consumption, investment, and output accordingly. In addition, the persistence of the re-
sponses of consumption, investment, and output is also inversely proportional to the level
of dollarization, though the peak effects in all three variants of the model occur roughly
three quarters after the shock. Finally, it has been shown that if a monetary shock pro-
duces more persistent effects on output than that of the instrument itself, there should
be a strong internal transmission mechanism in the model economy. The results show
that a monetary policy shock in the present model induces a more persistent effect on
output than on interest rate in model variants with lower level of dollarization. Therefore,
the presence of dollarization in the economy can substantially hinder the effectiveness of
monetary policy.
These findings are broadly consistent with Baliño et al. (1999) who argue that dol-
larization makes the demand for domestic money more volatile as agents shift frequently
between currencies for a number of not easily identifiable reasons in order to avoid the
negative effects of inflation. Yeyati (2006) also argues that if the switch to available
foreign-currency assets becomes less costly, the demand for reserve money in an economy
with partial dollarization would be more sensitive to a monetary expansion or an exchange
rate fluctuation. This poses challenges to the pursuit of a coherent and independent mon-
etary policy and of seigniorage, as in Chang & Velasco (2002). Figure 2.9 clearly shows
that by eliminating dollarization in the economy, the magnitudes of the impulse responses
of aggregate variables to a monetary policy shock are stronger, making the transmission
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mechanism of monetary policy more effective. This result is also in line with Ohanyan
(2016) who shows that with prices and interest rates largely influenced by foreign factors,
the economy appears to have smoother dynamics and stabilized domestic shocks, but a
weaker interest rate channel of monetary policy.
Furthermore, Calvo & Gramont (1992) point out that exchange rate volatility is ex-
pected to be higher in dollarized economies. This strong positive correlation between
exchange rate volatility and dollarization as well as unstable domestic demand are also
the key implication of earlier literature on the challenge posed by dollarization to the
effectiveness of monetary policy. In addition, as argued by Schaub (2009), it is the higher
elasticity of inflation to a monetary shock that limits the scope for monetary policy effec-
tiveness because of a lack of self-stabilizing effects in dollarized economies.
2.5 Summary
Following standard DSGE models, the DSGE model set up in this chapter shares the
essential features developed by the New Keynesian school. A relatively large number of
nominal and real frictions are incorporated in order to capture the empirical dynamics of
the macroeconomic variables, including price and wage stickiness, investment adjustment
costs, variable capital utilization, and habit formation in consumption. In addition, the
model is extended with two typical features of many developing countries which are par-
tial dollarization in the supply sector and a chronic budget-deficit fiscal rule on the part
of the government.
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In the theoretical model, the stochastics of the variables are explained by various
structural shocks, with technology and labour supply shocks on the supply side and con-
sumption, investment, and policy shocks on the demand side. The model is then fully
calibrated and simulated to examine the sensitivity of each of the nominal and real fric-
tions in explaining the dynamic development of the model economy. The results of the
exercise show that, with the exception of working capital channel and variable capital
utilization, nominal and real frictions play a significant role in the theoretical model in
generating the standard U-shaped dynamics of real variables.
Different scenarios of partial dollarization are also simulated so as to assess the im-
portance of dollarization in the performance of the model. Sensitivity analysis on partial
dollarization establishes that partial dollarization plays a significant role in shaping the
dynamics of the model following a monetary policy shock. The simulated results show
that the responses of real variables are larger in magnitude as the degree of partial dollar-
ization in the model economy decreases. Therefore, the presence of partial dollarization
is believed to substantially impede the effectiveness of monetary policy.
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Chapter 3
Bayesian Estimation of the DSGE
Model for Vietnam
This chapter estimates the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model for developing countries developed in the preceding
chapter for a macroeconomic dataset of Vietnam. The model is
estimated with Bayesian techniques using ten key macroeconomic
variables, including GDP, household consumption, government con-
sumption, investment, employment, interest rate, real exchange rate,
inflation, export, and import. The U.S. time series for output, inter-
est rate, and inflation are used as the world indicators. The presence
of orthogonal structural shocks on both supply and demand side al-
lows for an empirical investigation and comparison of the effects of
the shocks as well as their contribution to the development of the
model economy. The estimated model is also used to compare vari-
ants of the model at different levels of partial dollarization to find
87
out the most favourable setup that captures the properties of the
data.
3.1 Introduction
Before the Lucas critique, structural economic models which are theoretically constructed
and represent economic processes by a set of variables and a set of logical and/or quanti-
tative relationships between them were used to derive optimal decision rules of economic
agents. The decision rule was thought to embody constant coefficients and could be used
to predict the effects of a change in economic policy entirely on the basis of relationships
observed in historical data, and then used for macroeconomic policy selection. Traditional
structural models, however, fail to recognize that the decision rules depend on parame-
ters of which many are variable reduced-form parameters depending on stochastic policy
parameters. Thus, any changes in the policy will systematically alter the structure of
the econometric model, making it impossible to use those optimal decision rules, which
consequently also vary systematically with changes of the decision maker, for the purpose
of policy evaluation and forecast.
DSGE models with micro-foundations have been developed to address the Lucas cri-
tique. At the centre of DSGE models are the structural/deep parameters describing the
preferences of the agents and the constraints on technology and resources in the economy.
These parameters, as pointed out by Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2007), are called struc-
tural in the sense that they are invariant to interventions from policy makers, including
shocks by nature, as these parameters have been fully interpretable from the perspective
of economic theory and micro evidence. Thus, DSGE models avoid being subject to the
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Lucas critique and can be used to quantitatively evaluate policy. The separation between
structural parameters and reduced-form parameters1 leads to the development of non-
linear estimation techniques such as generalized method of moments, indirect inference,
maximum likelihood or Bayesian methods that are technically not dependant on the re-
duced forms of the parameters themselves.
This chapter presents the estimation of the present theoretical DSGE model using
Bayesian estimation methods and macroeconomic data from Vietnam during the period
1996-2012. Traditionally, a calibration method is a good choice to pin down parameters in
such complicated structural models. The deterministic steady states are used to solve for
parameter values that result in observed long-run outcomes for macroeconomic variables
such as hours worked, the great ratios, or the real interest rate. This is called first-moment
matching method and it can be extended to a second-moment matching method, including
variances, correlations and autocorrelations to calibrate shock processes. However, given
the development of macroeconometrics in recent years, economists tend to replace this
informal moment matching method with a formal systems estimation method. As argued
by Cantore et al. (2016), Maximum Likelihood (ML), Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM), and Bayesian Estimation are three widely-used approaches that deploy systems
estimation methods for DSGE models estimation.
Bayesian approach, among others, allows us not only to take advantage of prior infor-
mation to identify key structural parameters, but also to utilize all of the cross equation
restrictions implied by the DSGE setup, making the estimation process more efficient2.
1Reduce-form parameters are normally estimated by regression analysis.
2Partial equilibrium models only consider the clearance of a specific market of interest, while prices
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Bayesian estimation is also a full information systems estimation method, but to some
extent a hybrid approach between informal calibration and ML. As argued by Cantore
et al. (2016), when there is no prior information, Bayesian approach converges to ML and
if the priors are believed to be correct, we come back to calibration. Given the priors,
Bayesian method enables the utilization of additional sources of information to help solve
the problem of flat likelihood surface in some directions3 by adding “curvature” to the like-
lihood. In addition, Fernández-Villaverde (2010) shows that Bayesian approach provides
a straightforward method of evaluating the ability of the models in capturing the cyclical
features of the data, while allowing for a fully structural approach to analyse the sources
of fluctuation. It also provides facilities for the construction of confidence intervals for
estimated parameters, computing impulse response functions, forecasting, and performing
model comparison.
In a practical exercise, as argued by Cantore et al. (2016), the Bayesian estimation
method will first employ the log-linearized approximation of the original model’s non-
linear optimality conditions, normally the first-order conditions, using Taylor expansion
about a deterministic steady state to obtain a linear rational expectation system. This
system is then solved for its state-space form to derive the policy functions in the model’s
predetermined variables. Standard Kalman filter is then applied to evaluate the likelihood
function under the assumption of Gaussian distribution of the disturbances. Finally, this
likelihood function will be combined with the prior assumptions about the parameters to
compute their posterior probability.
of all other markets such as wages, interest rate are held fixed during the analysis.
3This is a major problem in likelihood approaches.
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic princi-
ples of the Bayesian estimation method and procedure. In Section 3, we first discuss the
detailed methodology for the transformation of the data before being taken to estimation
process, then present the derivation of measurement equations which must be included in
the system of model equations in order to match the model’s variables with the observ-
ables. Section 4 describes the prior distributions and discusses identification problems
related to the estimated parameters. The estimation results are reported in Section 5. In
Section 6 and 7, properties and the fit of the estimated model are in turn analysed and
discussed in detail before we have some concluding remarks in Section 8.
3.2 Bayesian Estimation Method
Bayesian econometrics is named after Reverend Thomas Bayes (1702-1761), an English
statistician, with important contributions to the original ideas by Pierre-Simon Laplace
(1749-1827), for the idea of “inverse probability”. However, according to Greenberg (2012),
it was not until the early 1960s that the application of the Bayesian viewpoint to economet-
ric models was realized by A. Zellner. The most important breakthrough of the approach
occurred in the early 1990s with the application of Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation
to statistical and econometric models, given its reliance on simulation techniques rather
than standard probability theory and statistics. Sims (2007) in his seminal paper “Why
Econometrics Should Always and Everywhere Be Bayesian?” argues that Bayesian infer-
ence is a way of thinking, not just a basket of methods, and Bayesian approaches might
become more practical and prevalent.
This section presents the principles of Bayesian estimation method and detailed pro-
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cedure for Bayesian estimation which is used for direct estimation and evaluation of the
DSGE model developed in the previous chapter.
3.2.1 Principles of Bayesian Estimation









where p(A,B) is the probability of A and B happening together.
Suppose that we estimate a vector of the model’s parameters θ = θ1, θ2, ..., θn as a sub-
set of the model’s parameters Θ given the full model’s variables y, Bayesian econometrics
uses the full dataset of all observed variables (Y T = y1, y2, ..., yT ) and applies Bayes’ Rule
to get




where p(θ) is the prior density of the parameters and p(Y T |θ) is the likelihood density of
the data given the model’s parameters4.
4This density is also the likelihood function of the parameters to be maximized, which is calculated
by the formula





Equation 3.3 shows that the posterior density p(θ|Y T ) depends only on p(Y T |θ)p(θ)
as p(Y T ) is already given. This key part of the posterior density is defined as posterior
kernel K(θ|Y T )5 and denoted by
p(θ|Y T ) ∝ p(Y T |θ)p(θ) ≡ K(θ|Y T ) (3.4)
According to Miao (2014), the Bayesian estimation method is to choose a parameter
value so as to maximize the posterior density p(θ|Y T ), or more simply the posterior kernel
K(θ|Y T ). It should be noted that the posterior density is the likelihood density of the
data given the model’s parameters p(Y T |θ), which is the density that Maximum Likeli-
hood method aims to maximize and computed using the Kalman Filter, updated by the
prior information of the parameters p(θ) which gives the surface more curvature6.
In addition, the posterior distribution p(θ|Y T ) which contains important informa-
tion about the parameters θ we are estimating, including distributional means, medians,
5Note that the difference between posterior density p(θ|y) and posterior kernel K(θ|y) is
p(θ|Y T ) ≡ K(θ|Y
T )
p(Y T )
6While Maximum Likelihood (ML) procedure stops at maximizing p(y|Y T ), the Bayesian method
extends ML method further by updating the results with prior information of the parameters. The result
of the Bayesian procedure combines information from data and prior information we already know about
the parameters in estimation themselves.
We can also distinguish a key difference between Bayesian (as well as ML) and classical/frequentist
econometrics. While the former assumes that if we need to estimate unknown parameters θ, then given
the data we should find the probability of getting those parameters of the model p(θ) (not fixed but
rather random objects), the latter treats θ as some unknown but fixed parameters and uses frequentist
method such as OLS, given the data, to find those fixed values. The point estimates of those parameters
can be the mode or median of the density.
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modes, and respective standard deviations, also allows us to implement Bayesian inference
as in the frequentist approach. Suppose Bayesian inference is expressed as E[g(θ)|Y T )]
where g(θ) is the inferred function we are interested in such as confidence interval etc.,
given the data Y T , the Numerical Integration method is used to compute the conditional
distribution of the target function as follows
E[g(θ)|Y T )] =
∫
g(θ)p(θ|Y T )dθ (3.5)
However, both Bayesian estimation (as well as ML method) and Bayesian inference
involve the evaluation of the likelihood function which, as argued by Miao (2014), typically
has no analytical solution. In other words, it is often impossible to evaluate the integral
in the likelihood function or the inference function analytically. Therefore, in practical
exercises, the Bayesian estimation requires a two-stage procedure as follows
• Stage 1: Solve the model and then use a filtering procedure7 to evaluate the likeli-
hood function p(y|Y T ), maximize p(y|Y T ) numerically to arrive at the mode of the
estimated parameters θ;
• Stage 2: A Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation method8 is used to
sample from the estimated mode in the first step which wanders over the posterior
distribution of the parameters. As the number of draws N increases, we can invoke
the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit Theorem to derive the posterior
distribution of the parameters.
7Such as the linear Kalman Filter assuming linear transition and measurement equations and Gaussian
shocks.
8Such as Metropolis-Hastings MCMC.
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3.2.2 Estimation Procedure
Analytical evaluation of the likelihood function is a great challenge. In practice, as argued
by Fernández-Villaverde (2010), DSGE models do not have a “paper and pencil” solution,
with very few exceptions. Therefore, numerical methods are normally used to solve the
problem in order to arrive at the estimated mode as output for Stage 1. While in a
general case, Bayesian Maximum Likelihood is used to compute the likelihood function,
the Kalman filter is the alternative to evaluate the likelihood function when Gaussian
assumptions, which are prevalent in the DSGE literature, of the distribution of the shock
processes are made9.
3.2.2.1. Stage 1 - Computation of the Posterior Mode
The maximization of the likelihood function of DSGE models, which is the essen-
tial part of Stage 1, normally involves the evaluation of a complicated, highly multi-
dimensional object. In addition, as argued by Fernández-Villaverde (2010), the likelihood
function of DSGE models is full of local maxima and minima and of nearly flat surfaces
due to the sparsity of the data10 and the flexibility of DSGE models in generating similar
behaviour with relatively different combination of parameter values. In a general case, the
Bayesian Maximum Likelihood method can be used to deal with this problem. However,
as stressed above, the Kalman filter is more efficient in computing the likelihood function
when Gaussian distributional assumptions for the shocks are added.
9For the sake of simplicity, we skip the discussion on Particle Filter for the case of non-linear state
space representation or the case in which the shocks are not normally distributed.
10As quarterly data are often not comprised of many observations that micro panels provide.
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Bayesian Maximum Likelihood: The General Case
Numerical methods such as perturbation or numerical projection produce a policy
function/decision rule with respect to the whole set of model variables yt which is expressed
as a polynomial of state variables (at time t− 1) and model shocks εt as follows
yt = h(yt−1, εt; θ) (3.6)
When it comes to estimation, however, not all of the model’s variables in yt are ob-
servable. In practice, suppose only a subset of the variables y∗t can be observed11 with
a dataset Y ∗,T , which is “smaller” than a full dataset Y T . Thus, the observed variables
y∗t are just a subset of the model’s variables yt and they are linked by a measurement
equation of the form
y∗t = l(yt, vt; θ) (3.7)
where vt is a vector of shocks to the observables such as measurement error.
As mentioned above, our objective is to evaluate the likelihood function of the data
given the model’s parameters p(Y ∗,T |θ) so as to get to the target likelihood function of
the parameters given our data p(θ|Y ∗,T ). As shown by Fernández-Villaverde (2010), we
can take advantage of the Markov structure of the state space representation to write the
likelihood density of the data given the model’s parameters as
p(Y ∗,T |θ) = p(y∗1|θ)
T∏
t=2
p(y∗t |Y ∗,t−1, θ) (3.8)
where y∗1, y∗t are observations number 1 and number t in the data Y ∗,T .
11Recall that all of the arguments in the previous section are applied for a full dataset Y T which means
all of the model’s variables are observed.
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Deriving this equation further using Lemma 3 given in Appendix D we have





p(y∗t |Y ∗,t−1, y1, θ)p(yt|Y ∗,t−1, θ)dyt (3.9)
On the right-hand side, p(y∗1|y1, θ) and p(y1|θ) are given as initial conditions. Also, as
Y ∗,t−1 ∈ yt, we have
p(y∗t |Y ∗,t−1, y1, θ) = p(y∗t |yt, θ) (3.10)
which is proved in Lemma 2.
Therefore, the evaluation of the posterior likelihood function in the general case is
equivalent to the computation of the last term {p(yt|Y ∗,t−1, θ)}Tt=1. For this task, as shown
by Fernández-Villaverde (2010), we need to rely on two fundamental tools which are the
Chapman-Kolmogorov equation and Bayes’ theorem. First, the Chapman-Kolmogorov
equation describes the forecasting rule for the evolution of states. It shows that the
distribution of states tomorrow given an observation until today, p(yt+1|Y ∗,t, θ), is equal
to today’s distribution p(yt|Y ∗,t, θ) times the transition probabilities p(yt+1|yt, θ):
p(yt+1|Y ∗,t, θ) =
∫
p(yt+1|yt, θ)p(yt|Y ∗,t, θ)dyt (3.11)
where among two terms on the right-hand side of this equation, the former p(yt+1|yt, θ)
can be induced from Lemma 1, while the later p(yt|Y ∗,t, θ) is computed using Lemma 4.
Second, Bayes’s theorem helps, as proved in Lemma 4, to update the distribution of
states p(yt|Y ∗,t, θ) whenever a new observation y∗t arrives with corresponding probability
p(y∗t |yt, θ) before Chapman-Kolmogorov equation comes in as a rule to forecast the evolu-
tion of the state from our initial condition p(y1, θ) up to p(yt|Y ∗,t−1, θ), which is the target
distribution we are interested in.
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Kalman Filter: The Special Case of Gaussian
As argued by Miao (2014) and Fernández-Villaverde (2010), even though Bayes’ the-
orem and the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation are mathematically straightforward, the
numerical computation of the term {p(yt|Y ∗,t−1, θ)}Tt=1 in practice is almost impossible as
it would require the computation of numerous integrals. However, given the assumptions
of normal distribution of the shocks12 which are prevalent in the literature and also the
case of the present model, Fernández-Villaverde (2010) argues that we can take advantage
of the observation that all of the relevant conditional distributions are thus also Gaus-
sian13. If so, we need only to keep track of the mean and variance of these conditional
normal distributions. In this case, Ricatti equations of the Kalman Filter are used to
compute the log likelihood density of p(Y ∗,T |θ)14.
In particular, Miao (2014) shows that in the first instance, a perturbation method
is used to solve the DSGE model in order to arrive at the decision rules which can be
expressed in a linear state space representation including a decision rule of the form
ỹt = A(θ)ỹt−1 + C(θ)εt (3.12)
and a transition equation for observed variables given by
y∗t = Gȳ(θ) +Gỹt + vt (3.13)
where ỹt is the deviation from steady state ȳ(θ) and Eεt = Evt = 0; Eεtε′t = Q(θ);
Evtv
′
t = V (θ). The coefficients A,C,G and the steady state values are dependent on the
12Another additional assumption is the linearity of the transition and measurement equations.
13Because the space of normal distributions is a vector space.
14This is also the case that is currently run by Dynare.
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structural parameter θ we are estimating. Coefficient G of the transition equation collects
the vector of observables from the vector of all equilibrium variables yt.
If we define the linear projections as
ŷt|t−1 = Et[ỹt|Y ∗,t−1]
where ŷt is the projected values and the subscript t|t− 1 indicates a draw at t conditional
on information until t− 1; and the variance-covariance matrices as
Pt = E
[
(ỹt − ŷt|t−1)(ỹt − ŷt|t−1)′|Y ∗,t−1
]
Then, given the initial values ŷ1|0, P1, and coefficients A,C,G,Q, V, Pt, Miao (2014)
shows that the following recursive identities can be achieved using the Kalman Filter
at = y
∗
t − ŷ∗t|t−1 = y∗t −Gȳ(θ) +Gỹt|t−1
Ωt|t−1 = GPtG
′ + V (θ)
Kt = A(θ)PtG
′Ω−1t|t−1
Pt+1 = A(θ)Pt[A(θ)−KtG]′ + C(θ)Q(θ)C(θ)′
ŷt+1|t = A(θ)ŷt|t−1 +Ktat
Finally, using the first two identities at15 and Ωt|t−1, the log likelihood density of the
data given the model’s parameters can be computed as follows














where n∗ is the number of observables.
15Which can be interpreted as the innovation of the observables.
99
In practical exercises, the detailed computation algorithm16 for Stage 1 is suggested
by Cantore et al. (2016) as follows:
Step 1: Solve the calibrated model numerically for a particular parameter vector θi17.
Results are corresponding policy functions and a decision matrix with all numerically-
solved values of the coefficients of θi which are used as the initial values for the Maximum
Likelihood algorithm.
Step 2: Given the estimated values of the model parameters in θi from step 1, the like-
lihood density of the data, Y ∗,T , which is p(Y ∗,T |θi) is evaluated using the linear Kalman
Filter, given the necessary assumption that all shocks are Gaussian.
Step 3: Return to step 1, solve the model again for another particular parameter
vector θi+118 and then evaluate the corresponding likelihood density p(Y ∗,T |θi+1) using
Kalman filter as in Step 2. The algorithm then just repeats steps 1 and 2 to get a new
p(Y ∗,T |θi+1) so as to maximize p(Y ∗,T |θ) numerically. The converged results θ0 are the
posterior mode of the parameters19.
Step 4: The posterior mode θ0 will be used as the starting point for the second stage.
We can also use this posterior mode to estimate the covariance matrix of all relevant
16Similar to Maximum Likelihood to estimate DSGE models.
17This is currently a first-order linear solution from perturbation technique implemented by Dynare.
18Specified by the algorithm.
19The algorithm sets up a threshold and a number of iterations which is large enough to get the
maximum likelihood numerically.
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parameters by the negative inverse Hessian matrix evaluated at the posterior mode
∑̂








where the term in brackets is the Hessian20.
Outputs from Stage 1 include the prior mean, estimated mode, standard deviation,
and a t-test. The two popular mode compute methods which are currently used by Dynare
are mode_compute = 4 or 6.
3.2.2.2. Stage 2: Computation of the Posterior Distribution
In Stage 2, the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to
find the posterior distribution of the parameters. Cantore et al. (2016) show that the
procedure is developed with theoretical contributions from each school named in the al-
gorithm. First, the Markov Chain postulates that any draw θs depends on its previous
draw θs−1. Second, Monte Carlo adds that a given draw θ∗s , which is also our target draw
in this context, can be drawn at random from a candidate/transition distribution which
is called α(θs−1, θ∗s). That means that θ∗s can only be either the previous draw or itself.
Thus, a new draw θs will either be our new target draw for the current round of the
process θ∗s or stand still at the previous point θs−1. In the later case, we add nothing to
the density that we are interested in. Thus, the Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach
starts from an initial value θ0 which is normally the estimated mode from the first stage
to sketch out a limiting distribution which is also our target distribution21.
20The square matrix of second-order partial derivatives of the likelihood density function log(p(y|θ))
with respect to all values of the parameters at the mode of θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θn).
21In practice, we need to discard the first several thousand draws to ensure that the sequence is not
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Third, as there always exists a discrepancy between the candidate and target distri-
bution, however, if we take the whole bunch of draws from MCMC, there may be a lot of
wrong draws from our target draws while we still want to sketch out the whole parameter
space as much as possible. Thus, as argued by Cantore et al. (2016), the Metropolis-
Hastings rule contributes to this process by calculating an acceptance rate which allows
us to discard the wrong draws from the MCMC process and, more importantly, suggests
the next candidate to continue the procedure. Accordingly, the next candidate θ∗s for the
process should be chosen given a Random Walk rule as follows
θ∗s = θs−1 + z
where the shock z has mean θs−1 and variance cσ2, or z ∼ N(θs−1, cσ2).
In a nutshell, the full Markov Chain Monte Carlo Metropolis-Hastings algorithm in
the second stage of Bayesian estimation method is specified as
Step 1: Choose a starting point θ0 for the process, which is the posterior mode from
the first stage.




Step 3: Given θ∗i , come back to solve the model and use the Kalman Filter to compute
the likelihood density p(θ∗i |y), given the available data.
dependent on the starting point θ0.
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where θi−1 is just θ0 in the first round.
Step 5: Come back to step 2 to find the next candidate. Keep doing this process until
sufficient draws are generated. We can then sketch out the whole posterior distribution
from accepted draws for parameters θ.
It is shown by Cantore et al. (2016) that the jump step from θs−1 to θ∗s in step 4
depends on z, which is then dependent on the constant c22. It should also be noted that,
first, if c is too small, z’s variance as well as the jump step become too small, the rate of
accepted draws will be too high and approach 1, and the chain thus gets stuck around a
local maximum and does not visit the tails. Second, if c is too large, the acceptance rate
will be low because z’s variance is now too large, θ∗i goes very far from θi−1 = θ0, which
is already an accepted draw at the mode, then its likelihood p(θ∗i |y) becomes very much
smaller compared with the mode. The draws will come to regions of lower probability
and the chain again gets stuck in the tails of the target distribution23.
22The constant c is chosen by user at the beginning of the Bayesian process.
23Therefore, the ideal acceptance rate should be from 20-40% during the whole process in order to ensure
that the entire domain of the target distribution is visited. We need to choose c from the beginning of
the estimation so as to make sure the acceptance rate in the range from 20-40%.
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3.3 Data Transformation and Measurement Equations
The Bayesian estimation method allows the use of all available information in the form
of prior distributions, as well as the use of observed data to update these priors, in
order to obtain the posterior distributions of the estimated parameters. However, one
of the fundamental issues in the estimation process is that the observed data usually do
not exactly match the model’s variables. This could be because of a stochastic trend
in the data, while the model’s variables are stationary since the model is solved using
perturbation techniques. The mapping of data onto model’s variables is expressed in
measurement equations section incorporated into the Dynare file.
3.3.1 Data Transformation
While many models are agnostic about the source of the trend in the data, there are mod-
els where the source of the trend is explicitly specified, as in the present model. Typically,
there are two sources of trend: (i) growth in population and (ii) technological growth.
Both are assumed to be a stochastic growth trend in the form of a random walk with drift.
As specified by Pfeifer (2018), for log-linearized DSGE models with a specified trend, the
respective variables are integrated, i.e. I(1) and differencing makes them stationary, or
I(0).
In the present model, original variables used to derive the firms and households’
problems are capital letters (Yt, Ct, ...) which need to be mapped with the original data
(Y datat , Cdatat , ...) when it comes to estimation. However, by incorporating a specified trend,
we have transformed the model’s original variables by εzt to obtain lower case model’s
transformed variables (yt, ct, ...). In order to estimate the model, transformed variables
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which are then log-linearized around a steady state (ŷt, ĉt, ...) have to be mapped with
observed variables (yobst , cobst , ...).
First, for integrated (non-stationary) variables such as output, the model’s original
variables are first detrended by dividing the trend εzt to get the intensive form of the






Y datat = Yt = ytε
z
t (3.17)
This equation cannot be entered into Dynare because εzt is not a stationary variable.
However, its growth rate in the detrended law of motion is stationary. Thus, in order to
get rid of εzt , we can simply work with its growth rate, µz,t. This term only enters the
measurement equations of variables that have a real unit root in the model.
Differencing the logs of Y datat gives exactly the observed variable yobst because
yobst = log(Y
data
t )− log(Y datat−1 )
= log(Yt)− log(Yt−1)
= log(yt)− log(yt−1) + [log(εzt )− log(εzt−1)]





yobst = ŷt − ŷt−1 + µ̂z,t
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Second, for stationary variables, such as inflation and interest rates, we can simply
take difference of the log of data
πobst = log(π
data
t )− log(πdatat−1 )
Robst = log(R
data
t )− log(Rdatat−1 )
And the measurement equations should be
πobst = π̂t − π̂t−1
Robst = R̂t − R̂t−1
In order to estimate the parameters of the DSGE model presented in Chapter 2, a
quarterly macroeconomic dataset published by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam
over the period 1996:1 - 2012:2 is then collected which covers 66 data points. The vector
of observables consists of 13 variables, including 10 domestic and 3 foreign variables. The
US output, inflation, and the federal funds rate series are used as the world indicators.
Thus, the data vector is given by
Datat = {GDP (Yt), household consumption (Ct), investment (It), real ex-
change rate (RERt), lending rate of four biggest commercial banks (Rt), in-
flation (πt), government consumption (Gt), employment (Et), exports (Xt),
imports (Mt), foreign output (Y ∗t ), foreign inflation (π∗t ), foreign interest rate
(R∗t )}
By construction, DSGE models focus on explaining business cycle fluctuations around
steady state values and model solutions imply stationarity of the variables. However,
original macroeconomic series often involve both trends and cycles, making it necessary
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to transform the series so that we can focus on cyclical behaviour. Thus, actual series are
seasonally adjusted with the X13-method of the U.S. Census Bureau and growth rates
are computed as quarterly log differences, while inflation and interest rates are expressed
at quarterly rates. A full description of the data transformation is given in appendix A.
3.3.2 Measurement Equations in Special Cases
It should be noted that, as argued by Adolfson et al. (2005), while data on consumption,
investment, import, and export are collected as simple summation of their components,
the corresponding variables in the present theoretical model are CES aggregates of do-
mestic and foreign components in the case of consumption and investment, or weighted
indices of consumption and investment goods in export and import. For example, while
data for investment are observed as Idatat = Idt + Imt , the original variable for investment
It is not just a simple summation of Idt and Imt as in the data but rather a CES index of
domestic and imported components.
Therefore, an adjusted original variable for investment Ĩt, which is the sum of Idt and
Imt adjusted with corresponding relative prices, needs to be derived and then used to map
with data on consumption (Ĩt = Idatat ). In other words, the adjusted original variable
plays an intermediate role in this context to link the model’s original variable (It) with




































= 1/χi,mit , which is the price of domestic investment relative to price
of imported investment.




































= 1/χc,mct , which is the price of domestic consumption relative to price
of imported consumption.


































Finally, log-linearization techniques are used to link the data (Cdatat , Idatat , Mdatat ,
Xdatat ) with the observed variables (cobst , iobst , mobst , xobst ), and then to map observed vari-
ables with the model’s original variables (Ct, It, Mt, Xt), or more directly with their
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log-linearized counterparts during the estimation process (ĉt, ît, m̂t, x̂t), through the in-
termediate adjusted original variables (C̃t, Ĩt, M̃t, X̃t). The corresponding log-linearized
measurement equations for consumption, investment, imports, and exports are as follows
cobst = ĉt − ĉt−1 + µ̂z,t (3.22)




(ĉt − ĉt−1) +
%5
%3
(̂it − ît−1) + µ̂z,t (3.24)
xobst = ŷ
∗
t − ŷ∗t−1 + µ̂z,t (3.25)
where specific parameters %3, %4, and %5 are derived as in appendix C.
3.3.3 Stochastic Singularity and Remedies
As pointed out by Fernández-Villaverde (2010), if the number of observables is more than
the number of shocks, the DSGE model will be up to first-order, stochastically singular,
that is, the extra observables would be a deterministic function of the other observables
and the likelihood of observing those added observables would be −∞ with probability 1.
In other words, there will be two or more linear combinations of the variables that hold
without noises, voiding any inference exercise. Thus, stochastic singularity, as argued by
Ruge-Murcia (2007), is one of the most important features of DSGE models which has
implications for all estimation procedures, limiting the number of variables that can be
exploited for the estimation.
Ruge-Murcia (2007) also suggests three strategies to deal with singular DSGE models.
First, the model can be estimated with a number of shocks at least as many as the number
of observed variables. Second, error terms can be added to observation equations of the
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state-space representation which contain no information about current or future struc-
tural shocks. Finally, the model can be extended to permit additional structural shocks
and this strategy seems to be attractive because it increases the realism of the model and
allows the use of more observables in the estimation process.
In a nutshell, in order to have well-defined econometric estimates, it is necessary that
for every observed variable, there should be at least one unobservable stochastic shock
driving its evolution, making it possible to generate the forecast error for every observed
variable and more importantly, a non-zero likelihood of fitting the predicted values from
our theoretical model with the observed data. In the present model, even though stochas-
tic singularity is not a serious problem during the estimation as the number of observables
is less than the number of structural shocks, measurement errors are still added to mea-
surement equations due to the fact that time series in developing countries in general and
Vietnam in particular are noisy and presumably poorly measured. In addition, measure-
ment errors are technically a way of accounting for model misspecification when the data
violate the cross-equation restrictions implied by the theoretical model.
3.4 Prior Distributions and Identification
3.4.1 Prior Distributions
One of the advantages of Bayesian estimation and inference is that the technique allows
us to use pre-sample information, which is often very rich and considerably useful, from
previous studies at both macro and micro levels in a formal way. Estimates of macro
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parameters from different countries are one of the best sources of pre-sample informa-
tion given a default belief, as argued by Fernández-Villaverde (2010), that individuals
are broadly the same across countries and that differences in behaviour can largely be
accounted for by differences in relative prices. In addition, microeconometric evidence
such as estimates on discount factor is another source of pre-sample information which
can be very useful for the specification of prior distributions. Pre-sample information is
particularly convenient when it comes to the estimation of DSGE models for developing
countries due to the limited source of data or the possibility of a change in policy regime.
During the estimation, prior distributions show us all the available information about
the parameter prior to observing the data. On the other hand, the data, or observed
variables, are then used to update the prior information in order to arrive at the posterior
distribution of the parameters which is characterized by its measures of location (mode
and mean) and spread (standard deviation and probability intervals). The present model
is estimated for 12 key structural parameters and 8 shock-related parameters. Table 1
summarizes the prior and posterior distributions of the estimated parameters. For prior
information, following Adolfson et al. (2005), a beta distribution is first used for param-
eters bounded between 0 and 1, including nominal stickiness parameters ξ, indexation κ,
habit persistence b, and the persistence parameters of the shock processes ρ. In the utility
function, habit parameter is assumed to fluctuate around 0.7 with a standard error of 0.1,
while the indexation to previous price is set around 0.5 with a standard error of 0.15.
Also, the Calvo and indexation parameters for wages are assumed to fluctuate around
0.7 and 0.5 with standard errors of 0.05 and 0.15, respectively. For the shocks which
are serially correlated, the prior mean of the autoregressive coefficient is set at 0.50 with
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standard errors of 0.2.
Second, the normal distribution is used for all unbounded parameters such as invest-
ment adjustment costs ζ, which is assumed to be around 2 with a standard error of 1.5.
Third, inverse gamma distribution is used for parameters assumed to be positive such as
the standard deviations of the shocks, domestic markup, and the substitution elasticities.
The domestic markup is assumed to be around 1.2 with a standard error of 2.0, while the
priors for substitution elasticities are set at 1.5 with a standard error of 4.0. The means
for the standard deviations of the monetary policy rule, government spending rule, and
domestic mark-up shocks, which are of interest of the present study, are set at 0.1, 0.5,
and 0.1, respectively. Two degrees of freedom (standard deviation 2) are also admitted
for all of them, which is considered by Smets & Wouters (2007) to be a rather loose prior.
Finally, the parameters describing monetary policy rule, which is the focus of the
present research, are based on a standard Taylor rule. While the long-run reaction on
inflation and output are described by a normal distribution with mean 2.0 and 0.125 and
standard errors 0.25 and 0.05, respectively, the persistence of the policy rule is deter-
mined by the coefficient of the lagged interest rate, which is also assumed to be normally
distributed around a mean of 0.75 with a standard error of 0.1.
3.4.2 Identification Analysis of the Parameters
Before taking the model to data, we need to confront the question of parameter identifi-
ability as parameter identification is a prerequisite for the informativeness of the estima-
tors. This section seeks to answer two questions: (i) how to check whether a parameter
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is identified or not? and (ii) if it is identified, what is the strength of that identification?
In order to answer these questions, following Iskrev (2010) and Iskrev & Ratto (2011),
the classical rank condition approach24 is used to analytically evaluate the information
matrix of the reduced-form model and check for rank deficiency of the gradient matrix
to get information on the identification of the parameters given the priors and observables.
The parameters passing the identification check are then ranked in terms of strength
of identification. As defined by Pfeifer (2017), weak identification in general can be due to
(i) a correlation of the parameters in which other parameters also having exactly the same
effect on the likelihood and the collinearity dampens the effect of the related parameter; or
(ii) a sensitivity that the likelihood does not change at all, or the moments do not change,
with the related parameter. Correlation of the parameters leads to a flat likelihood at
the local point which can, however, be diagnosed and completely ruled out by checking
collinearity between the effects of different parameters on the likelihood. If there exists
an exact linear dependence between a pair and among all possible combinations, their
effects on the moments are not distinct and the violation of this condition must indicate a
24It should be noted that the sources of identification failure could, as argued by Cantore et al. (2016),
be (i) marginalisation (omitting relevant explanatory variables from the analysis) which is caused by
the model structure, i.e. mapping deep parameters to the reduced form coefficients of the solution and
mapping the solution to the population objective function (only this issue is considered in the present
study); and (ii) lack of information which comes from the data, i.e. mapping the population to the sample
objective. Current approaches to deal with identification problem in the literature can be categorized into
three main branches. The first group uses classical rank condition approach that checks rank deficiency
of the gradient matrices based on model-implied moments. Second, objective function method focuses
on population moments of the data. The last approach is based on observational equivalence focusing on
(non-linear) system matrices in the solution model.
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flat likelihood and weak identification. Furthermore, in order to elaborate the sensitivity
effect of the parameter, a moment information matrix is introduced and computed either
by using the parameter values at the prior means or by normalizing the identification
strength measures relative to the parameters’ priors on standard deviation.
Figure 3.1 plots the measures described in the previous section, showing the identifica-
tion strength and sensitivity component in the moments of the model where large bars in
absolute value (in the log-scale plot) imply strong identification for the related parameter.
In the upper panel, the bars show the identification strength of the parameters based on
the information matrix normalized by either the parameter at the prior mean (blue bars)
or the standard deviation at the prior mean (yellow bars). As explained by Pfeifer (2017),
the graphs generally use a log-scale except for parameters that are unidentified, which
are shown with a bar length of exactly 0. Intuitively, these bars represent the normalized
curvature of the log likelihood function in the direction of the parameter at the prior
mean. If the strength is 0 for both bars, the parameter is not identified as the likelihood
function is flat in this direction. The larger the absolute value of the bars, the stronger
the parameter’s identification.
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Figure 3.1: Identification Strength and Sensitivity Component
The lower panel decomposes further the effect on the parameters shown in the upper
panel. As pointed out in the previous section, any instance of weak identification can be
due to either the fact that other parameters linearly compensate (or replace) the effect
of a parameter or the likelihood does not change at all with the related parameter. The
weighting can be conducted with either prior means (blue bars) or prior standard devia-
tions (yellow bars). The results show that almost all of the parameters of interest, except
for λd, are well identified given our vector of observables. Moreover, the key parameters
of the monetary policy rule θπ, θy, and ρR are strongly identified both in terms of overall
identification and sensitivity component.
Furthermore, in order to disaggregate the impact of a change of the elements of the
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parameter vector θ on the model’s moments, as suggested by Iskrev & Ratto (2011), a
normalization/standardization procedure is implemented to plot three different measures
of sensitivity either at the prior mean or standard deviation using Jacobian/local deriva-
tives. As argued by Pfeifer (2017), since derivatives are not scale-invariant and thus not
easily comparable, the derivative of the jth moment of the moment vector mj with re-
spect to the parameter entry i, ∂mj/∂θi, is then normalized by the corresponding ratio
of standard deviation, std(θi)/std(mj), to have
∂mj/std(mj)
∂θi/std(θi)
The normalization of the change in the ith parameter ∂θi by its variance std(θi) techni-
cally accounts for different parameter uncertainty by ascribing, ceteris paribus, more im-
portance to more variable parameters as they induce higher changes in the moments, while
the normalization of a change in the moment ∂mj with its standard deviation std(mj)
allows for the comparison of the impact of the ith parameter on differently volatile mo-
ments, as explained by Pfeifer (2017).
The bars in figure 3.2 show the norm of the columns of three standardized Jacobian
matrices for the related parameter shown on the horizontal axis, including the moments
matrix25, the solution matrix26, and the Linear Rational Expectation (LRE) model27.
Consistent with the aggregate results, the key parameters of interest, especially monetary
policy rule parameters, have relatively good identifiability strength with respect to any of
25∂mT /∂θ
′. This matrix tells us how well a parameter can be identified due to the strength of its
impact on the observed moments, as in Pfeifer (2017).
26∂τ/∂θ′. This matrix shows how well a parameter could in principle be identified if all state variables
were observed, as in Pfeifer (2017).
27∂γ/∂θ′. This shows trivial cases where non-identifiability is due to, for example, the fact that some
parameters always show up as a product in the model equations, as in Pfeifer (2017).
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the sensitivity measures.
Figure 3.2: Sensitivity Analysis using Derivatives
Finally, figures 3.3 and 3.4 help to check the collinearity between the effects of different
parameters and show, as guided by Pfeifer (2017), which linear combination of parameters
in the columns is able to best replicate (or replace) the effect of the parameter in the row
on the moments of the observed variables. These are the results of the brute force search
for the groups of parameters whose columns in the Jacobian matrix best explain each
column of the Jacobian, which means that those groups of parameters best reproduce the
behaviour of each single parameter in the model. As the implied values rises, the related
parameter is more of relative redundancy, meaning weak- or un-identifiability. In these
figures, the darker red squares show the more critical collinearity between parameters.
The figures spot some concerns over possible collinearity of the parameters in the
present model. For example, the row of θπ suggests that there should be a correlation
between the effect of θπ on the model moments and the effect of a linear combination of
ρR and θy. However, as shown in Dynare outputs, the cosn of the collinearity pattern of
θπ and a combination of ρR and θy is 0.9787, which is not identical to 1, indicating a high
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but not perfect collinearity and thus not problematic in this case, as argued by Iskrev &
Ratto (2010) and Iskrev & Ratto (2011).
Figure 3.3: Collinearity Patterns with 1 Parameter
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Figure 3.4: Pairwise Collinearity Patterns
3.5 Estimation Results
The parameters which are chosen for estimation relate mostly to monetary policy and
to deep parameters (such as the nominal and real frictions in the model). Parameters
that are weakly identified by the available dataset or related to the steady states of the
observables are calibrated and kept fixed throughout the estimation process. As discussed
in the technical section above, during the estimation process, the joint posterior distribu-
tion of all estimated parameters is obtained in two stages. In the first stage, the posterior
mode and the approximated standard errors based on the Hessian matrix evaluated at the
mode are computed using the Monte-Carlo based optimization routine (mode_compute
= 6), which is not a standard numerical optimization routine such as Matlab’s fmincon
(mode_compute = 1) or Christopher Sims’ optimizer csminwel (mode_compute = 4) in
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terms of time efficiency. However, the latter is a derivative-based Newton-type and thus
a local optimizer, while the former should work more globally.
In the second stage, draws for the joint posterior distribution are generated using
the Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm, based on 300,000 draws, and the proposal
distribution is taken to be the multivariate normal density centred at the previous draw
with a covariance matrix proportional to the inverse Hessian at the posterior mode. Table
3.1 shows the prior distribution information and the posterior means of all estimated
parameters along with the approximate posterior standard deviation obtained from the
inverse Hessian. In addition, the table also presents the 90% highest probability density
(HPD) intervals for the parameters of interest. It is noteworthy that all parameters and
standard errors of the shocks are estimated to be significantly different from zero. As
argued by Smets & Wouters (2003), this tells us that they play a significant role in the
estimated model.
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Parameters Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
type mean std mean 90% HPD interval std
Monetary Policy Parameters
Inflation Response θπ norm 2.000 0.25 1.6353 1.3316 1.9185 0.1326
Interest Rate Smoothing ρR beta 0.750 0.10 0.8458 0.8091 0.8829 0.0113
Output Response θy norm 0.125 0.05 0.1558 0.0945 0.2136 0.0179
Structural Parameters
Inv. Adj. Cost ζ norm 2.000 1.50 2.7495 1.3033 4.2433 0.4365
Habit Formation b beta 0.708 0.10 0.6448 0.4621 0.7664 0.0192
Calvo Domestic Prices ξd beta 0.500 0.10 0.3205 0.1299 0.4997 0.0604
Calvo Wages ξw beta 0.675 0.05 0.6963 0.6232 0.7601 0.0321
Domestic Prices Index. κd beta 0.5 0.15 0.0624 0.0004 0.1282 0.0268
Wages Indexation κw beta 0.5 0.15 0.4608 0.2310 0.7192 0.0659
Domestic Markup λd inv. gamma 1.2 2.00 1.9571 0.5690 3.6867 1.0688
Inv. Sub. Elasticity ηi inv. gamma 1.5 4.00 0.9937 0.3759 1.6948 0.7280
Con. Sub. Elasticity ηc inv. gamma 1.5 4.00 0.5351 0.3104 0.7590 0.2396
Con. Pref. Shock ρεc beta 0.5 0.20 0.5834 0.3114 0.8521 0.0530
Labour Supply Shock ρεh beta 0.5 0.15 0.8755 0.8034 0.9434 0.0533
Invest-spe. Tech. Shock ρεi beta 0.5 0.20 0.9587 0.9328 0.9992 0.0176
Unit Root Tech. Shock ρµz beta 0.50 0.20 0.6796 0.5175 0.8011 0.0038
Stationary Tech. Shock ρε beta 0.500 0.20 0.3103 0.0427 0.5160 0.0651
Standard Deviation of Shocks
Fiscal Pol. Shock σzG inv. gamma 0.5 2.00 0.0074 0.0057 0.0091 0.1458
Monetary Pol. Shock σzR inv. gamma 0.1 2.00 0.1794 0.1721 0.1845 0.0480
Domestic Markup Shock σλ inv. gamma 0.1 2.00 0.0715 0.0245 0.1209 0.0234
Table 3.1: Prior and Posterior Distributions121
Furthermore, estimation results are also presented visually in figures 3.5 to 3.7 where
both prior and posterior distributions are plotted. The horizontal axis shows part of
the support of the prior distribution, while the vertical axis indicates the corresponding
density. The grey line depicts the prior density and the black line indicates the density of
the posterior distribution. The dashed green vertical line shows the posterior mode. As
argued by Pfeifer (2017), if the posterior looks like the prior, then either our prior was an
accurate reflection of the information in the data or, more often, the parameter of interest
is only weakly identified and the data do not provide much information to update our
priors.
Figure 3.5: Priors and Posteriors - A
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Figure 3.6: Priors and Posteriors - B
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Figure 3.7: Priors and Posteriors - C
A number of interesting results merit attention. First, the point estimate for the
domestic sticky price parameters ξd at 0.3205 is substantially lower than that of recent
estimated DSGE models where Calvo estimates suggest that firms re-optimize their prices
around every six quarters. However, the implication of an estimated average price dura-
tion of roughly 1.5 quarters28 is fully consistent with Altig et al. (2004) and Altig et al.
(2011) who show that firms re-optimize prices on average once every 1.5 quarters. The
difference is that while Altig et al. (2004) find an aggregate inflation inertia despite the
fact that firms change prices frequently because they do so by a small amount, the high
frequency and large magnitude of price change in the present model for developing coun-
tries can be the reasons accounting for the lack of inflation inertia in the model. Also,
as argued by Altig et al. (2004), this reflects conflicting pictures of price behaviour in
28The average price duration is 1/(1− ξd).
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which microeconomic data indicate that firms change prices frequently while macroeco-
nomic data suggest that inflation is inertial and these conflicting results are also present
in recent macroeconomic models. In addition, the estimate of the sticky wage param-
eter is 0.6963, indicating a considerable degree of wage stickiness where wages can be
re-optimized only after 3.3 quarters. The wage indexation parameter is estimated at
0.4608, which is broadly consistent with Adolfson et al. (2007) and Dutu (2016) where
their estimates are 0.497 for the Euro area and 0.50 using Indonesian macro data.
Second, the point estimate of the indexation parameter κd at 0.0624 indicates a sub-
stantially forward-looking Phillips curve in the estimated model. This result is empirically
robust as it is broadly in line with recent estimated DSGE models in which estimates sug-
gest that the Phillips curves in most cases are forward-looking. It should also be noted
that although the results are estimated based on a dataset from a developing country, it
is shown to be consistent with those from estimated models using developed countries’
data such as Adolfson et al. (2007) or Galí et al. (2001).
This result also suggests an intrinsic inflation persistence in the model economy which
is strongly supported by Levin et al. (2004)’s finding that if the central bank’s inflation
objective is not transparent or credible, which is a prevalent feature of many developing
countries, the private sector’s rational forecast of medium- to long-run inflation depends
on the recent behaviour of actual inflation. In addition, the intrinsic inflation persistence
property of the estimated model is also robust and highly consistent with Sheedy (2010)
or Fuhrer (2005) where empirical evidence suggests that inflation determination is found
not to be purely forward-looking but intrinsic inflation somehow can constitute the dom-
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inant source of persistence.
Third, in addition to indexation, habit formation is typically regarded as an essential
feature in rational expectations models in order to match the persistence in the data,
to account for the dynamics of the model’s variables as well as to improve its fit. The
estimated mean of habit parameter b at 0.6448 is also highly consistent with estimates
found by standard DSGE models. For example, Christiano et al. (2005) estimate habit
formation parameter at 0.65, Smets & Wouters (2005) at 0.69, Fuhrer (2000) at 0.8, and
Boldrin et al. (2001) at 0.7. Though it is admittedly hard to agree on the role of habits
in DSGE models, particularly in developing economies, the estimated result appears sup-
portive of the importance of additional sources of endogenous persistence in DSGE models
in explaining the inertial behaviour of macroeconomic variables. Also, as shown in figure
3.12, the slow contraction in demand for goods reflects the presence of habit formation in
preferences and adjustment cost in investment, as argued by Christiano et al. (2005).
Fourth, for the present DSGE model, the investment adjustment costs parameter is
estimated at 2.75, which is slightly higher than the estimate using the US data at 2.48 in
Christiano et al. (2005) but lower than the estimate of 6.9 for the Euro area reported in
Smets & Wouters (2003). The elasticity of investment with respect to 1 percent tempo-
rary increase in the current price of installed capital is thus 0.36,29 while the elasticity of
investment with respect to 1 percentage point change in the permanent price of capital,
which is adjusted by the discount factor, is 0.18, indicating that a permanent 1 percent-
age point change in the price of capital induces a 0.18 percent change in investment. As
29The elasticity of investment with respect to 1 percent temporary increase in the current price of
installed capital is 1/ζ; with respect to 1 percent permanent increase in the price of capital is 1/ζ(1−β).
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argued by Christiano et al. (2005), a more persistent change in the price of capital causes
a larger percentage change in investment because adjustment costs induce agents to be
forward-looking.
Fifth, the posterior means of persistence parameters of the supply-side technology and
labour supply shocks are estimated at 0.68 and 0.87, respectively. The demand-side shock
coefficient for consumption preference is estimated at 0.58. However, the persistence co-
efficient of the monetary policy shock estimated at 0.18 is substantially lower than the
estimates reported in standard DSGE models. This low level of persistence in the mone-
tary policy rule is also reflected in the inertia puzzle behaviour of prices in the estimated
model30. The estimates of the substitution elasticity of domestic and foreign investment
and consumption goods are 0.994 and 0.535 respectively, which are less than 1 and not far
from the estimate of 0.477 for Indonesia, a neighbouring country in the same region, in
Dutu (2016). This may reflect the fact that in many developing countries, the short-run
demand elasticity for oil import, a foreign consumable which usually takes a large share
of consumption, is very low.
Finally, the estimates for monetary policy parameters are 1.63, 0.84 and 0.15 for in-
flation response, interest rate smoothing, and output response, respectively. In general,
the estimation delivers plausible parameters for the reaction rule for the monetary au-
thorities both in the short term and long term. The estimate for the inflation response is
broadly in line with Taylor (1993) where the estimated result shows a long-term response
of interest rates to inflation greater than 1. The substantial degree of the estimated in-
30See detailed discussion in the impulse response functions section.
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terest rate smoothing is also in line with a common finding from the literature that, as
argued by English et al. (2003), the lagged interest rate enters estimated policy rules with
overwhelming significance31. The short-term reaction to output in the estimated results
is also significantly positive and different from zero, which is consistent with the standard
rule suggested by Taylor (1993). It should be noted that our estimates for a model for
developing countries with partial dollarization also reflect the fact that policy-makers have
to take into account the policy movements from foreign central banks. Thus, monetary
authorities appear to put lower weight on output in order to achieve its own targets such
as exchange rate stabilization. This result, surprisingly, fits the actual policy performance
of Vietnam in recent years remarkably well.
3.6 Properties of the Estimated Model
3.6.1 Impulse Response Analysis
The Bayesian impulse response functions of the macro variables to key demand-side and
supply-side shocks are plotted in figures 3.8 - 3.12. The grey-shaded areas indicate the
Highest Posterior Density Interval (HPDI) of the estimated parameters, which is the key
difference in the computation of impulse response functions between Bayesian estimation
and the frequentist approach. While classical IRFs are computed at the calibrated param-
eter combination, Bayesian impulse response functions show the mean impulse responses,
that is, parameters are set to the posterior means before endogenous variables are then
IRF simulated corresponding to this interval of the parameters32.
31Sack (1998), Clarida et al. (2000), Amato & Laubach (1999), and Goodhart (1996), for example.
32In case of Maximum Likelihood, parameters are set to the posterior modes.
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There are some typical as well as specific features from the Bayesian impulse responses
which are worth considering. On the supply side, the first result that stands out, as shown
in figure 3.8, is that there is a decline of employment in response to a positive technology
shock. This result is largely consistent with Galí (1999) who shows that a positive tech-
nology shock will have a negative short-run effect on employment. This is because in this
case, as argued by Galí (1999), the combination of price rigidities and demand constraints
leads firms to contract employment in the face of an exogenous increase in multifactor
productivity. Put simply, producing the same output will require less labour input as
the technology shock is positive. Therefore, we can observe a decline in employment,
which is in stark contrast with the basic RBC model33. A similar result is also found by
Rotemberg (1996), King & Wolman (1996), and King & Watson (1996). Furthermore,
the strong positive comovement of output and employment, which is generally viewed as
central characteristic of business cycle, then leads to a decrease in output. In addition, in
the face of a decrease in output which is triggered by the decline in employment, it also
brings about a decline in investment and consumption in the following quarters.
The decrease of output is largely consistent with Tervala (2007) who argues that in an
open economy, there is an additional factor that can cause a decline in employment and
output in the short run which is named “the expenditure-switching effect of an exchange
rate change”. It is because when the country’s currency appreciates, the relative prices
of exports also increase and world consumption shifts away from the country’s goods.
Furthermore, given a negative position on foreign bond holdings, as is well known in de-
33King & Rebelo (1999), for example.
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veloping countries, a positive technology shock will reduce the risk-premium on foreign
borrowing, inducing real exchange rate appreciation, as featured in the variable risk-
premium identity. As shown in figure 3.8, a technology shock leads to an appreciation of
the real exchange rate34, causing a decline in output in the short run.
Also, as argued by Adolfson et al. (2011), a positive technology shock in this case
creates a trade-off between a decline in the output and the induced increase in inflation,
leading to an increase in the interest rate. Therefore, as shown in the next section on
shock decomposition, technology shocks in the estimated model play a dominant role in
explaining the business cycle variations in Vietnam and these shocks can help explain
the negative correlation between output growth and inflation in the sample. Technology
shocks in Adolfson et al. (2011) produce similar impacts on aggregate quantities. This re-
sult is also in line with Francis & Ramey (2005) who argue that the sign of the response of
inflation and the interest rate in a model with nominal rigidities is a priori indeterminate.
However, it is shown that both variables always move in the same direction on impact
following a technology shock, while a monetary shock would normally induce a negative
correlation between these two variables. In addition, the real wage also decreases because,
as argued by Cantore et al. (2013), employment decreases less than proportionally with
output. The impulse response functions also show that the exchange rate appreciates in
34The appreciation of real exchange rate in the present model following a technology shock is largely
consistent with Corsetti et al. (2008) where a positive technology shock appreciates the real exchange
rate for at least a year (using US data). Similar results are also reported in Enders & Müller (2009)
and Enders et al. (2011). In Armington-type models, such as Raffo (2010), an unanticipated jump in
domestic technology leads to a depreciation of the real exchange rate. However, as the model economy is
assumed to be a very small open economy, it should not influence world relative prices.
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response to a positive technology shock, even though the key driver of the exchange rate
volatility, as shown by Eichenbaum & Evans (1995) and Clarida & Gali (1994), should be
a monetary disturbance35. This result is largely consistent with Enders et al. (2011).
As shown in figure 3.9, an increase in the disutility of work seems to produce quali-
tatively similar effects on real variables as a positive technology shock. As expected, a
negative shock to labour supply leads to a decline in employment and other real variables,
including consumption and investment, inducing a fall in output. This result is broadly
consistent with Altig et al. (2011) and Adolfson et al. (2007). Real wage increases, as ar-
gued by Cantore et al. (2013), because labour supply decreases more than proportionally
with that of output in the first several quarters. It is this increase in the real wage that
leads to a rise in the marginal cost and a rise in inflation following a labour supply shock,
as argued by Smets & Wouters (2003). The behaviour of the aggregate variables after
a labour supply shock in the present model is largely in line with the result shown by
Adolfson et al. (2005) that nominal rigidities are very important in shaping the dynamics
of the labour supply shock. If prices and wages are flexible, the labour supply shock has
limited effects on the development of the model economy.
35In particular, Clarida & Gali (1994) show that demand shocks explain the majority of the variance
in real exchange rate fluctuations, while supply shocks explain very little.
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Figure 3.8: Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock
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Figure 3.9: Impulse Responses to a Labour Supply Shock
On the demand side, it is shown in figure 3.10 that a positive consumption preference
shock induces significant effects on aggregate variables, which is also in line with Adolfson
et al. (2005). In particular, while an increase in the utility of the households leads to a
drop in investment, households have to increase their labour effort in order to meet their
desired increase in consumption. In consistence with Adolfson et al. (2005) and Khan &
Tsoukalas (2012), consumption preference shock explains for a substantial amount (10.88
percent) of the cyclical behaviour of consumption in the short run, as can be seen in table
3.2. In addition, as argued by Cantore et al. (2013), as labour supply increases slightly
less than proportionally with output following a preference shock, real wage also increases
slightly in the first few quarters.
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Figure 3.11 displays the pattern of the dynamic responses of output and its three
demand components, including government spending, investment, and consumption, after
a positive government spending shock. An increase in government purchases, as explained
by Galí et al. (2007), has a negative wealth effect which is reflected in lower consumption
and a rise in labour supply. The latter effect leads to a lower real wage in equilibrium but a
rise in employment and output. Given a constant money supply, the rise in consumption is
accompanied by an investment decline due to a higher interest rate. This result is strongly
supported by Christiano & Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter & King (1993), and Fatás & Mihov
(2001). However, the variance decomposition shows that with a chronic budget-deficit rule
in the present model, a fiscal expansion only has a limited effect on output and the effects
on other aggregate economic activities are also gradually transmitted36.
36A positive fiscal shock accounts for only 4.88 percent of output variation in the first quarter and dies
out rapidly in the following quarters.
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Figure 3.10: Impulse Responses to a Consumption Preference Shock
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Figure 3.11: Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Shock
Finally, figure 3.12 shows the dynamic effects on aggregate quantities in the econ-
omy following a shock to monetary policy. It is clearly shown from the results that an
unanticipated temporary increase in the nominal interest rate reduces consumption and
investment, leading to a decline in employment and output in a U-shaped manner. The
impact reaches its bottom after roughly one year and returns to the pre-shock levels after
approximately two years. While the fall in investment occurs because of a sharp jump in
the interest rate, the increase in real wage reflects the effects of a decrease in employment.
Keynes (1936) argued, at least implicitly, that goods prices were much more flexible than
the money wage rate and that firms should be regarded, approximately, as profit max-
imising competitors. In this case, the assumption of positive but diminishing marginal
product of labour implied a negative association between the real wage and the level of
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employment. Therefore, the behaviour of real wage in the estimated model is largely in
line with this argument as money wage rates are estimated to be relatively stickier than
prices, which are roughly 3.3 and 1.5 quarters, respectively. The responses of the model’s
real variables are broadly consistent with the results reported in Altig et al. (2011) and
Adolfson et al. (2005).
The estimated model is also successful in accounting for a trade-off between inflation
and output when a fall in aggregate demand leads to a lower level of inflation. However,
it should be noted that one of the distinct features of the present theoretical model
for developing countries is the inertia puzzle in the response of inflation where it falls
sharply after a positive monetary policy shock and then quickly returns and even slightly
overshoots the steady state. A similar result is also found by Altig et al. (2011). This is
because, as argued by Altig et al. (2011), the firms re-optimize prices very frequently at
estimated intervals of 1.5 quarters, given a relatively high level of capital utilization cost,
as further stressed by Adolfson et al. (2005).
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Figure 3.12: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
3.6.2 Variance Decomposition
Table 3.2 compares the contribution of respective structural shocks to the forecast error
variance of key macroeconomic variables of the economy in the short run, medium run,
and long run. Particularly, it shows the percentage of variance of the n-step-ahead fore-
cast error of the variables. Results, which are reported for 1, 4, 20, and 50 periods of
forecast horizon, show that macro variables in the estimated model behave differently af-
ter various shocks from the demand side and supply side. Some important insights emerge.
First, the effects of an investment-specific technology shock on most of macroeconomic
variables except for the real wage build up as the horizon lengthens, which is broadly in
line with Smets & Wouters (2003). In addition, the results show that the investment-
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specific technology shock is the key driver of the business cycle as it accounts for 70-76
percent of the long-run forecast variances in macroeconomic variables, including output,
inflation, government spending, employment, and the interest rate. In the medium run,
the investment-specific technology shock also accounts for more than 50 percent of the
variability of key aggregate variables in the economy. On the other hand, the unit root
technology shock only plays a limited role in driving the variance of output in the long
run, accounting for 12.15 percent, while it has more significant impacts in the short run,
inducing 26.15 percent of output variance in the first quarter and 27.12 percent after one
year.
Second, the results show that consumption preference shock plays a very limited role
in the present estimated model. In the short run, a shock on consumption preference
only accounts for 0.23 and 0.26 percent of the variation of inflation in the first quarter
and after one year, while a unit root technology shock captures 13.15 and 18.34 percent,
respectively. The consumption preference shock only makes a small contribution in ex-
plaining movements in output growth and labour inputs, accounting for 4.08 and 0.09
percent in the short run, respectively, while results reported by Ireland (2004) show a
preference shock’s contribution of 20 percent and by Galí & Rabanal (2004) 57.1 percent
to the variability of output. However, the insignificance of consumption preference shock
in driving the business cycle is broadly consistent with Adolfson et al. (2005) who show
that preference shock only contributes less than 0.2 percent to the variation of both output
growth and employment in any time horizon. Likewise, on the supply side, labour supply
shock also plays a very limited role in driving the movements of aggregate variables, which
is largely in line with Smets & Wouters (2003). Inflation, for example, is estimated to
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respond very sluggishly to both consumption preference and labour supply shocks at all
horizons.
Third, it is shown that monetary policy shock explains less than 1 percent of output
growth and labour movements. The limited contribution from a monetary policy shock
to the variability of the business cycle is not dissimilar to the findings reported by Galí
& Rabanal (2004) where monetary policy shock accounts for only 4.8 and 0.4 percent of
output growth and labour input variation, respectively. However, while Galí & Rabanal
(2004) show that monetary shock is an important determinant of inflation variability,
contributing to 27.1 percent of total volatility, a shock to monetary policy in the present
model contributes only 1.36 percent to the variation of inflation in the very short run and
its contribution is even less significant at longer horizons. This result is consistent with
Christiano et al. (2005) in which policy shocks are found to account for only a small frac-
tion of inflation’s variation and, at the same time, for a nontrivial fraction of the variation
in other real variables, except for the real wage. This effect, as explained by Smets &
Wouters (2003), could well be due to the fact that under the estimated monetary policy
rule, the interest rates respond strongly to a policy shock, thus preventing inflationary or
deflationary pressures from arising.
Finally, all markup shocks in the external sector except for the imported consumption
markup shock only explain a small amount of the variability of aggregate quantities in
the short, medium, and long term. Specifically, the imported consumption markup shock
accounts for more than a quarter of the variability of the real exchange rate in the short
run, which is broadly consistent with Adolfson et al. (2005). However, unlike Adolfson
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et al. (2005), the imported consumption markup shock is shown to be an important
supporting source driving the business cycle of the model economy, contributing roughly
7 and 3 percent of the variability of output growth and inflation, respectively, in the short
run.
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Inf. Wage Con. Inv. Exc. Rate Emp. Out. Spen.
Technology shock
1 period 13.15 10.94 87.17 9.83 3.27 0.00 14.10 26.15 14.11
4 periods 18.34 16.28 89.97 2.77 6.07 16.32 11.78 27.12 29.50
20 periods 17.60 31.32 70.91 4.50 6.51 18.04 7.94 22.15 23.70
50 periods 11.31 30.36 45.42 1.65 2.56 11.35 11.48 12.15 12.94
Investment-spe. tech. shock
1 period 10.77 0.54 1.40 32.35 0.53 0.00 36.12 2.83 2.39
4 periods 19.66 0.50 3.54 9.63 12.95 18.48 56.72 1.31 1.06
20 periods 54.76 4.99 20.33 59.44 57.42 57.79 73.57 44.15 43.92
50 periods 73.50 27.86 45.15 86.50 82.81 76.13 71.91 73.05 72.81
Labour supply shock
1 period 1.12 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.67 0.25
4 periods 1.65 0.51 0.07 0.39 2.11 1.28 0.03 2.01 1.64
20 periods 1.08 1.99 0.37 1.20 1.27 1.03 0.24 1.53 1.44
50 periods 0.60 1.60 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.55 0.58 0.69 0.65
Cons. preference shock
1 period 0.23 0.17 10.88 0.38 0.20 0.00 0.09 4.08 2.06
4 periods 0.26 0.14 5.01 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.09 1.19 1.13
20 periods 0.26 0.27 1.93 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.01 0.43 0.40
50 periods 0.17 0.30 0.90 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.25 0.23
Monetary policy shock
1 period 1.36 1.80 0.00 2.24 7.18 99.94 0.20 0.64 0.72
4 periods 0.73 0.34 0.00 0.81 3.42 2.93 0.08 0.93 1.62
20 periods 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.34 0.28 0.00 0.06 0.11
50 periods 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.05
Imp. Con. markup shock
1 period 2.94 3.57 0.06 0.52 18.94 0.00 0.04 6.66 2.98
4 periods 1.23 2.52 0.15 0.19 26.73 0.05 0.02 1.86 1.48
20 periods 0.33 0.28 0.72 0.02 8.59 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.10
50 periods 0.20 0.17 0.86 0.01 4.04 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.04
Imp. Inv. markup shock
1 period 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02
4 periods 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03
20 periods 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
50 periods 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Export markup shock
1 period 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.13
4 periods 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.26 0.24
20 periods 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.08
50 periods 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04
Note: Con. consumption; Inv. investment; Exc. exchange rate; Emp. employment; Spen. spending.
Table 3.2: Variance Decomposition (in percent)142
3.6.3 Historical Decomposition
While smoothed variables and smoothed shocks plots generate the best guess for the path
of all observed variables and the best guess for the structural shocks of the theoretical
model, given our set of observables (mean estimate of the smoothed variables and the
smoothed structural shocks), following Pfeifer (2017), figures 3.13 and 3.14 go one step
further to decompose the contribution of the respective smoothed shocks to the deviation
of the smoothed endogenous variables from its steady state37. The black line shows the
deviation of the smoothed value of the corresponding endogenous variable from its steady
state at the specified parameter set. This parameter set is, by default, the posterior mean
when Bayesian estimation is performed and posterior mode in case of Maximum Likeli-
hood. The coloured bars describe the contribution of the respective smoothed shocks to
the deviation of the corresponding smoothed variable from its steady state. In fact, this
can be taken as the best guess of the shocks that lead to the best guess of the deviation of
the unobserved endogenous variables. As argued by Pfeifer (2017), the initial values indi-
cate the part of the deviations from steady state which is not explained by the smoothed
shocks, but rather by the unknown initial value of the state variables and this impact
usually goes away relatively quickly.
Figure 3.13 decomposes the historical inflation time series using the estimated param-
eters. It is clearly shown that the variability of inflation during the sample period was
to some extent driven by both demand and supply shocks. The historical decomposition
results indicate that technology and labour supply shocks are the key drivers of the vari-
37The difference between the smoothed variables plot and shock decomposition graph is that in the
former, steady state values are added to the smoothed variables while the later excludes steady state
values.
143
ation of inflation during the whole sample period. Monetary policy also played an active
role in affecting the variability of inflation in the first half of the sample period, but a very
limited role in the determination of the level of inflation before and after the burst of the
global financial crisis in 2007. Initial conditions, which refer to the part of the deviations
from its steady state explained by the unknown initial value of the state variables, are
also included in the plots. The influence of the initial values, by construction, usually dies
out relatively quickly as shown in the figures, but its persistence depends on how much
persistence the model has.
Figure 3.13: Historical Decomposition of Inflation
The contributions of various shocks to the variation of interest rate during the sample
period are depicted in figure 3.14. The figure shows that, according to the estimated
model, shocks to technology and labour supply played a dominant role in explaining the
variation in interest rates during the sample period. This result is broadly consistent with
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the variance decomposition analysis in the previous section and reflects the fact that the
dynamics of the model economy depends more heavily on the supply side. It is shown
that a shock to labour supply was the key factor in driving the variability of interest rate
during the financial crisis, other than a relatively large contribution from the initial values
of the state variable in the beginning of the sample period. In addition, the monetary
policy manipulation of the authority also plays a non-trivial role in the variance of the
interest rate during the whole sample period.
Figure 3.14: Historical Decomposition of Interest Rate
3.7 Model Fit
It is shown that the present model is able to produce reasonable and significant estimates
of the model parameters. This section discusses the smoothed variables and smoothed
shocks from the estimated model and a comparison of different versions of the theoretical
145
model with respect to different degrees of partial dollarization in the economy. In addition,
the overall significance of the estimates is also analysed through the assessment of the
multivariate convergence diagnostics.
3.7.1 Smoothed Variables and Smoothed Shocks
Figures 3.15 and 3.16 show the smoothed shocks plots during the estimation process. The
black lines show the estimate of the smoothed structural shocks, or the best guess for the
structural shocks given all observables. These are derived from the Kalman smoother at
the posterior mean in the Bayesian estimation, as explained by Pfeifer (2017).
Figure 3.15: Smoothed Shocks - A
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Figure 3.16: Smoothed Shocks - B
In addition, figure 3.17 plots the historical and smoothed variables, which are the best
guess for observed variables used in the estimation in comparison with their actual data.
While the dashed black lines show the actual data, the red lines indicate the estimate
of the smoothed variable, or the best guess for the observed variables given all observed
data, as guided by Pfeifer (2017). These are also derived from the Kalman smoother at
the posterior mean in the Bayesian estimation.
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Figure 3.17: Historical and Smoothed Variables
These figures show that the estimated model succeeds in producing the in-sample fit,
given the conformity of the data and the artificial time series generated from the estimated
model. It is also noticeable that the smoothed shock plots show that most of the shocks
are also in line with our a priori expectations.
3.7.2 Model Comparison and Validation
As argued by Cantore et al. (2016), the plausibility of the model can be assessed by com-
paring the marginal likelihood associated with different variants of the theoretical model,
the vector autocovariance or the unconditional second moments with those of the data. In
this section, the role of partial dollarization is further investigated by comparing the log
marginal likelihood of the baseline model with the log marginal likelihood for a specifica-
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tion of the model at high level of dollarization, where δpd = 0.46 and a low dollarization
scenario where δpd = 0.01.
Bayesian inference, as argued by Cantore et al. (2016), provides a framework for the
comparison of alternative and potentially misspecified models based on their marginal




Under the framework of Bayesian estimation so far, the unconditional density of the
data p(y) has not been used/needed in order to maximize the likelihood p(θ|y) with respect
to θ. However, the unconditional density of the data is of importance in performing
Bayesian model comparisons. It is computed by integrating over the prior distribution





As argued by Smets & Wouters (2003), the marginal likelihood of a model reflects its
prediction performance and the Bayes factor compares abilities of alternative models in
predicting out of sample. For a particular model mi ∈M among a number of alternatives
M models, the marginal likelihood of the corresponding model and the Bayes Factor











where p(θ|mi) is the prior, p(y|mi) is the data density for model mi given parameter
vector θ, and the log-likelihood LL(y|mi) ≡ log[p(y|mi)] can be obtained from the log of
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the marginal likelihood mentioned above.
Given the Bayes factors, the corresponding model probabilities are given by
pi = p1BFi,1
where p1 = 1/
∑n
i=2BFi,1 given the fact that
∑n
i=1 pi = 1.
Table 3.3 reports the log marginal likelihood of alternative variants of the original
model with different levels of partial dollarization together with the corresponding Bayes
factors related to the baseline model. The probability of each variant of the model is
computed based on its log-likelihood values obtained from the first and second stage of
the estimation. The log marginal likelihood results show that the sample data prefer the
high-dollarization scenario with a log marginal likelihood of -1934.51, larger than that of
the baseline model (-2229.73) and the low-dollarization version of the model (-1953.30).
In other words, the estimated model with high level of partial dollarization is the most
favourable variant of the theoretical model with respect to its ability to capture the main
features of the macroeconomic data of Vietnam and entertain the structural shocks to
capture the stochastics.
Model Low Dol. Baseline High Dol.
LLs (Stage 1) -1974.83 -2325.93 -1965.18
LLs (MCMC) -1953.30 -2229.73 -1934.51
Bayes Factors to Baseline 1.13 1 1.63
Prob (MCMC) 0 0 1
Table 3.3: Marginal Log-likelihood Values
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Furthermore, table 3.3 also shows the computed results of the Bayes factors of the
model with high and low levels of partial dollarization in relation to the baseline model.
While the results indicate that the Bayes factor of 1.13 is in favour of the model with low
level of partial dollarization, the model with high level of partial dollarization is even more
favourable than the baseline model with the Bayes factor at 1.63. In addition, the results
on model probabilities also suggest that the model with high level of partial dollarization
does the best in predicting all of the observables over the sample period. This specification
of the model will thus be the one to be used in the qualitative and quantitative analyses
as well as the computation of optimal policies in the next chapter.
However, the limitation of this likelihood comparison methodology is that the assess-
ment of model fit can only be implemented within the range of variants of the same model
with different restrictions. The outperforming model in the space of competing models
may, as argued by Cantore et al. (2016), still be inadequate in capturing the key dynam-
ics of the data. Sims (2002) argues that weighting the evidence in favour of a particular
characteristic of the model but failing to account for other aspects of the specification of
the model may lead to disparate inference which is the comparison of things belonging to
totally different kinds and not in the same class. As the models being considered are too
sparse, thus using posterior odds can lead to extreme outcomes and may also be highly
dependent on the prior distribution. As proposed by Sims (2002), the possible solution to
solve this problem is to “fill the space of models” in order to address the lack of continuity
in the model space and to make the model comparison more robust.
Therefore, while Bayes Factors can be used to assess the relative fit among different
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variants of the model, absolute fit of each variant of the model can be evaluated by com-
paring the corresponding model-based test quantities with those in the data. Following
Schorfheide (2000), the absolute fit of the estimated model can be evaluated by comparing
the test quantity T (y), which is a test criteria that reflects any aspects of the data such
as second moment, with the corresponding predictive quantity T (ysim). This predictive
quantity T (ysim) is obtained from the simulation of the estimated model in which the
path of the variables over the number of simulated periods is first computed by solving
all of the model equations for every period, and then the result will be used to compute
the empirical moments of the simulated variables ysim.
Table 3.4 shows some selected second moments of three key variables (output, infla-
tion, and interest rate) implied by the Bayesian estimation procedure, including standard
deviation, cross-correlation with output, and autocorrelation of order 1. These are com-
puted by solving the models at the posterior means obtained from the estimation. The
statistics are then compared with the second moments in the actual data in order to
evaluate the corresponding estimated model’s empirical performance.
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Output Inflation Interest Rate
Standard Deviation
Data 22.3876 2.0986 0.7119
Low DL 10.4029 6.9772 13.8640
Baseline 12.4452 4.9774 7.8939
High DL 22.1376 44.4151 24.0392
Cross-correlation with Output
Data 1 -0.2116 0.0418
Low DL 1 -0.0504 -0.1770
Baseline 1 -0.0931 -0.1012
High DL 1 -0.0968 0.0260
Autocorrelation (Order 1)
Data -0.74 0.5379 0.8124
Low DL 0.0880 0.4587 0.3174
Baseline 0.0943 0.6604 0.5534
High DL 0.4731 -0.0766 0.5011
Table 3.4: Selected Second Moments of the Model Variants
Finally, in order to investigate further how the estimated models capture the data’s
statistics and especially the persistence, following Fuhrer & Moore (1995), the vector
autocorelation functions of the respective models with low, high, and baseline levels of
partial dollarization are compared with those in the data. Figure 3.18 compares the au-
tocorrelation functions up to order 10 with respect to output, inflation, and interest rate
generated by three variants of the model with those in the observables.
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Figure 3.18: Autocorrelation Functions Comparison
A number of results are worth noting. First, the cross-correlation of inflation and
the interest rate with output statistics indicate that only the high-dollarization version is
indeed able to mimic the sign and the magnitude of the cross-correlation in the data. Sec-
ond, the upper part of table 3.4 shows that the standard deviations of output generated
from the model with high dollarization level are the closest to those of the data, though
this variant of the model is not really successful in replicating the standard deviations for
inflation and the interest rate in the data. Third, the high-dollarization model also does
at least as good a job as the baseline model in predicting the first-order autocorrelation
functions of the interest rate, while the first-order autocorrelation functions statistics for
inflation are in favour of the baseline model. However, all three variants of the model face
difficulties in accounting for the negative first-order autocorrelation functions in output.
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Finally, the comparison of autocorrelation functions up to order 10 for inflation and
the interest rate depicted in figure 3.18 indicates that the model with high level of partial
dollarization is the most successful variant of the estimated model which is able to mimic
the autocorrelation functions of inflation and the interest rate up to order 10. However,
as mentioned above, all three variants of the model are not really successful in replicating
the autocorrelation functions of observed output. In general, even though there is quite
a room for further improvements in some respects, the model with high level of partial
dollarization is shown to be the most favourable version of the model which is able to
capture the persistence and volatility of key endogenous variables relatively well.
3.7.3 Convergence Diagnostics
The Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms that we are using in the estimation
of the present model are also in wide use for fitting economic models in situations where
the application of traditional estimation techniques is not easy38. However, one of the
stumbling blocks in using a MCMC algorithm is to determine the convergence of the al-
gorithm as it is not only that of a scalar quantity to a point, but a distribution of another
distribution. Gelman & Shirley (2011) argue that MCMC methods are wonderfully conve-
nient and flexible but, compared to more simple methods of statistical computation, they
face two difficulties: first, running the Markov chains long enough for convergence, and
second, having enough simulation draws for suitably accurate inference. Sinharay (2003)
argues that we can safely assume convergence of a MCMC algorithm if we are certain
that the sample generated from the algorithm is indeed from the posterior distribution of
interest. Technically speaking, the convergence occurs when the generated Markov chain
38The key idea of an MCMC algorithm is to create a stationary time series that is the same as a
posterior distribution of interest.
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converges in distribution to the posterior distribution of interest.
In order to perform statistical analysis on the convergence of the MCMC algorithm39,
Gelman & Rubin (1992) suggest running multiple chains with overdispersed starting val-
ues to compute and estimate the posterior distribution and a reduction factor reflecting
how much sharper the distributional estimate might become if the simulations were con-
tinued indefinitely. This is in essence a comparison of the between-chain and within-chain
moments of the second order and quantitatively represented by a potential scale reduction
factor (PSRF). However, the limitation of the original convergence diagnostic, as argued
by Brooks & Gelman (1998), is the assumption of normality of the marginal distribution
of each scalar quantity. This assumption is unappealing as MCMC methods are often
used for highly non-normal, and even multimodal, densities.
Therefore, following Brooks & Gelman (1998), the PSRF is further refined to compute
an interval PSRF based on the empirical interval lengths as a measure of information,
39A number of diagnostics have also been suggested. Some of them apply the theory of Markov chains
to the sampled values to detect if the sampled distribution has reached stationarity. Other approaches
compare the sampled distributions obtained from the MCMC for different runs, in which one run may be
the subset of another, and convergence can be concluded when the difference between some aspects of the
empirical distributions (mean, quantile, cumulative density function etc.) over different runs is negligible
in some sense. However, the key disadvantage of these approaches is that they can measure the distance
between the sampled distribution and the target posterior distribution rather than examining one or two
approximations of the latter. In addition, there are also a number of simple tools for MCMC convergence
assessment such as the time-series plots, running mean plots, plot of autocorrelation functions etc. These
methods examine the chains of values generated for each parameter to determine if the simulation process
stabilizes in some sense.
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rather than variance estimates. Thus, the interval PSRF is a ratio of interval lengths in-
stead of a variance ratio and in fact it does not require normality assumption. As shown
by Pfeifer (2017), while the univariate convergence diagnostics are computed based on
individual parameters’ distributions, the multivariate convergence diagnostics are gener-
ated based on the range of the posterior likelihood function and the posterior kernel is
used to aggregate the parameters.
Figure 3.19 shows the multivariate convergence diagnostics of the model’s estimated
parameters. As guided by Pfeifer (2017), the first subfigure with the appended “Interval”
indicates the Brooks & Gelman (1998) convergence diagnostics for the 80% interval. The
blue line depicts the 80% interval/quantile range based on the pooled draws from all
sequences and the red line indicates the mean interval range based on the draws of the
individual sequences. The second and third subfigures with the appended “m2” and
“m3” show an estimate of the same statistics for the second and third central moments
respectively, which are the squared and cubed absolute deviations from the pooled and
the within-sample means. As shown in figure 3.19, the blue and red lines in all measures
of interval, second, and third moments stabilize horizontally and are close to each other,
meaning that the potential scale reduction factors in any measures are close to 1. This
suggests that the parameters’ convergence has been obtained after 300,000 iterations.
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Figure 3.19: MCMC Multivariate Convergence Diagnostics (Brooks and Gelman, 1998)
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, the theoretical DSGE model is estimated using a full macro dataset of
13 observed variables from Vietnam. As far as my supervisors and I are aware, this is
the first estimated DSGE model for Vietnam. As the theoretical model features a non-
stationary technology shock that induces a common stochastic trend in the real variables,
the observed variables are then first differenced in order to achieve stationarity. Also,
given the limited quality of the dataset collected from a developing country, measurement
equations are also added to account for measurement errors in the data.
The model is estimated for 20 parameters using Bayesian estimation methods includ-
ing structural, policy, and shock parameters after an extensive identification diagnostics.
The results show that all estimated parameters are significantly different from zero. The
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data do provide useful information to update the priors so as to arrive at the posterior
distributions. Impulse response functions of key macroeconomic variables to structural
shocks show that the introduction of frictions in the model induces the empirical persis-
tence and covariances in the main macroeconomic data. The transmission of structural
shocks as well as monetary policy shocks are also examined thoroughly by a variance
decomposition at various time horizons. The estimates of the effects of the respective
shocks show that the technology shock on the supply side is the key source driving the
business cycle fluctuations.
Finally, smoothed variables and shocks are generated, and convergence diagnostics are
assessed to confirm the model’s ability to produce reasonable and significant estimates
of the parameters. Results from the model validation and comparison exercise are in
favour of the model with high level of partial dollarization, which is able to capture the
persistence and volatility of key variables relatively well. By and large, there is strong
support for the use of the present estimated model for optimal monetary policy analysis
in an empirically plausible setup.
159
Chapter 4
Optimal Monetary Policy for Vietnam
This chapter summarizes the methodology to derive an optimal mon-
etary policy problem with linear, forward-looking constraints and a
quadratic objective that yields a correct linear approximation to the
optimal policy rules under the estimated Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium (DSGE) model. A quadratic loss function is chosen
so as to facilitate the comparison of corresponding asymptotic losses
from an optimal Ramsey policy, an optimal discretionary policy, and
an ex ante optimized simple Taylor-type rule. A detailed discussion
on the dynamics of the model economy under optimal policy is also
presented in the final section.
4.1 Introduction
In a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model subject to nominal rigidi-
ties, it is shown that monetary policy can actively contribute to some extent to stabilising
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the real and nominal economy. Therefore, a large body of studies has focused on examin-
ing optimal monetary policy in both backward-looking and forward-looking environments.
Generally speaking, in an optimal policy problem the policymaker sets out a number of
instruments to maximize a general discounted welfare criterion1 subject to constraints of
a suitable DSGE model. Traditionally, when the expected discounted household utility
is set up as the welfare criterion, this becomes the well-known Ramsey problem in which
we get a complex solution in the form of a sequence of variables in the best equilibrium,
even in a simple New Keynesian setup.
In this study, we consider the case of a Ramsey policy, a discretionary policy, and a
simple Taylor-type rule for the monetary authority to gauge the feasibility of such policy
framework in the context of developing world with partial dollarization. When it comes to
solving this optimal policy problem, according to Cantore et al. (2016), only the Ramsey
solution is available for a non-linear model and for a general objective function which
is the expected discounted household’s utility. Thus, a linear-quadratic problem is, in
general, manageable and can be used for the computation of all policy options of interest.
The central bank’s optimal monetary policy problem is thus to minimize an intertemporal
loss function subject to constraints with forward-looking rational expectations.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the
early papers and arguments on the optimal monetary policy problem. Section 3 describes
in detail the optimal monetary policy problem in which we assume the central bank’s
ability to follow a commitment rule, whether in the form of a Ramsey problem or with
1Discounted household utility, discounted losses etc.
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an ex ante optimized Taylor-type simple rule, or a discretionary policy. A general frame-
work for the loss function is given in Section 4, focusing on a standard ad hoc quadratic
loss function in deviation form. Section 5 sets out the detailed mathematical foundation
of a linear-quadratic problem which facilitates the understanding of the central bank’s
stabilization goals and trade-offs and summarizes the computational methodology for the
linear-quadratic problem. Section 6 presents the results from the estimation of the optimal
monetary policy. The dynamics of the model economy under optimal policy is discussed
in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 contains the concluding remarks.
4.2 Optimal Monetary Policy in Retrospect
4.2.1 Early Discussions on Optimal Policy
The debate on optimal monetary policy can be dated back to the arguments between rule
and discretion schools. Fischer (1990) in a review shows that the debate started with the
rules of game of the gold standard under which rules were not well-defined, while active
discretionary policy was pursued to defend the gold standard. On the other side, Milton
Friedman was the pioneer economist to develop initial arguments for rules, followed by a
series of analysis on alternative rules such as constant money growth rate rule, interest
rate rule, or nominal GDP targeting. However, these arguments were under serious criti-
cism and suffered from the dominance of discretion.
It was not until 1977 with the introduction of dynamic/time inconsistency by Kydland
& Prescott (1977) that the case for rules rather than discretion was strongly supported
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by economic literature in the field. “A policy is dynamically inconsistent when a future
policy decision that forms part of an optimal plan formulated at an initial date is no longer
optimal from the viewpoint of a later date, even though no relevant new information has
appeared in the meantime”, as paraphrased by Blanchard & Fischer (1989). In other
words, Kydland & Prescott (1977) highlight the manner in which rational expectations
can fundamentally alter the nature of optimal policies by showing that “optimal, welfare-
maximising policies which are optimal ex ante become sub-optimal ex post or with the
passage of time.” The term time-inconsistency is generally used to describe this prop-
erty. The cost for this type of policy is a problem called inflation bias where monetary
authority, with a discretionary policy, can print more money and create more inflation
than people expect. However, though these inflation surprises can have some benefits,
they cannot arise systematically in equilibrium when people with rational expectations
understand the central bank’s incentives and form their expectations accordingly. As the
central bank has the authority to create inflation shocks ex post, the equilibrium growth
rates of money and prices turn out to be higher than otherwise.
Therefore, a significant welfare gain can be achieved if policymakers precommit to a
stabilization plan and the precommitment is made with credibility. Kydland & Prescott
(1977) specifically suggest that discretionary policy for which policymakers select the best
action, given the current situation, will not typically result in the social objective function
being maximized. Such behaviour results in suboptimal planning or economic instability.
Rather, policymakers should follow rules which specify current decisions as a function of
the current state, and economic performance will then be improved. Blanchard & Fischer
(1989) also argue that a precommitted government, such as one following policy rules, will
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carry out the policy that is optimal given that it is expected. A discretionary authority
may be, under rational expectations, expected to take short-run optimal decision every
time it can and the consequence is that it not only gains nothing from the action, but on
average produces a worse outcome than an authority with a rule.
Time-inconsistency problem of a policy can thus be understood as the case where
the central bank takes advantage of creating ex post monetary shocks to renege and re-
optimize the optimal policy to achieve its own target, leaving the overall social welfare to
be suboptimal due to an associated cost. In mathematical terminology, if the optimal rule
is recomputed at a later time t0 > 0 with the integral evaluated over [t0, t] instead of [0, t],
the rule is said to be changing with the passage of time and it can be time-inconsistent,
as in Currie & Levine (1993). Rogoff (1987) argues that the government might be able
to increase its own welfare, and in some instances social welfare, if it could precommit to
a path/rule for the money supply even if there are no exogenous disturbances. Dennis
(2007) shows that in the absence of a commitment mechanism, optimal monetary policies
in general are time-inconsistent. Time-inconsistency problem can be addressed either by
simply assuming that the central bank commits not to reoptimize, but rather just under-
takes a single optimization and implements the chosen policy in all subsequent periods; or
by explicitly modeling the strategic interactions that occur between the various economic
agents in the model2.
2It is a subgame-perfect equilibrium problem which commonly solves for Markov-perfect Stackelberg-
Nash equilibria. “Timeless perspective” is an alternative approach which is developed by Woodford (1999).
In this framework, the policymaker during its optimization process behaves as it would have chosen to if
it had optimized at a time in the past.
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Further development in mid-1980s has contributed considerably to the game-theoretic
discussion on optimal monetary policy. However, these early arguments rest on the as-
sumption that the game between policymakers and private sector is a one-shot game.
Under a repeated stochastic policy game framework, the problem of time-consistency but
non-optimality of discretionary policy due to inflation bias3 can be mitigated by an appro-
priate design of monetary policy institutions. Thus, Barro & Gordon (1983) first propose a
reputational equilibrium framework in which the outcomes are weighted averages of those
from discretion and those from the ideal rule. While Kydland & Prescott (1977) show
that commitments (rules) for monetary behaviour outweigh discretionary policy, Barro
& Gordon (1983) argue that it is possible for reputational forces to substitute for formal
rules given the repeated interaction between policymakers and private agents. Reputation
is modeled as the use of a “trigger strategy” in which the private sector sets low wages
(or inflation expectations) and the policymakers set low inflation. The private sector can
punish the policymakers by setting high wages in the next period if they set high inflation.
It is this punishment strategy that creates incentives for policymakers to preserve their
reputation of setting low inflation.
Blanchard & Fischer (1989) comment that reputation is the most interesting and
persuasive explanation of how governments avoid dynamic inconsistency. By acting con-
sistently over long periods, governments can build up a reputation that causes the private
sector to believe their announcements. However, solutions from a reputational framework
when dealing with time-inconsistency problem can become complex and give rise to mul-
tiple equilibria. It is, thus, not easy to settle down the coordination between governments
3Expected inflation is positive and exceeds the socially optimal zero rate and is detrimental to welfare.
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and the private sector within one particular equilibrium.
Second, Rogoff (1985) argues that inflation bias as mentioned above can be reduced
considerably by appointing conservative policymakers. This type of central banker, as
argued by Rogoff (1985), does not share the social objective function. When there is a
distortion leading to a high time-consistent rate of inflation, the society can make itself
better off by having the central bank place more weight on inflation-rate stabilization rel-
ative to employment stabilization. Blanchard & Fischer (1989) also agree that the more
conservative policymakers are, the closer the society comes to achieving the precommited
equilibrium. Among the optimal designs of monetary institutions which have been sug-
gested over the past three decades to deal with time-inconsistency problem, delegation of
monetary policy to an independent central bank has been the focus of large amount of
literature in the field.
Finally, optimal contracts are also a possible solution to time-inconsistency problem
of optimal policy. Walsh (1995) adopts a principal-agent framework and considers the re-
lationship between governments and central banks as a principal-agent problem. Central
banks are taken as the agent of the government which attempts to maximize an objective
function that depends on contingent transfers from the government. The inflation bias
inherent to discretionary policy is eliminated, as argued by Walsh (1995), and an optimal
response to shocks is achieved by the optimal incentive contract.
In general, these initial arguments on optimal policy focus mainly on the debate of
rules versus discretion. However, most of the early discussions are based on game-theoretic
166
analysis with one-shot game problem and hence may have overstated the government’s
credibility4 which can help mitigate or even eliminate time-inconsistency problem. Currie
& Levine (1993) suggest that it is, therefore, much more natural to consider this optimal
policy problem as a continuing game, not in the restricted two-period setting.
4.2.2 Recent Discussions on Optimal Policy
The topic of time inconsistency is of central importance in explaining many of the in-
stitutions of policy making, as argued by Fender (2012). As time-inconsistent policies
will generally not be pursued, policy makers are constrained to pursue time-consistent
or credible policies. However, as suggested by Fender (2012), there is a possibility that
many optimal monetary policies may be time inconsistent, so that the outcome will be
inferior to what would be obtained if the optimal monetary policy were pursued. The
time-inconsistency of optimal policies in models with forward-looking rational expecta-
tions has long been discussed and the arguments, as pointed out by Currie & Levine
(1993), are mainly formulated on the basis of Pontryagin’s maximum principle in which
the passage of time leads to an incentive to renege on the initial optimal plan and to
adopt a new one. The private sector with rational expectations can anticipate this and
the initial policy becomes incredible and the consequence is an inflation bias, resulting in
suboptimal monetary policy from a social welfare standpoint.
Woodford (2003) argues that the central bank’s stabilization goals can be most ef-
fectively achieved only to the extent that the central bank not only acts appropriately,
but is also understood by the private sector to predictably act in a certain way. Thus, a
4Time-consistency, inflation bias, rules vs. discretion, commitment, credibility are key issues in the
centre of the policy debate in this period.
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decision procedure based on a rule is able to successfully steer private-sector expectations
as systematic character of the central bank’s actions can be most easily made apparent to
the agents. Furthermore, Woodford (2003) points out that an optimal monetary policy
is generally not correspondent to what would result from discretionary optimization - a
procedure under which at each time an action is to be taken, the central bank evaluates
the economy’s current state and hence its possible future paths from now on and to choose
the optimal current action in the light of this analysis, which no advance commitment
about future actions, except that they will similarly be the ones that seem best in what-
ever state may be reached in the future. Therefore, much of the recent literature has
focused on the type of policy rule that a central bank should commit itself in order to
reap the benefits of policy commitment and, as shown by Woodford (2003), a commitment
to a relatively simple rule is supposed to represent the only feasible form of commitment
because of difficulties of explaining the nature of the central bank’s commitment to the
public some more complex case would otherwise have to face.
Currie & Levine (1993) develop a new approach to address the optimal policy prob-
lem in which optimal policies are examined under a standard control state-space approach
with a stochastic noise5 and the solution procedure for obtaining an optimal policy in-
5The significance of the stochastic noise in the model also helps transform the nature of the policy
problem from one-shot deterministic policy game into a repeated stochastic policy game.
168
stead satisfies Bellman’s principle of optimality6. By definition, time-consistent optimal
policy in this framework must not depend on past values of the state vector, while it will
for time-inconsistent policies. Central banks have to make a choice between two types
of policy which are time-consistent policies where the central bank has no credibility; or
time-inconsistent ones with credibility where the central bank does not succumb to any
short-run incentive to renege.
As argued by Currie & Levine (1993), Ramsey, discretionary, and simple rule poli-
cies are in essence all rules in the sense of a state-contingent or feedback procedure in
which monetary policy instruments are changed period-by-period in response to changes
in target variables such as output and inflation. Optimal policy in form of a Ramsey
commitment rule, as pointed out by Cantore et al. (2013), is formulated only once at
time t = 0 when policymakers simply set the co-state vector associated with the forward-
looking variables in the first-order conditions at 0. Thus, optimal Ramsey policy will
not change from period to period and is, by definition, time-consistent. However, this
policy is essentially a complex rule optimized at time t = 0 and future predetermined
components of the state vector at time t > 0 will not be taken into consideration in future
6As shown by Currie & Levine (1993), stochastic optimal control problem aims at maximiz-
ing/minimizing, for example, the function
J(u) = V ar[x(T )] = E[x2(T )]− (E[x(T )])2
Then, optimal control theory helps to, first, verify the existence of a minimum/maximum of the per-
formance functional J , and second, implement explicit computation/characterization of such a mini-
mum/maximum using either (i) Bellman’s principle which yields the Bellman equation for the value
function; or (ii) Pontryagin’s maximum principle which yields the Hamiltonian system for “the deriva-
tive” of the value function.
169
periods. According to Currie & Levine (1993), this is the key feature of commitment
policy contrasting with discretionary policy7.
While optimal Ramsey policy targets all endogenous variables in the model, an ex ante
optimized simple rule is “simple” in the sense that policymakers just assign the instruments
to a limited number of target variables. Thus, simple monetary rules can be characterized
by the solution rn,t = Dyt where policy instrument rn,t is managed to achieve the policy’s
targets and matrix D helps select just a subset of endogenous variables yt in order to
achieve simplicity. Simple rules, as argued by Cantore et al. (2013), are time-inconsistent
even in non-rational expectation models because the rules will change over time as the
optimized matrix D∗ at period t > 0 will depend on the state vector at time t and so the
new rule will differ from that at t = 0. Technically speaking, unlike optimal commitment
or discretionary counterparts, optimized simple rules are, as explained by Currie & Levine
(1993), not certainty equivalent in the sense that they are not robust, or in other words,
not independent of the variance-covariance matrix of additive disturbances. Thus, this
period’s optimized simple rule is not the same as next period’s, or this period’s optimal
rule will become sub-optimal next period, leading to the time-inconsistency problem.
Finally, discretionary policy which is defined as decisions based on the ad hoc judg-
ment of policymakers, without any predetermined rules, is also a stationary solution of
7The main problem with optimal Ramsey policy is the classic time-inconsistency problem facing
stabilization policy. As shown in section 4.3.1, in the absence of some institutional arrangements which
effectively deter any change in the previously announced optimal Ramsey rule, there is an irresistible
incentive to renege by resetting λ2,t = 0 at any period t > 0 along the trajectory of the optimal policy,
causing a time-consistent optimal Ramsey policy to become time-inconsistent.
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the form rn,t = −Azt, where A is the coefficient matrix and zt is the current period’s state
vector. In principle, as argued by Cantore et al. (2013), this is also a feedback rule but the
optimal monetary policy is “discretionary” because at each period t along the trajectory
of the optimal policy, policymakers will set the instrument rn,t based on the same period’s
state vector zt. This rule is thus also unchanged over time in the sense that the coefficient
A is the solution of an iterative process starting with some initial values and the process
then converges to stationary values of the coefficients independent of their initial values.
Thus, optimal discretionary policy is also a time-consistent policy.
In conclusion, recent literature using a state-space approach has agreed that optimal
Ramsey policy and optimal discretionary policy are taken as time-consistent, while ex
ante optimized simple rules are time-inconsistent. The comparison of different optimal
monetary policy setups should be conducted based on a standard control state-space
approach with Bellman’s principle of optimality, as proposed by Currie & Levine (1993).
The rest of the chapter evaluates and suggests the normative options for policymakers to
select from a Ramsey commitment rule, discretionary policy, and an ex ante optimized
Taylor-type rule by comparing their outcomes/related asymptotic loss values.
4.3 The Optimal Monetary Policy Problem
4.3.1 The Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey problem in a dynamic, stochastic, and non-linear form, as set out in Cantore
et al. (2016), can be expressed in state-space representation as follows
zt = h(zt−1, xt, wt, εt) (4.1)
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with transition rule
Etxt+1 = g(zt, xt, wt) (4.2)
where zt is a (n−m)× 1 vector of backward-looking/lagged/state variables, xt is a m× 1
vector of forward-looking/lead variables/jumpers, εt is a l × 1 vector of i.i.d shock vari-
ables, and wt is a vector of policy instruments, with size r × 18.





Then, the model equations from 4.1 and 4.2 can be rewritten in a compact form as
E [f(yt, yt+1, yy−1, wt, εt+1)] = 0 (4.3)







The optimal policy with Ramsey problem is to maximize the households’ discounted








subject to all model equations as constraints and given the initial values of the elements
of the state variables z0.
The Lagrangian is specified as follows
L = E0
{∑
βt [u(yt, yt−1, wt)] + λ
′f(yt, yt−1, wt, εt+1)]
}
(4.5)
8Note that under perfect information, all variables dated t or earlier are observed at time t, including
shocks.
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where λt is a column vector of multipliers associated with n constraints defining the
model9.
As shown by Cantore et al. (2016), the multiplier λt can be partitioned into two
components [λ1,t, λ2,t] in which λ1,t is the co-state vector10 associated with the backward-
looking component of the first-order condition and λ2,t is the co-state vector associated
with the forward-looking component of the first-order condition, which is xt. Thus, from
initial n of λt, we now need to meet 2n boundary conditions. For the first n conditions
related to the state variables, we know that z0 is already given, so they are satisfied. In
the present model, the only instrument is the nominal interest rate Rn,t and according to











9Note that the total number of variables/equations in the model is n. Each model equation is taken
as a constraint of the maximization problem of Ω0, corresponding to one of the λ.
10Co-state vector is a vector of first-order differential equations/partial derivatives of the negative of
the Hamiltonian with respect to the state variables. Co-state variables can be interpreted as Lagrange
multipliers associated with the state equations. While the state equations represent constraints of the
minimization problem, the co-state variables represent the marginal cost of violating those constraints.
State equations are solved forward in time as they are subject to an initial condition. However, co-state
equations must satisfy a terminal condition and are solved backward in time, from the final point toward
the beginning. In our case, z0 is given as initial condition, so co-state vector can be solved. However, as
xt is not given or a free variable, transversality condition requires that the co-state vector to be 0.
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and D,F are fixed matrices.
In the equation of first-order derivatives, all components need to be zero11. Since xt
is a free variable, as argued by Currie & Levine (1993), the transversality condition12
requires the remaining n conditions related to these forward-looking variables to satisfy
λ2,0 = 0 (4.8)
Thus, in the context of commitment, in order to achieve optimality, the policymaker
just simply sets this component of λt, which is λ2,0 equal to 0 at time t = 0. In periods
at t > 0, with this form of ex ante optimal policy, there exists a gain from reneging by
resetting λ2,t = 0. As emphasized by Cantore et al. (2016), it is this incentive which exists
at all points along the trajectory of the optimal policy that encourages the policymaker to
re-optimize in this fashion. In other words, this is exactly the time-inconsistency problem
we have to deal with in pursuing a stabilization policy with an optimal Ramsey setup.
11Kuhn-Tucker complementary slackness conditions.
12Currie & Levine (1993) argue that in the first-order condition of an optimal problem, usually defined
as an Euler equation, when we do the partition as above for the state and forward-looking variables, the
second part with forward-looking variables (usually with wealth) induces the transversality condition in
an infinite horizon case as follows
lim
T→∞
βT [−λ2,t(xT , xT+1)]xT+1 = 0
that can be interpreted as “the present discounted value of wealth at infinity must be zero, or wealth
xT+1 should not grow too fast compared to its marginal value βT [−λ2,t(xT , xT+1)].” This basically says
that λ2,t must be zero. In other words, nothing should be saved in the last period unless it is costless to
do so, which is βT [−λ2,t(xT , xT+1)] = 0 (Kamihigashi, 2006).
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4.3.2 Optimized Simple Rules
As shown above, the optimal policy in the form of the Ramsey solution for the instruments
can be expressed as a function of state variables and co-state vector of the jumpers as
follows
wt = f(zt, λ2,t) (4.9)
As argued by Cantore et al. (2016), the implementation of this solution can, however,
be problematic because of its complexity and the observability of elements of zt13. There-
fore, the literature also pay a lot of attention to simple rules, taking Ramsey solution as
a benchmark to compare and evaluate the feasibility of the simple rules. In this case,
the optimal policy problem solves for an optimized simple rule in which the vector of





where the matrix H selects a subset of yt from which to feedback15.
Given this optimized simple rule, following Cantore et al. (2016), we can redefine the
inter-temporal welfare loss at time t in Bellman form as
Ωt(zt) = u(yt, yt−1, wt) + βEt[Ωt+1(zt+1)] (4.11)
Given the steady-state values for the instrument w, the optimized simple rule prob-
lem then computes a second-order solution for a particular setting of w and solves the




13Technology process or λ2,t, for example
14In the present model, wt includes the nominal interest rate Rn,t only.
15In the present model, they are lagged interest rate, output, and inflation.
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given the initial values of the state variables z0 and the variance-covariance matrix of
shocks Σ16.
In the present DSGE model, we set initial values equal its steady state z0 = z and
maximize the conditional value of social welfare at this steady state, given the variance-
covariance matrix of the shocks17. The simple Taylor rule examined in this chapter is of
the form




t−1 − ˆ̄πt) + θyŷt−1
]
+ zR (4.13)
In order to maximize efficiently with respect to feedback parameters, following Cantore
et al. (2016), we re-parameterize the feedback parameters as follows
απ̄ ≡ (1− ρR)
απ ≡ (1− ρR)θπ
αy ≡ (1− ρR)θy
Then the simple Taylor rule now becomes
R̂t = ρRR̂t−1 + απ̄ ˆ̄πt + απ(π̂
c
t−1 − ˆ̄πt) + αyŷt−1 + zR (4.14)
This type of simple policy rule, as suggested by Taylor (1993), does not necessarily
mean either a fixed setting for the policy instruments or a mechanical formula. In fact,
this algebraic formula just sketches out a contingency plan that lasts until the monetary
authority officially cancels the plan.
16A diagonal matrix in all the codes.
17In a purely dynamic and deterministic model, there is no exogenous shock and the optimization
problem is driven by the need to return from z0 to its steady state z.
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4.3.3 Discretionary Monetary Policy
In order to evaluate the optimal discretionary policy, following Cantore et al. (2016), the









= u(yt, yt−1, wt) + βEt[Ωt+1(zt+1)]
If the value function is defined as
V (zt) = max
wt
{u(yt, yt−1, wt) + βEt[Ωt+1(zt+1)]}
Then, the Bellman equation should be
V (zt) = max
wt
Et{u(yt, yt−1, wt) + βEt[Ωt+1(zt+1)]}
As argued by Cantore et al. (2016), the computation of the discretionary solution
involves the minimization of Ωt at time t, subject to all of the model constraints, under
the knowledge that the same procedure will be implemented to minimize Ωt+1 at time




which show a policy function for the instruments and the transition rules for forward-
looking variables as functions of the state variables.
4.4 Quadratic Loss Function
King & Wolman (1999) argue that a loss function for the monetary authority plays a
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key role in determining the details of optimal monetary policy. Stabilizing output by
eliminating the “Okun gaps”18 as well as keeping a low and stable level of inflation are
widely viewed as important monetary policy goals. Thus, the loss function helps balance
different targets of an optimal policy and, in general, our presumption is that the optimal
policy should involve variability in both inflation and real economic activity.
Traditionally, it has been assumed that monetary authority should minimize some
ad hoc quadratic loss function, where losses are caused by key variables being away from
their respective targets. According to Woodford (2003), one of the reasons for resorting to
a quadratic loss function that represents a quadratic approximation19 is a mathematical
convenience as we can address the nature of optimal policy within a linear-quadratic
optimal control framework in which the characterization of optimal policy is relatively





where the monetary policy discount factor β is fixed to the value chosen for the house-
holds’ discount factor. The vector yt = [x′tu′t] contains xt: a n × 1 vector of endogenous
and exogenous variables; and ut: a p×1 vector of control variables. W is a time-invariant
symmetric, positive semi-definite matrix of policy weights reflecting the central bank’s
preferences over the target variables.
An alternative approach toward optimal monetary policy which is, however, less com-
monly used in the literature is a welfare-based loss function. King & Wolman (1999) also
develop a so-called welfare-based loss function which involves maximizing the representa-
18Between output and its potential level, as in Okun (1963).
19Second-order Taylor series.
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However, Ilbas (2008) argues that adopting a welfare-based loss function would make
our results rely more heavily on the specific assumptions about the underlying model
than would be the case under an ad hoc loss function. Adolfson et al. (2011) also point
out that the quadratic approximations of the welfare of a representative household are
very model-dependent and reflect the particular distortions assumed in any given model
because, as shown by Clarida et al. (1999), in this instance, the relative weights we as-
sign to respective variables in the quadratic loss function are also functions of the model’s
primitive parameters. The households’ welfare is thus, in any case, hardly a central bank’s
operational objective, although it may be of interest and relevance to examine how house-
holds’ welfare in particular models is affected by the central bank’s policy.
Therefore, following Cantore et al. (2016), a standard ad hoc quadratic loss function20
in deviation form is therefore used to evaluate optimal policy choices in this chapter,
20Intertemporal loss function has a discounted sum of all periods’ losses, while one-period loss function
incorporates only one period loss.
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which is of the form21











' 16var(πt) + λ1var(yt) + λ2var(rn,t) as β → 1
where the variances are unconditional22.
It is stressed by Batini et al. (2006) that this is the central bank’s loss function, not a
welfare function, which describes the actual policy objectives the central bank has rather
than what they should have. Also, it is desirable, as argued by Dieppe et al. (2005), to
have a penalty on the instrument variability. This is reflected by a positive weight on
interest rate variability in the loss function23. Therefore, the loss function of the central
bank penalizes the deviations of inflation, output, and the interest rate. In the simplest
case, all the weights are set to be unity or the central bank gives equal priority to the
21As argued by Vredin (2015), Smets (2014), and Froyen & Guender (2016), there should be an inclusion
of financial stability indicators in the central bank’s loss function as they are welfare-improving. Real
exchange rate, among others, is a major shock of financial stability and can be included. As shown by
Froyen & Guender (2016), when the exchange rate is given a non-zero weight in the loss function, the
loss under a Taylor rule at optimal policy is diminished considerably. In addition, as shown in Curdia
& Woodford (2011) and Woodford (2012), the presence of frictions in the financial intermediation sector
also leads to the inclusion of a financial stability objective in the loss function. However, for the sake of
simplicity and computational efficiency, the loss function is simplified by excluding the exchange rate in
the present model and this property would be featured in our further studies in the future.
22As the model is quarterly, the annualized rate of inflation entering the loss function should be πa ≈
4πqt , then the period loss function is given by 16var(πt).
23We should distinguish between discount factor (β) and discount rate (r). The former tells us “how
much agents care about a period in the future as compared to today”. If β → 1, agents take the next
period as equal. The latter shows the rate at which agents discount future utility in a multi-period model.
The relationship between two notions is β = 11+r .
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variance of annualized inflation, output, and also the instrument. However, in the present
research, following Yellen (2012) and Reifschneider et al. (2015), the weights for the annu-
alized rate of inflation, interest rate, and unemployment gap are all set to unity. Based on
the widely spread empirical specification of the Okun’s law, as argued by Yellen (2012),
the unit weight on the unemployment gap accordingly converts into a weight of λ1 = 0.25
for the variation of output in the loss function. Also following Yellen (2012), the variance
of the change in short-run interest rate is weighted at λ2 = 1.
In addition, as the discount factor β → 1, agents care about future period the same
as today. Then the ad hoc loss function used in the evaluation is of the form










' 16var(πt) + 0.25var(yt) + var(rn,t) as β → 1 (4.17)
4.5 Computational Methodology
The linear-quadratic (LQ) approximation approach is applied to this non-linear dynamic
optimization problem for a number of reasons. As argued by Cantore et al. (2013),
the characterization of time-consistent Ramsey equilibria for a single policymaker, and
even so for many interacting central banks, is well understood. Besides, policy can be
decomposed into deterministic and stochastic components and this is a very convenient
property as it enables the stochastic stabilization component to be pursued using simple
Taylor-type feedback rules rather than the exceedingly complex optimal counterpart. In
addition, for sufficiently simple models, LQ approximation allows analytical rather than
numerical solution. Benigno & Woodford (2012) also prove that the most we can obtain
181
with any generality would be for the solution to the LQ problem to represent a local linear
approximation to the actual optimal policy, that is, a first-order Taylor approximation to
the true, nonlinear optimal policy rule. Therefore, this section considers the stochastic
linear-quadratic problem which can usefully be employed to approximate the optimal
policy choices and summarizes the solution method given by Heer & Maussner (2009).
4.5.1 Stochastic Linear-Quadratic Problems
Linear-quadratic models have two essential features, including (i) a quadratic reward/return
functions24; and (ii) linear constraints. In other words, it is a class of problems with a
quadratic return function and a linear transition function. This specification of the model
leads to a wide application of the optimal linear regulator problems for which the Bellman
equation can be solved quickly using linear algebra. This is also, in the class of DSGE
models, used to solve the problem of optimal monetary policy through the quadratic loss
function.
Heer &Maussner (2009) provide a detailed framework of the stochastic linear-quadratic
model and derive its important properties. Suppose the economy is characterized by a
stochastic linear model
xt+1 = Axt +But + εt (4.18)
where xt: n× 1 vector of predetermined/state variables, ut: m× 1 vector of control vari-
ables of the model (which are set by the agents/fictitious social planner), εt: n× 1 vector
of shocks which has a multivariate normal distribution with E(εt) = 0 and E(εε′) = Σ.
24Describing how the agent “ought” to behave, or in its normative content, stipulating what we want
the agent to accomplish.
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With the presence of shocks, the social planner cannot control the economy perfectly and
has to choose ut before he can ascertain the size of the shocks.
Given the initial values of the state variables x0, the planner’s (intertemporal) objective
is to solve the maximization problem at t = 0, which is basically a quadratic function











subject to the model equations in 4.18. This expression shows that the objective function
is quadratic in xt,ut and there is also a product of xt and ut. The equation is by definition
concave in xt,ut25. This also requires that both the symmetric n×n matrix Q and m×m
matrix R are negative semidefinite, so both quadratic terms are negative: x′tQxt ≤ 0 and
u′tRut ≤ 0.













t in the present model.



































4.5.2 Solving the Model
There are two popular approaches to solve for the solution of the linear-quadratic problem
(Ramsey problem), based on Euler Equations method or Dynamic Programming method.
While the former relies on a linear approximation of the model’s Euler equations and
then solves the resulting system of linear stochastic difference equations to get the solu-
tion using a Linear Approximation technique, the latter performs the LQ Approximation
technique in order to approximate the policy function by value function iteration.
The second approach which is used for computational purpose in this chapter is also
explained in detail by Heer & Maussner (2009). Suppose the Bellman equation for the
stochastic linear-quadratic problem is given by
v(xt) := max
ut
{x′tQxt + u′tRut + 2u′tSxt + βE[v(xt+1)]} (4.21)
If we use the model representation given by 4.18 to replace the next period’s variables,
the Bellman equation becomes
v(xt) := max
ut
{x′tQxt + u′tRut + 2u′tSxt + βE[v(Axt +But + εt)]} (4.22)
The expectations are taken conditional on the information contained in the current
state xt. Let us guess the value function is given by
v(xt) := x
′










where P is a n dimensional symmetric, negative semidefinite square matrix and d ∈ R.
Then the following identity is also true
v(xt+1) := xt+1
′Pxt+1 + d (4.24)
:= (Axt +But + εt)
′P (Axt +But + εt) + d
From 4.21, 4.23, 4.24, the Bellman equation can be rewritten as
x′tPxt+d := max
ut
{x′tQxt + u′tRut + 2u′tSxt + βE[(Axt +But + εt)′P (Axt +But + εt) + d]}
(4.25)
Evaluating the conditional expectation of this equation we have
x′tPxt + d := max
ut








′PBut + βtr(PΣ) + βd}
Differentiating the right-hand side of 4.26 with respect to ut and solving the first-
order condition, we get the policy function for ut, which describes the vector of control
variables ut as a function of the state variables xt, as follows
ut = −(R + βB′PB)−1(S + βB′PA)xt
or
ut = −Fxt (4.27)
where
F = (R + βB′PB)−1(S + βB′PA)
In this expression, F , A,B are given from the model equation, R from the quadratic
planner’s objective function. In order to pin down F , the only term we need to specify is
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P . Putting ut back into the Bellman equation 4.26 we have














and second, an equation for P , also known as the matrix Riccati equation27 which is a
difference equation with quadratic unknowns, is given by
P = Q+ βA′PA− (S + βB′PA)′[R +B′PB]−1(S + βB′PA) (4.30)
Solving 4.30 by iterating on the matrix Riccati difference equation, or matrix factor-
ization, we get a solution for P which is needed to pin down F .
Thus, from equations 4.18 and 4.27, the dynamics of the economy is, finally, given by
xt+1 = (A− FBut)xt + εt (4.31)
4.5.3 Linear-Quadratic Approximation
Linear-Quadratic (LQ) approximation is the appropriate method to solve the linear-
quadratic problem specified in the previous section. According to Heer & Maussner
(2009), suppose the model consists of a n vector of state variables x, a m vector of
control variables u, and a current period return function g(x,u) which includes all the
non-linear relations of the model28. The model’s (linear) equations in this section are, for
27Riccati (1724) is the first official document on Riccati equation.
28The loss function in the present model.
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the sake of simplicity, redefined as
x′ = Ax +Bu (4.32)
where x′ means xt+1.
If we define a n + m column vector y = [xT ,uT ], then there is usually a stationary
solution of the deterministic counterpart of the model ȳ = [x̄T , ūT], which is also the
steady states of the model having the property that ȳ = h(ȳ, 0) where h is the policy
function.
Following Heer & Maussner (2009), the procedure for performing a linear-quadratic
approximation is specified as follows:
Stage 1: Approximation of the Bellman/Value Equation
If Q ∈ R(n+m)×(n+m) is the symmetric matrix that characterizes the linear-quadratic
approximation of the current period return function g, we can apply the Taylor’s theorem
to expand this return function at order n+m about the steady states ȳ to get
yTQy = g(ȳ) +
n+m∑
i=1







gij(yi − ȳi)(yj − ȳj) (4.33)
where gi and gij are the first and second-order partial derivatives of g at ȳ.
From this equation, by comparing Q and the coefficients on the right-hand side, we
can find out all elements of Q as follows

























with i, j = 2, 3, ..., n+m.
At the end of this stage, we get the matrix Q which is the core of a matrix R charac-
terizing the Bellman/value function.
Stage 2: Reduction of the Bellman/Value Function
In this stage, we begin to eliminate all future values of the state variables so that the
resulting quadratic form of the Bellman/value equation is reduced to a function of the
current state variables and the control variables. In order to achieve this target, we need
to implement the iteration all the way backward from the final point in the time frame
(n in this model).
After each step of the iteration process, we get a new matrix R which characterizes
a new Bellman equation. Suppose a matrix Rs characterizing the quadratic form of the







Let cTs denote the n+ 1− s row of the matrix
Cs = [A B 0n×(n−s)]
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The iteration continues until all future values of the state variables are eliminated from
the value function. At this point, we can move to the next stage of maximization.
Stage 3: Maximization of the Bellman/Value Function
It is worth noting that after stage 2, there are only the current state of the state vari-
ables and control variables in the Bellman equation. We can now solve the maximization
problem by taking first-order derivative of the value function with respect to the control
variables. Doing this implies eliminating the control variables from the right-hand side of
the Bellman equation. In addition, by setting the first-order derivatives to 0, we can find
an expression for the control variables as functions of the state variables. Though this
is exactly the policy function at this point of the procedure, it will not be the solution
until we get the policy function associated with the maximum of the value function when
convergence has been achieved.
After the last reduction step, matrix R is reduced to a square matrix of n+m, which
is associated with a value function V 0. We therefore need another m maximization steps
so as to get matrix R to be further reduced down to a square matrix of size n where at
this point we also get a new guess of the value function V 1.
During the maximization stage, at any step s = 1, 2, ...,m, the optimal choice of the
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control variable um+1−s as a linear function of the state variables and the remaining control










, k = n+m− s









 , s = 1, 2, ...,m
As mentioned above, a new guess of the value function V 1 = Rm+1 is achieved when
matrix R is reduced to size n. At this point, we need to compare elements of the new
guess to those of the previous one V 0. The iteration stops if and only if the maximal
element in |V 1 − V 0| is smaller than a threshold of ε(1− β) for some small positive ε:
max
ij
|v0ij − v1ij| < ε(1− β)
with i, j = 1, 2, ..., n.
In this case, we have arrived at the maximum of the value function. Then we stop the
iteration and jump to the last stage to compute the solution policy function. If it is still
over the threshold, we replace V 0 with V 1 and continue to iterate.
Stage 4: Computation of the Policy Function
During the maximization stage, vectors ds are stored in a matrix D of the size m ×
(n + m + 1). At the end of the maximization stage, convergence has been achieved and
the associated matrix D = (dji) can be used to derive the policy functions for all of the
control variables in the model. The last row of matrix D consists of the coefficients that
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help shape the policy function for the first control variable as a function of all n state





Similarly, the row before the last row consists of the coefficients for the policy function







Finally, we can construct am×nmatrix of coefficients of the policy functions F = (fji)
for all m control variables which are dependent on n state variables. The i column of
matrix D shapes the i column of matrix F by setting
f1,i = dm,i
f2,i = dm−1,i + dm−1,n+1f1,i




where j = 1, 2, ...,m and i = 1, 2, ..., n.








... f1,i = dm,i ...
...
... fm−1,i = d2,i +
∑m−2
k=1 d2,n+kfk,i ...






As shown in chapter 3, the marginal likelihood values29 speak clearly in favour of the
high dollarization scenario, compared to the baseline and low dollarization ones30. The
fit of the model is also considerably better with a high dollarization rate when comparing
second moments implied by the Bayesian estimation procedure with those of the data.
Therefore, in this section, numerical results for optimal monetary policies are presented
for the case of highly-dollarized economy (δpd = 0.46). Results are from a linear-quadratic
problem with a quadratic loss function on the part of the monetary authority. The results
are formally quadratic approximation about the steady state of the Lagrangian, repre-
senting the true approximation about the fully optimal solution.
Table 4.1 reports the asymptotic losses for an optimal Ramsey policy, an optimal
discretionary policy, and an ex ante optimized simple Taylor-type rule together with the
rule’s optimized parameters’ values.
Setup Asymptotic Loss ρR απ αy s.d
Ramsey 24.2043 n.a n.a n.a 1.9190
Discretion 37.7316 n.a n.a n.a 2.4322
Simple Rule 35.7184 0.9999 2.1281 -0.0609 1.7369
Table 4.1: Outputs from the Optimal Monetary Policy Problem
Several important features are worth noting. First, it is very clear that, using the
loss measure, the optimal Ramsey policy dominates the policy options, followed by the
29From Laplace approximation as well as from MCMC.
30-56244, -58887, and -60426, respectively.
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simple rule, and last, the discretionary option. The asymptotic loss is largest in case of
discretion which is 37.7316, slightly bigger than 35.7184 in the scenario of simple rule.
The loss is smallest at 24.2043 when Ramsey commitment policy is chosen. This result
has also been affirmed by Boehm & House (2014) that optimal monetary policy depends
in complicated ways on the underlying state variables and is often history-dependent, as
is the case of Ramsey commitment.
Second, in line with the previous literature, it is found that interest rate smoothing
plays an important role in monetary policy setting. The smoothing parameter is esti-
mated at around 0.9999 which implies a very slow adjustment of the policy rate to its
benchmark level. This is also consistent with Taylor (1993)’s original rule. In addition,
the estimated inflation reaction parameter is 2.1281, considerably higher than the average
estimated value of 1.5 for emerging economies by Hofmann & Bogdanova (2012) or the
same benchmark of inflation coefficient in Taylor (1993). However, rather than indicating
a genuine violation of the Taylor principle, this result may just be a reflection of the
central bank’s difficulties in coping with chronically high levels of inflation in a heavily-
dollarized economy.
Third, deviating from the standard Taylor rule, the estimated response of the policy
rate to output is estimated at -0.0609. This finding, on the one hand, implies a higher
preference for inflation stabilisation. On the other hand, the negative sign of output pa-
rameter also shows that under a heavily-dollarized economy where the autonomy of the
central bank is always the thorniest issue because of its dependence on the foreign central
bank’s policy, a monetary authority following a simple rule may still run an expansionary
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monetary policy to some extent to achieve its own targets31 when output increases in the
short run. This result is strongly supported by Hendry et al. (2003) who argue that in a
model where the key shocks driving the business cycles of the economy, which are tech-
nology shocks in the present model, produce negatively correlated pressures on inflation
and output, the second-round effects of these negative responses would facilitate rather
than undermine stabilisation32. In this case, while the increase in inflation requires the
central bank to raise nominal interest rates, an original decline in output also leads the
central bank to increase nominal interest rates in order to reduce the upward pressures
on inflation, seemingly at the expense of output33.
Finally, one way to assess the scope of the monetary policy activism or the ranges in
which monetary authority can manipulate the instrument to achieve its targets is to eval-
uate the steady-state variances of the nominal interest rate, which is the central bank’s
instrument in this case. These variances also highlight possible zero lower bound (ZLB)
problems which constrain the central bank’s ability to stimulate the economy during
downturns. As we can see from the results reported in the last column of table 4.1, the
31For example, exchange rate stabilization in case of Vietnam.
32As a priori perception, raising interest rates when output is already low would exacerbate fluctuations
and make monetary policy to have a destabilising effect on the economy.
33According to Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2019), the Taylor principles, which have become a central
tenet of monetary policy, consist of four elements: (i) the coefficient on inflation should be greater than
and significantly different from 1 (the nominal interest rate should be raised more than point for point
when inflation rises, so that the real interest rate increases); (ii) the coefficient on the output gap should
be greater than 0, less than 1, and significantly different than both; (iii) the inflation target should equal
2.0; and (iv) the equilibrium real interest rate should also equal 2.0. Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2019)
also find evidence that violations of one or more of the elements of Taylor principles, which should be the
case for many developing countries, can lead to the Taylor rule deviations.
194
central bank cannot have much room for policy manipulation with quite small standard
deviation of the nominal interest rate when following a simple rule.
4.7 Dynamics under Optimal Policy
4.7.1 Supply Shock
Figure 4.1 shows the impulse response functions (IRFs) to a positive (one standard devi-
ation) supply shock, particularly a technology shock, under the optimal Ramsey policy,
optimal discretionary policy, and ex ante optimized simple Taylor rule. The plots show the
IRFs as proportional deviations about the steady state for key variables, including output,
consumption, investment, the real wage, the exchange rate, employment, and inflation.
The nominal interest rate is used as the central bank’s instrument in this problem.
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Figure 4.1: Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock
The dynamics of the economy under the optimal Ramsey rule and the optimal discre-
tionary policy, which are depicted by the black and dashed red curves, respectively, are
largely in line with Galí (1999) and the previous analysis in section 3.6. As argued by Ter-
vala (2007), in an open economy, there is an “expenditure-switching effect of an exchange
rate change” in the model that causes a decline in employment and output in the short
run, following a positive technology shock. It is because when the country’s currency
appreciates after the shock, as shown in figure 4.1, the relative prices of exports also in-
crease and thus world consumption shifts away from the country’s goods. In addition, the
positive response of inflation is due to the trade-off, which is, as argued by Adolfson et al.
(2011), created by a positive technology shock34, between the decline in the output gap
34Unlike the traditional/short-run trade-off between the level of output/unemployment rate and the
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and balancing the induced increase in inflation. We see that inflation jumps up and output
declines right after the shock and it takes quite a long time, almost 40 quarters, before
inflation can be brought back to its steady state as the shock is literally persistent in this
case. If the technology shock had been less persistent, the inefficient trade-off between
inflation and output stabilization would be less pronounced. In addition, for all three
policy options, an increase in domestic inflation implies a real exchange rate appreciation,
which is broadly in line with the result found by Chang et al. (2015) using China’s macro
data. It should be noted that a positive technology shock is traditionally understood
to induce an increase in employment and output. Therefore, the opposite behaviour in
the present model is named by economists in the field the “technology-hours/employment
debate” as in Cantore et al. (2014), Cantore et al. (2017), Francis & Ramey (2009), Rujin
(2017), and Pelgrin & Corrigan (2005), and is further explained in the next section.
Impulse responses under the optimized simple Taylor rule are shown by the green
curves. It is clear that the optimized simple Taylor rule stabilizes inflation at a relatively
higher cost in terms of output, not to mention an initial puzzle in some quarters. This
is an unfavourable trade-off between stabilizing inflation and output after a technology
shock, compared with the optimal Ramsey policy. We also see that the optimized simple
Taylor rule is slightly less successful in stabilizing consumption and employment or stip-
ulating investment, whereas an appreciation of the real exchange rate remains for a long
level of inflation, optimal policy problems consider a new trade-off which, as defined by Fuhrer (1997),
focuses on an efficient long-run trade-off between the variability in inflation and in the output gap. The
research on the new trade-off suggests that attempting to keep inflation within a very narrow band may
increase fluctuations in real output and employment. Conversely, attempts to smooth business cycle
fluctuations more actively will lead to wider fluctuations in inflation.
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time. The plot shows that the optimal Ramsey policy is somehow more effective than
the optimized simple rule in terms of stabilizing inflation in the long run, although the
former’s initial response is slightly larger in magnitude. A qualitatively similar result is
also found by Adjemian et al. (2007). In addition, comparing with the optimal Ramsey
rule or optimal discretionary policy, inflation in the optimized Taylor rule falls sharply
and then behaves as a “puzzle” following a technology shock. Given the chosen simple
rule, this consequently calls for a puzzled fluctuation of the nominal interest rate in the
opposite direction.
Impulse responses under the optimal discretionary policy shown by the dashed red
curves behave almost the same as in the case of the optimal Ramsey policy. Similarly,
the optimal discretionary policy also outperforms the optimized simple rule by induc-
ing a more efficient trade-off between the variability of inflation and output. However,
compared with the optimal Ramsey rule, there is a larger initial jump of inflation after a
technology shock because, as argued by Ravenna & Walsh (2006), the central bank cannot
commit to producing a future deflation under discretion, making it less able to stabilize
current inflation. This obviously makes the optimal discretionary option less preferable
for the central bank. A lower nominal interest rate response also allows for larger scope of
monetary activism with the optimal Ramsey rule. Furthermore, as shown in figure 4.1, it
requires a longer time for real quantities including consumption, output, and employment
to come back to steady state under the optimal discretionary policy.
Finally, from a labour market perspective, figure 4.1 also compares the impulse re-
sponses of key variables of the labour market after a positive supply shock. We can see
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that wages, employment, and output fall and rise back to the steady state as the shock
fades away. As argued by Cantore et al. (2013), the real wages decrease because labour
supply decreases less than equiproportionately with output. We can also see from figure
4.1 that the optimal Ramsey rule, optimal discretionary policy, and optimized simple
rule lead to different levels of impact on the labour market with the smallest being from
the optimal Ramsey policy both in the short run and long run. Therefore, the optimal
Ramsey policy induces not only the smallest asymptotic loss but also the most efficient
responses compared with the other options.
4.7.2 Demand Shock
Figure 4.2 shows the impulse response functions for the same set of endogenous variables
following a positive demand-side shock (one standard deviation) to government expendi-
ture with persistence parameters being approximately 0.7. The dashed red curve depicts
the responses under the optimal discretionary policy, while the black and green curves
show the responses under the optimal Ramsey policy and the ex ante optimized Taylor
rule, respectively.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Shock
As expected, the shock materially affects real variables in the economy where, with
sticky prices in the model, firms respond to an increase in demand by raising output,
leading to an upward movement of the aggregate output. Output then decreases and
overshoots the steady state before rising back to the steady state in the long term. Fur-
thermore, impulse responses from other real variables in the model show that a shock
to government spending to some extent causes a crowding-in effect on consumption, but
crowds out investment in all policy options and the effect is much smaller in the simple
rule setup.
The major difference, however, occurs in the behaviour of inflation, which is shown to
be much more sensitive to a demand shock under the optimized simple rule. The plots
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under the optimal Ramsey rule and optimal discretionary policy show the same trade-off
between balancing a slightly induced decline in inflation and the variability of output,
which is in line with Adolfson et al. (2011), while there is a sharp rise of inflation under
the optimized simple rule following a positive demand shock. Contrary to the supply
shock, however, a demand shock under optimal policies results in a relatively less persis-
tent trade-off, which is approximately after two years before coming back to the steady
state in the medium term when, as argued by Khan et al. (2003), the price level should
be largely stabilized. The behaviour of key aggregate variables following a government
spending shock under the optimal Ramsey and discretionary policies in the present model
is largely consistent with Adjemian et al. (2007).
It should be noted that the response of inflation, under a technology shock and gov-
ernment spending shock alike, shows that commitment under the optimal Ramsey option
can enable the central bank to contain inflation more efficiently, which under discretion
rises substantially. This is, as argued by Cantore et al. (2013), a major source of welfare
differences which are highlighted in table 4.1. In addition, Cantore et al. (2013) also argue
that only the policies generating an increasing interest rate path after the initial fall are
time-consistent. The time-consistent optimal options, Ramsey and discretionary policies,
see this happening with a slightly larger drop of interest rate and inflation in case of
the optimal Ramsey policy. This can allow for an expansionary monetary policy when
inflation goes down, while it is not the case with the optimized simple rule.
In the labour market, as argued by Cantore et al. (2013), a rise in consumption de-
creases the marginal utility of consumption, inducing the households to switch from leisure
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and consumption. This feature is reflected in figure 4.2 by the opposite movements of
employment and consumption. While employment decreases sharply over 10 quarters af-
ter the initial increase, there is a strong upward movement in consumption over the same
period. Also, as labour supply increases much less than proportionally with output, the
substitution effect outweighs the income effect to cause the real wage to go up, except the
case of the simple rule.
4.7.3 Technology-Employment Debate
The behaviour of the IRFs for employment and output under optimal monetary policy in
most cases, as shown by our simulations, is the major point of distinction in this model.
We can see from the IRFs that there is a short-run decline of employment after a positive
technology shock together with a corresponding decline in output35. This result lies in
the centre of the technology-hours/employment debate which is, as argued by Cantore
et al. (2013), probably one of the most controversial issues in business cycle theory. In gen-
eral, canonical real business cycle (RBC) models36 predict that positive technology shocks
should generate a short-run increase in hours worked, while Keynesian models in which
output is largely determined by aggregate demand in the short run due to price/wage
rigidities argue that such shocks temporarily reduce hours (employment).
Proponents of RBC school, after the seminal work of Kydland & Prescott (1982) and
35Demand-side shocks are also shown to generate a strong positive comovement between GDP and
employment, which is generally taken by much of the literature as a central, uncontroversial characteristic
of any theory of business cycles, as argued by Galí (1999) and Galí & Rabanal (2004).
36In canonical RBC models, output is largely driven by supply-side shocks.
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Prescott (1986), have claimed a central role for exogenous variations in technology as a
source of economic fluctuations in industrialized economies. As explained by Galí (1999),
the RBC’s key argument is that aggregate fluctuations can be explained, at least to a first
approximation, as the economy’s response to exogenous variations in technology with a
highly positive correlation between the shock and hours (employment). This argument
has been strongly supported by the ability of RBC models to generate unconditional mo-
ments for a number of macroeconomic variables that display patterns similar to the data.
In particular, RBC models show that there is an increase of hours (employment) after
a technology shock which reflects the shifts in the labour demand schedule caused by
technology shocks. However, those dynamics have been interpreted by RBC economists
in an economy with perfect competition and intertemporally optimizing agents, especially
in which the role of nominal frictions and monetary policy is, as stressed by Galí (1999),
at most, secondary.
On the contrary, Galí (1999), in line with a class of New Keynesian models with im-
perfect competition and sticky prices, shows that there is a persistent decline of hours
(employment) in response to a positive technology shock. The movements in output
and hours (employment) attributed to demand shocks are strongly positively correlated
and account for the bulk of the business cycles, while neither is true for the fluctuations
attributed to technology shocks. Thus, technology shocks cannot be a quantitatively im-
portant and, even less, a dominant source of observed aggregate fluctuations. Instead,
their caveats notwithstanding, New Keynesian models point to demand factors as the
main force behind the strong positive comovement between output and employment that
is the hallmark of the business cycle.
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The pattern of the impulse response of employment generated by the present model is
largely consistent with the class of New Keynesian models, where it also shows a persistent
decline in employment after a positive technology shock. Over the past decades, most
of the rapid growth in many emerging economies has been propelled by export-oriented
industries which are highly labour-intensive in nature, as argued by Mottaleb & Kalira-
jan (2014). As the majority of labour-intensive sectors which have been reallocated from
developed to developing countries lead to a considerably higher share of labour inputs in
GDP, productivity growth becomes less a significant factor of output creation. Evidence
from Vietnam shows that an expanding labour pool and a structural shift away from agri-
culture contributed more than two-thirds of Vietnam’s GDP growth in the period 2005-10,
as in Breu et al. (2012). Thus, when labour inputs play a key role in the variation of out-
put, a sharp decline of employment after a positive technology shock, as established by
Galí (1999), should also be responsible for the short-run downward movement of output.
In recent years, a large empirical literature has been developed to identify technology
shocks as well as analyse the technology-hours correlation in order to provide empirical
validity for the above competing theories. However, as argued by Cantore et al. (2017),
its results rely on two strict assumptions that the impact of technology shocks not only
remains constant over time but also depends crucially on the speed of price adjustments on
the demand side. Cantore et al. (2014) relax these assumptions and show that the response
of hours depends on the factor-augmenting nature of technology and the capital-labour
substitution elasticity in either RBC or New Keynesian models. The results also show
that both of them can generate technology-hours responses of positive or negative signs.
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Furthermore, Cantore et al. (2017) provide empirical evidences using the US data in the
post-war period to reaffirm that the change in the response of hours to technology shocks
relates to changes in key supply-side parameters. There is a significant sign variation of
the response of hours worked to a positive technology shock and the sign of the response
of hours is crucially driven by a change in the magnitude of the elasticity of capital-labour
substitution. Therefore, to what extent technology shocks are responsible for the pattern
of labour and GDP fluctuations associated with business cycles remains an open question.
4.8 Summary
This chapter discusses the basic framework of an optimal monetary policy problem and
the linear-quadratic approximation approach that facilitates the estimation of the prob-
lem. In addition, the nature of the dynamic responses of the economy under optimal
monetary policy is also analysed with some important findings. It is shown that the prob-
lem of the central bank is to choose a time path for the instrument (interest rate in this
case) to engineer the time paths of the target variables that minimize the objective/loss
function. A central bank operating under discretion chooses the current interest rate by
reoptimizing every period. Any promises made in the past do not constrain current policy.
With rules, whether a Ramsey commitment or a simple one, the central bank chooses a
plan for the path of the interest rates that it sticks to for ever.
The key distinction between discretion and rules is whether current commitments con-
strain the future course of policy in any credible way, as argued by Clarida et al. (1999).
The two approaches also differ in their implications for the transmission mechanism from
policy to private sector beliefs. Under a framework of commitment, it is simply the bind-
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ing commitment that makes the policy believable in general. However, within a discretion
framework, a perceptive private sector forms its expectations taking into account how cen-
tral bank may adjust its policy.
The estimation results show that the optimal Ramsey commitment policy compares
very well with other policy options, while of the other two, the ex ante optimized simple
rule is almost as good as the optimal discretionary policy. The outperformance of the
optimal Ramsey policy is also depicted by the impulse response functions of key endoge-
nous variables of the model following a supply-side shock or a demand-side shock. The
optimal Ramsey policy allows the monetary authority to contain inflation more efficiently
than with other options. Therefore, the key implication from this chapter should be a
specified policy rule that could be recommended for practical use with great confidence.
However, as suggested by Clarida et al. (1999), it is not less useful to take a close look at
the cases of discretion and simple rules in order to develop a set of normative guidelines




This chapter presents the findings and contributions of the thesis and also relates the find-
ings of the study to the objective of monetary policy within the macroeconomic framework
of a developing country. The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section
is devoted to the research results of general interest. Key contributions of the research
are presented in Section 2. The last section briefly indicates some limitations and major
further questions which are prompted by this study. They form a potential agenda of
research beyond the scope of this thesis.
5.1 The Thesis in Summary
This thesis sheds a new light on the analysis of macroeconomics in developing countries
thanks to the use of latest macroeconomic theories and methodological tools. While new
classical school culminated in real business cycle theory, modern macroeconomists formu-
late models with the crucial element of a Keynesian perspective which is the view that
real economies are neither perfectly flexible nor perfectly competitive. This provides a
powerful cause for (inefficient) business cycle fluctuations and some indications of the
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temporary non-neutrality of monetary policy. Thus, imperfect competition/information
and nominal price rigidities later came to make their way into the current class of DSGE
models.
After the introduction of a general picture of dollarization and a thorough review
of the theoretical as well as empirical literature on dollarization in developing countries
in chapter 1, a DSGE model of a developing economy which pays a special attention
to important characteristics of developing countries is set up in chapter 2. This model
incorporates key features of New Keynesian economics and develops a setup for partial
dollarization on the supply side. Furthermore, a chronic budget-deficit rule which best
describes Vietnam’s fiscal policy formulation over the past decades is also examined in
the context of this model. These two features appear to be typical characteristics of the
macroeconomic background in many developing countries. The chapter also offers a sim-
ulation of the theoretical model, including assessments of the relative importance of real
and nominal frictions to explain the dynamic development of the model economy.
In addition, chapter 2 employs modern econometrics and computational methods to
obtain model solutions. In particular, perturbation methods are first used to derive the
decision rules and transition equations for forward-looking variables from the first order
conditions of the dynamic optimization problem for a representative agent. Calibration is
then used to pin down model parameters based on previous studies in the field, especially
studies on developing countries in the Southeast Asia and Latin America which share a
lot of common characteristics with Vietnam. Simulated impulse responses after a mon-
etary shock show that the U-shaped responses which are pervasive features of estimated
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VAR models are also displayed for most of the key variables in the model. Monetary
policy effectiveness seems to be only temporary due to a high level of dollarization in the
economy. This finding is consistent with previous studies.
In chapter 3, the econometric model is further refined and then brought to a macroe-
conomic data set of Vietnam which includes 13 observables. Departing from previous
studies which are mostly based on standard econometric and informal moment matching
methods, the research takes advantage of formal systems estimation, particularly Bayesian
estimation techniques which are now one of the most widely used system estimation meth-
ods for DSGE models. Given the derivation of model variables as deviations about steady
states and the explicitly-specified trend, measurement equations play an important role in
matching model variables to the data. A possible linear relationship among observables
is eliminated in order to avoid singularity problems that can arise with Bayesian estima-
tion. According to the estimated model, there is a considerable number of shocks that
play significant roles in the fluctuations of key variables under consideration. It is also
found to be a fitted model to explain the variations in the data, especially the dynamics
of key variables including inflation, output, and consumption following a monetary policy
disturbance.
The study also benefits from the use of a linear-quadratic framework to design an
optimal monetary policy mechanism in chapter 4 within the estimated DSGE model.
Linear-quadratic approximation methods are also utilized to approximate the asymptotic
losses for an optimal Ramsey commitment rule, an optimal discretionary policy, and an
ex ante optimized Taylor-type rule. Results show that a commitment rule dominates the
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other policy options and would be a useful benchmark or normative policy for monetary
policy design. While the external validity of the findings from this research remains to
be tested, its internal validity is supported by the multivariate convergence estimation
results and the robustness of the optimal monetary policy setup.
5.2 Contributions of the Thesis
The dissertation makes several contributions to the study of macroeconomic policies in
developing countries. First, the study establishes a comprehensive picture of dollarization
in Vietnam which is the country in focus of the research. It is shown that the rationale for
dollarization in developing countries, in the first place, lacks a standard theoretical justifi-
cation. Additionally, it emphasizes the need for empirical evidence on the behaviour of the
monetary authority under dollarization, in order to ascertain the foundation of macroe-
conomic policies in officially dollarized economies. The model economy of the study is
also the first estimated DSGE model for Vietnam, as far as my supervisors and I are aware.
Second, this is one of the early attempts to incorporate key features of a develop-
ing economy1 in a DSGE model which includes a dollarized supply side and a chronic
budget-deficit fiscal policy on the part of the government. As an “original sin”, the need
for official borrowing in foreign currency reflects domestic fiscal strains, which are acute
in many emerging economies, and particularly so when they import oil at times when
oil prices are high. Fiscal strains and reputational concerns create the need for fiscal
rules, of which Vietnam provides an example. Fiscal strains also create suspicion that the
1They are widely recognized as dollarization, budget-deficit fiscal policy, oil-dependent fiscal policy
etc.
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authorities might turn, as many have, to the printing press in emergencies. This strength-
ens firms’ and households’ demand for assets and transactions in foreign currency, as a
hedge, when permitted to do so. Hence “dollarization”. However, elaborating dollariza-
tion aspects of an emerging economy is challenging and the approach of the present study
focuses on, among other dimensions, partial dollarization in the form of asset substitution
of domestic firms which eventually leads to different Phillips curves for the group of firms
setting prices in foreign currency and the others, which set prices in domestic currency.
Various policy implications from three scenarios of dollarization (low, baseline, and high)
are addressed throughout the analysis.
The study reveals how to incorporate features from non-standard market economies
into standard DSGE models which are first designed to describe model economies with ra-
tional expectations and rationally-behaved agents. When it is taken to Vietnamese macro
data, the estimated model shows that different levels of dollarization in the economy lead
to different policy options for the authority. However, the high-dollarization scenario vari-
ant of the model is the best fit with data and the behaviour of key endogenous variables
is also highly consistent with results from other seminal DSGE models. This is one of the
key technical contributions from the research.
Third, simulation results under the estimated model show that dollarization hinders
the effectiveness of monetary policy, which accords closely with predominant findings
from previous studies. Partial dollarization makes the demand for domestic money more
volatile and more sensitive to a monetary expansion or an exchange rate fluctuation. The
strong positive correlation between exchange rate volatility and dollarization is also a
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serious challenge to monetary authorities in dollarized economies. Furthermore, it is the
high elasticity of inflation to a monetary shock that limits the scope for monetary policy
effectiveness because of a lack of self-stabilizing effects in dollarized economies.
The fourth major contribution of the study is the empirical assessment of optimal
policies under the framework of a DSGE model for developing countries. An optimal
monetary policy is further unpackaged into three standard options. These are (i) an op-
timal Ramsey commitment rule, (ii) an optimal discretionary policy, and (iii) an ex ante
optimized Taylor-type rule. Departing from previous studies, the state-space approach is
utilized to facilitate the debate on optimal policy options. A standard ad hoc quadratic
loss function where the central bank is assumed to be concerned with both long-run dis-
tortion and short-run non-optimal fluctuations in inflation is also used in the evaluation.
Asymptotic losses are computed and compared in three scenarios of policy options for
Vietnam. Impulse responses of key variables under a supply shock and demand shock are
also analysed carefully in order not to conflate all kinds of policy options. Evidence from
the study shows that dollarization in the economy leads to important differences in the
responses to both supply-side and especially demand-side shocks. Key characteristics in
the trade-off between the variability in inflation and output are largely consistent with
those in standard New Keynesian models for non-dollarized economies. The estimation
results are in favour of the optimal Ramsey commitment policy, which could be used as
normative guidelines for the central bank’s policy decisions.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge a distinctive behaviour of macroeconomic vari-
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ables in the present DSGE model for a dollarized economy. While proponents of real
business cycle models argue that technology shocks play a key role in driving the eco-
nomic fluctuations in industrialized economies and there should be a positive correlation
between technology shocks and hours/employment, New Keynesian economists pioneered
by Galí (1999) show that with imperfect competition and sticky prices in the model, the
relationship between a technology shock and hours/employment is negative. However,
recent empirical studies, such as Cantore et al. (2014) and Cantore et al. (2017), show
that there is a significant sign variation of the response of hours worked to a positive
technology shock, which is crucially driven by a change in the magnitude of the elasticity
of capital-labour substitution.
The pattern of the impulse response of employment in the present study is largely in
line with Galí (1999). Results show a significant finding from the analytical simulation
that there is a persistent decline in employment following a positive technology shock. As
it has been widely established that labour inputs play a key role in the variation of output
and most of the rapid growth over the past few decades in many emerging economies has
been led by highly labour-intensive sectors, a negative relationship between a supply shock
and hours/employment in the present model is also considered to be responsible for the
short-run decrease of output.
5.3 A Potential Research Agenda
Having shown that the estimated model, to a large extent, fits Vietnam’s macroeconomic
data and following the broad lines of objectives set forth in the present study, a number
of key macroeconomic issues can be suggested for further research. Apart from a quanti-
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tative assessment of different choices of optimal monetary policies which has already been
analysed in the study, the first potential research question would be an investigation in
the main driving forces of output in a dollarized economy. The impact of various levels
of dollarization on output should be analysed, distinguishing developing countries from
their developed counterparts.
The second type of further investigation would involve the determinants of inflation
and the output-inflation cross-correlation. This issue has been addressed in a number of
previous studies. Nguyen et al. (2012) show that money supply and other supply-side
factors such as crude oil and rice prices present dominant elements in the inflation pro-
cess. Elgammal & Eissa (2016) find a significant relationship linking inflation and three
macro variables including past inflation, real income, and exchange rate. Moreover, past
inflation plays the most important role in explaining inflation in Vietnam. It is also found
by Nguyen & Nguyen (2010) that public expectations and memory of inflation are crucial
factors in shaping the current rate of inflation. While most of these studies use standard
econometric models, the estimated model of the present study can be an alternative and
feasible option to implement empirical validation tests, compared with results from iden-
tified VAR or VECM models in previous studies.
Third, although the DSGE setup for a dollarized economy in this study has, in gen-
eral, been shown to be an empirically plausible model for the purpose of policy analysis,
a well-developed banking sector with relevant financial frictions, which has recently been
seen to be an important feature of the state-of-the-art DSGE models, is still absent in
this model. In particular, seminal improvements in this area include, first, a financial
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accelerator by Bernanke et al. (1999), which is later developed by Gertler & Kiyotaki
(2010) in a number of respects, allowing endogenous developments in credit markets work
to amplify and propagate shocks to the macroeconomy. The second is a collateral con-
straint in the spirit of Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) where the dynamic interaction between
credit limits and asset prices plays a powerful role in the transmission mechanism by
which the effects of shocks persist, amplify, and spill over to other sectors. While these
financial frictions are embedded into a RBC framework, the DSGE model in the present
study can be extended to incorporate a financial friction either between banking sector
and firms/entrepreneurs or between households and the banking sector2.
Fourth, the policy arrangements for monetary authority in this study are basically
Taylor-type rules for the nominal interest rate. Policy recommendations are thus based
on quantitative analysis on nominal interest rate as the main policy instrument. However,
while whether low interest rates are deflationary or inflationary is still an on-going de-
bate3, a number of other instruments are considered not to be less feasible solutions and
should be taken into account in further research. The Singaporean exchange-rate-based
2Credit frictions, as proposed by Cúrdia & Woodford (2016) and Del Negro et al. (2010) is also a
possible option.
3The debate was initiated by Cochrane (2015) who supports the “neo-Fisherian” proposition that low
nominal interest rates can cause inflation to be lower. Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2014), under such a view,
also suggest that “when inflation falls below a threshold, the central bank should temporarily deviate from
the traditional Taylor rule by following a deterministic path for the nominal interest rate that reaches
the intended target for this policy instrument in finite time.” However, García-Schmidt & Woodford
(2019) in their latest publication in the American Economic Review (2019) argue that a commitment to
maintain a low nominal interest rate for longer should always be expansionary and inflationary, rather
than causing deflation.
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monetary system with the exchange rate as the key instrument for monetary policy is a
prominent example. And Malaysia is now another. Chow et al. (2014) use a DSGE-VAR
model to argue that the exchange rate rule has a comparative advantage over the Taylor-
type rule when export price shocks are the major sources of real volatility. A Taylor rule
should be preferable only if domestic productivity shocks are dominant. The exchange
rate rule is also shown to dominate Taylor rule for reducing inflation persistence. As
Vietnam is an export-oriented economy, the present DSGE model can be extended in this
dimension and then taken to independent empirical validation methods.
Fifth, Castillo (2006) finds that the combination of sticky prices and sector specific
productivity shocks makes it optimal for some firms to use a foreign currency as unit of
account and this equilibrium can be sustained by the central bank’s actively manipulating
the nominal exchange rate as a policy instrument. A certain level of dollarization in this
case to some extent can be a sustainable macroeconomic option. Therefore, given the fact
that dollarization in a broad sense is increasingly a defining characteristic of developing
economies, the discussion can be moved forward beyond the importance of this trend
quantitatively as well as theoretically to endogenize dollarization parameter and examine
the optimal level of dollarization in developing countries.
Finally, given the estimated DSGE model, it should be useful to look at important
questions for developing countries that remain unanswered such as “Is high dollarization
potentially reversible and the corresponding welfare implications?” “Does dollarization,
given the fact that domestic agents can switch currencies quickly, make a policy of lower
inflation more credible?” “How does partial dollarization compare with 100% dollarization
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(Panama or Ecuador)?” “Will dollarization be replaced or challenged by Renminbization?”
In addition, it should also be worth improving the current model by incorporating more
advanced features such as heterogeneous agents, bounded rationality, and the specifica-
tion of the steady-state growth path for developing countries4, given a possible future
slowdown after a long period of rapid growth5 or even a preclusion of the long-run steady-
state growth path unless all technical progress is labour-augmenting6, which is, as argued
by Leon-Ledesma & Satchi (2018), difficult to justify. While the first generation of DSGE
models was rooted in the rational expectations revolution and built on the representative
agent paradigm, the development of information technology and improvements in numer-
ical methods have made it possible to study rich heterogeneous agent models. These
models, once matched to micro data, are able to deliver empirically realistic results which
matter a great deal for the conduct of monetary policy, as argued by Kaplan et al. (2018)
in their latest publication in the American Economic Review.
4The loglinearization of the variables about a zero inflation steady state is a standard practice in
DSGE models. However, it could be problematic when the model is taken to developing countries’ data
with high inflation.
5As shown by Barro & Sala-í Martín (1992), there is a growth convergence in the sense that developing
countries tend to grow faster than developed countries when they are below the steady-state position.
Therefore, Vietnam’s current rapid growth would not last for ever and even slow down when public
investment share tends to be larger, as argued by Sala-í Martín et al. (2004).
6Technical progress can be incorporated into the Solow growth model by taking it as a labour-
augmenting factor. As the state of technology improves, technical progress makes each worker more
productive by augmenting their labour. In addition, as shown by Leon-Ledesma & Satchi (2018), the
steady-state growth theorem states that balanced growth requires either all technical progress to be
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Data for the Estimation
The data are quarterly and provided by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO).
They cover the period from 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q2. The U.S. output, inflation, interest rate,
and population index (LNSindex) are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Following Smets & Wouters (2007), observed variables are
scaled with a factor of 100. As the model is linearized before being taken to estimation,
the time series are constructed as follows1
• Real Output Growth.
Output = [log(GDPt)− log(GDPt−1)] ∗ 100
• Inflation.
Inflation = [log(CPIt)− log(CPIt−1)] ∗ 100
1Three stochastic trends that affect the genuity of data on the development of an economy include: (i)
price factor or inflation which will be eliminated by using real variables in the estimation; (ii) population
growth; and (iii) technological progress. The latter two factors are dealt with by modelling techniques.
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• Interest Rate.
Interest Rate = LENDRATE/4
• Real Household Consumption Growth.
Household Consumption = [log(CONHHt)− log(CONHHt−1)] ∗ 100
• Real Government Consumption Growth.
Government Consumption = [log(CONGOVt)− log(CONGOVt−1)] ∗ 100
• Real Investment Growth.
Investment = [log(INVt)− log(INVt−1)] ∗ 100
• Real Exchange Rate Growth.
RER = [log(RERt)− log(RERt−1)] ∗ 100
• Employment Growth.
Employment = [log(EMPt)− log(EMPt−1)] ∗ 100
• Real Export Growth.
Exports = [log(EXPt)− log(EXPt−1)] ∗ 100
• Real Import Growth.
Imports = [log(IMPt)− log(IMPt−1)] ∗ 100















• U.S. Inflation. Gross Domestic Product - Implicit Price Deflator (GDPDEF).






• U.S. Interest Rate. Federal Funds Rate (FFR) is measured as the averages of
daily figures, percent.


























The decision problems of firms and households as well as equilibrium conditions are de-
rived as follows1
Households











we obtain the following consumption demand function












where the consumer price index is given by
P ct =
[





1This section is adapted from Adolfson et al. (2005).
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As for investment, we know that the prices of the domestically produced investment
goods and domestically produced consumption goods are the same (Pt). By maximizing










we obtain the following investment demand function












where the aggregate investment price index is given by
P it =
[





Second, taking partial derivatives of equation 2.11 with respect to It and It−1 we have
f 31 (It, It−1) ≡
∂f 3(It, It−1)
∂It
= −f 4′(It/It−1)It/It−1 + [1− f 4(It/It−1)] (B.2)









Third, in order to maximize the intertemporal utility subject to the given constraints,


























+(1− τ kt )Rkt uj,tK̄j,t +R∗t−1f 5(at−1, ϕt−1)StB∗j,t
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(1− δ)K̄t + υt[1− f 4(It/It−1)]It + ϑt − K̄j,t+1
}
For the sake of notation simplicity, we define ψz,t ≡ εztψt = εztntPt (the Lagrangian
multiplier being scaled with εzt ) which is used in all of the first order conditions. The
first-order conditions for the household’s problem after dividing all quantities with the
























τ kt+1(Rt − 1)
]
= 0 (B.5)
Access to market ϑt:
−ψtP kt + ωt = 0 (B.6)
Capital stock k̄t+1:













































−τ kt+1St+1(R∗t f 5(at, ϕt)− 1)− τ kt+1(St+1 − St)]} = 0



































Taking first-order conditions of equation 2.26 gives us the following relationships
With respect to Hi,t : WtRwt = (1− α)λtPi,t(εzt )1−αεtKαi,tH−αi,t (B.13)























3Because of a nominal and real stochastic trend due to the permanent technology shock and the
unit-root in the price level.
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where K̄t+1 is the physical capital stock at date t + 1 and Kt+1 is the capital services
generated by the former4.
From equations B.13, B.14, and B.15 we obtain the following solution for the scaled









From equations B.13 and B.14, the equilibrium real marginal cost is given by










































The aggregate domestic price for the final good in equation 2.22 can be rewritten in
a CES form of the reoptimized price P̃t (for all firms that are allowed to reoptimize) and





1−κd (for the rest which are not allowed to reoptimize at
































4Following Adolfson et al. (2005), both variables are rendered stationary by εzt , though only the
physical capital stock K̄t+1 is a stock variable which is determined in period t, while the capital services
Kt+1 is determined in period t+ 1.
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Log-linearizing B.18 using B.19 yields the following log-linearized domestic Phillips
curve:
(π̂t − ˆ̄πt) =
β
1 + κdβ
(Etπ̂t+1 − ρπ ˆ̄πt) +
κd
1 + κdβ











From equations 2.31 and 2.32, each intermediate importing firm i faces demands for



















Using these identities in the first order condition of the importing firms’ profit opti-











































































The aggregate price indices for imported consumption and imported investment are










































Log-linearizing equation B.21 using B.23 yields the log-linearized Phillips curve for
imported-consumption firms





















t + ŝt − p̂
m,c
t
Log-linearizing equation B.22 using B.24 yields the log-linearized Phillips curve for
imported-investment firms





















t + ŝt − p̂
m,i
t








where Xt is the demand for final export good and Xi,t is demand of individual intermedi-
ate exporting firms. λxt denotes a stochastic/time-varying markup on the exported goods.
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The log-linearized first-order condition of the optimization problem implies the aggre-
gate export Phillips curve of the same form



















m̂cxt = p̂t + ŝt − p̂xt
In general, there are thus four specific Phillips curve relations determining inflation in
the domestic, imported-consumption, imported-investment, and export sectors. In case
of price dollarization, the domestic Phillips curve will be a weighted combination of the
Phillips curves for firms setting their prices in domestic currency and those setting their
prices in USD.
Identities of the Open Economy
There are basically two different types of relative prices for an open economy. In
the internal sector, the domestic households care about relative prices between imported











































where Pt denotes price for the domestic final good. As the final good can be con-
sumed or invested by the households, Pt is taken as both the domestic consumption
price and the domestic investment price. P ct and P it are aggregate consumption and
aggregate investment prices, respectively, which are indices of domestic/imported con-
sumption/investment prices.
In the external sector, foreign households and exporting firms take into account relative
































So, the deviations from the law of one price for imported consumption/investment





































From equation 2.46, replace the formula for P ct given by
P ct =
[















































The nominal deficit is defined as the difference between non-interest government rev-


















(Rt−1 − 1)(Mt −Qt) +Rkt utK̄t + [R∗t−1f 5(at−1, ϕt−1)− 1]StB∗t + πt
}
However, for the sake of simplicity, following De Castro et al. (2011), we assume that
total taxes are a time-varying proportion of nominal GDP of the form
TAXnt = Tt(PtYt)















t = PtYt(Tt − Ωt)
If we assume that government deficit is financed only by domestic debt, the budget







where Bt is the level of debt.
Dividing the above equation by current nominal GDP using the above identity for Gnt ,











From equations 2.6, 2.9, 2.41, and 2.42 we substitute all disaggregated variables of the


























t − εztφ− f(ut)K̄t (B.34)
Assuming that world output is just composed of consumption and investment, Y ∗t =
C∗t + I
∗
t , the stationarized version of the goods market clearing condition after scaling Y ∗t
































In the foreign bonds market, we divide both sides of the equilibrium condition given



































where ε̃z∗t = εz∗t /εzt 5.













where mt = Mt/Pt−1εzt−1.
Partial Dollarization































5The fraction ε̃z∗t = εz∗t /εzt can be taken as a shock measuring the asymmetric level of technological




By logging both sides of the equation in the non-linear setup and using Taylor expan-
sions about the steady state, we can derive the corresponding linear one which is also the
deviation of the variable around its steady state. The hat variables in the log-linearized
equations are the deviations from their steady states1. Log-linearized equations include2:
Households
Log-linearized law of motion for capital given by 2.123
ˆ̄kt+1 = (1− δ)
1
µz
ˆ̄kt − (1− δ)
1
µz
µ̂z,t + [1− (1− δ)
1
µz




Log-linearized real wage equation from the optimization problem with respect to real
wage given by equation B.12
1This section is adapted from Adolfson et al. (2005).










) = logXt − logX
where log(1 +X) = X if X is small. Thus, a constant c has the identity ĉ = log(1 + c−cc ) = log 1 = 0
3Note that ϑt = 0 for all t in equilibrium.
260








[λwσh − (1− λw)]
[(1− βξw)(1− ξw)]
βξwŵt+1 −




[λwσh − (1− λw)]
[(1− βξw)(1− ξw)]
βξw(π̂t+1 − ρπ ˆ̄π) +




wσh − (1− λw)]
[(1− βξw)(1− ξw)]




τ̂ yt − (1− λw)
τw
(1 + τw)
τ̂wt − (1− λw)ε̂ht = 0
Log-linearized Euler equation from the optimizing with respect to consumption given
by B.4
−bβµz ĉt+1 + (µ2z + b2β)ĉt − bµz ĉt−1 + bµz(µ̂z,t − βµ̂z,t+1) + (µz − bβ))(µz − b)ψ̂z,t
+
τ c
1 + τ c
(µz − bβ)(µz − b)τ̂ ct + (µz − bβ)(µz − b)χ̂
c,d
t − (µz − b)(µz ξ̂ct − bβξ̂ct+1) = 0 (C.2)
Log-linearized equation from the optimizing with respect to total assets given by B.5
−µψ̂z,t + µψ̂z,t+1 − µµ̂z,t+1 + (µ− βτ k)R̂t − µπ̂t+1 +
τ k
1− τ k
(β − µ)τ̂ kt+1 = 0 (C.3)












µz − β(1− δ)
µz
τ̂ kk+1 = 0
(C.4)
Log-linearized equation from the optimizing with respect to investment given by B.8




t − µ2zζ[(̂it − ît−1 − β(̂it+1 − ît) + µ̂z,t − βµ̂z,t+1] = 0 (C.5)











4We know that the utilization cost function a(ut) is assumed to satisfy f(1) = 0, f ′(u) = (1 − τk)rk
at steady state value u = 1.
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where, as argued by Altig et al. (2011), 1
σa
is taken as the elasticity of capital utilization
rate to the rental rate of capital. A smaller value of σa corresponds to a larger elasticity.















Log-linearized aggregate employment equation is given by log-linearizing the first order
condition of the optimization problem 2.20, using the log-linearized employment aggrega-
tor. This can be taken as an auxiliary equation that links Ψ̂t with Ĥt:
∆Ψ̂t = βEt∆Ψ̂t+1 +
(1− ξe)(1− βξe)
ξe
(Ĥt − Ψ̂t) (C.8)
where Ψ̂t = (Ψ̃t − Ψ̃)/Ψ̃ and Ψ̂t = Ĥt if ξe = 0.
Firms
The Domestic Phillips curve or the aggregate supply curve for domestic firms takes
the form
(π̂t − ˆ̄πt) =
β
1 + κdβ
(Etπ̂t+1 − ρπ ˆ̄πt) +
κd
1 + κdβ










Key related identities of domestic firms include the real rental rate of capital (from
equation B.16)
r̂kt = µ̂z,t + ŵt + R̂
w
t + Ĥt − k̂t (C.10)
Real marginal costs for intermediate good firms (from equation B.17)
m̂ct = αr̂
k
t + (1− α)(ŵt + R̂wt )− ε̂t (C.11)
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or
m̂ct = α(µ̂z,t + Ĥt − k̂t) + ŵt + R̂wt − ε̂t (C.12)




νR + 1− ν
R̂t−1 +
ν(R− 1)
νR + 1− ν
ν̂t (C.13)
The Phillips curves for the consumption-importing firms and investment-importing
firms




































where the corresponding marginal costs are given by log-linearized versions of equations
B.29 and B.30










The Phillips curve for exporting firms















































The log-linearized version of this equation is
m̂cxt = m̂c
x
t−1 + π̂t − π̂xt −∆Ŝt (C.19)
General Equilibrium



























(k̂t − ˆ̄kt) (C.20)
Log-linearized law of motion for net foreign assets, given by B.36




∗ ˆ̃z∗t + (c
m + im)χ̂ft − cm[−ηc(1−ωc)(χc,d)−(1−ηc)χ̂
c,d
t + ĉt]




Log-linearized version of the loan market condition, given by 2.53
νwH(ν̂t + ŵt + Ĥt) =
µm
πµz
(µ̂t + m̂t − π̂t − µ̂z,t)− qq̂t (C.22)
where the log-linearized relationship between money growth and real balances given by
B.37 is
µ̂t − m̂t+1 − µ̂z,t − π̂t + m̂t = 0 (C.23)
Foreign Economy
Output


















Identities of the Open Economy


































The uncovered interest rate parity
R̂t − R̂∗t = Et∆Ŝt+1 − Λaât + ϕ̂t (C.27)
Government
The fiscal rule is given by
Ĝt = φGĜt−1 + (1− φG)(φΩΩ̂t−1 − φBB̂rt ) + zGt (C.28)
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The law of motion for government debt
B̂rt = R[B̂
r
t−1 + Ĝt −Br(ŷt − ŷt−1 + π̂t − µ̂z)] +BrR̂t (C.29)
Monetary Rule
R̂t = ρRR̂t−1 + (1− ρR)[ˆ̄πt + θπ(π̂ct − ˆ̄πt) + θyŷt] + zRt (C.30)
Partial Dollarization
The log-linearized versions of the real marginal costs and relative prices in equations
2.54, 2.55, B.38, and B.39 are given by
m̂cDt = m̂ct − t̂Dt






êt = êt−1 + π̂
D
t − π̂USDt −∆Ŝt
The Phillips curve for the firms that set prices in domestic currency


















The Phillips curve for the firms that set prices in USD


















The domestic Phillips curve in case of partial dollarization
π̂t = (1− δpd)π̂Dt + δpd(π̂USDt + ∆Ŝt) (C.33)
266
where 0 < δpd < 1 is the degree of preference for USD.
Measurement Equations in Special Cases
First, the relationship between steady states of the original and adjusted original

















%1 = (1− ωc)(χc,d)ηc + ωc(χmc,c)−ηc
Equation 3.18 is log-linearized as follows


























%2,t = (1− ωc)(χc,d)ηc(1 + ηcχ̂c,dt ) + ωc(χmc,c)−ηc(1− ηcχ̂
mc,c
t )





or the link between the log-linearized original variables and the log-linearized adjusted
original variables is given by
ˆ̃ct = ĉt +
%2,t − %1
%1
In order to facilitate the estimation of the model, it is assumed that the differences
of relative inflation rates are negligible and can be accounted for by measurement errors.
The measurement equation for consumption is, therefore, defined by
cobst = log(C
data
t )− log(Cdatat−1 )
= log(C̃t)− log(C̃t−1)














= ĉt − ĉt−1 + µ̂z,t (C.36)
Second, the same observations apply to investment which leads to the measurement
equation for investment as follows
iobst = ît − ît−1 + µ̂z,t (C.37)



















Log-linearizing both sides to get
M̃(1 + ˆ̃mt) = ωc(χ
mc,c)−ηcC(1− ηcχ̂mc,ct + ĉt) + ωi(χmi,i)−ηcI(1− ηiχ̂
mi,i
t + ît)
A simplified version of the equation is given by
%3(1 + ˆ̃mt) = %4ĉt + %5ît + %6,t
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where the steady state of imports is defined as














%4ĉt + %5ît + %6,t − %3
%3
As argued above, the measurement equation for imports is specified as
mobst = ˆ̃mt − ˆ̃mt−1 + µ̂z,t
=
(












(ĉt − ĉt−1) +
%5
%3
(̂it − ît−1) + µ̂z,t (C.38)
Finally, exports are taken as








Log-linearize this equation to get
X̃(1 + ˆ̃xt) = (χ
x,∗)−ηfY ∗(1− ηf χ̂x,∗t + ŷ∗t )
where the steady state position is given by
X̃ = (χx,∗)−ηfY ∗
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Then,
(χx,∗)−ηfY ∗(1 + ˆ̃xt) = (χ
x,∗)−ηfY ∗(1− ηf χ̂x,∗t + ŷ∗t )
ˆ̃xt = ŷ
∗
t − ηf χ̂
x,∗
t
As argued above, the measurement equation for exports is given by
xobst = ˆ̃xt − ˆ̃xt−1 + µ̂z,t
= (ŷ∗t − ηf χ̂
x,∗
t )− (ŷ∗t−1 − ηf χ̂
x,∗
t−1) + µ̂z,t




The following lemmas are needed to evaluate the likelihood of the data given the param-
eter p(Y ∗,T |θ):
Lemma 1: Given the decision rule 3.6, we can compute the density of the model
variables given state variables
p(yt|yt−1, θ) (D.1)
Lemma 2: From the measurement equation 3.7, we can compute the density of the
observables given model variables
p(y∗t |yt, θ) (D.2)
Lemma 3: By definition of conditional probability
p(y∗1, y1) = p(y
∗
1|y1)p(y1)
However, because y∗1 ∈ y1, then we have






And if we add in the known θ in both sides, the equation remains the same
p(y∗1|θ) = p(y∗1|y1, θ)p(y1|θ) (D.3)
Lemma 4:












Finally, adding θ to both sides, we have
p(yt|Y ∗,t, θ) =
p(y∗t |yt, θ)p(yt|Y ∗,t−1, θ)
p(y∗t |Y ∗,t−1, θ)
(D.4)
where p(y∗t |yt, θ) is identified by Lemma 2, (yt|Y ∗,t−1, θ) is identified by the Chapman-
Kolmogorov equation from the latest round of forecasting.
Applying Lemma 3 for all observations up to t, the conditional likelihood in the de-
nominator is also identified by an integral of
p(y∗t |Y ∗,t−1, θ) =
∫
p(y∗t |yt, θ)p(yt|Y ∗,t−1, θ)dyt (D.5)
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